

A
DEMONSTRATION
OF THE
Being and Attributes
OF
G O D:

More Particularly in Answer to
Mr. H O B B S, S P I N O Z A,
And their Followers :

Wherein the Notion of *LIBERTY* is Stated,
and the Possibility and Certainty of it Pro-
ved, in Opposition to *Necessity* and *Fate*.

Being the Substance of Eight S E R M O N S
Preach'd at the Cathedral-Church of St. Paul,
in the Year 1704. at the Lecture Founded by
the Honourable ROBERT BOTLE Esq;

S. Clarke (57)

By Samuel Clark, M. A. Chaplain to the Right
Reverend Father in God JOHN, Lord Bi-
shop of Norwich.

The Second Edition, Corrected.

Rom. 1. 20. *For the Invisible things of Him from the Creation
of the World are clearly seen, being understood by the things
that are made; even his Eternal Power and God-head: So
that they are without excuse.*

London, Printed by Will. Bodham, for James Knapton,
at the Crown in St. Paul's Church-Yard. 1706.



T O T H E

Most Reverend Father in God

T H O M A S

Lord Archbishop of *Canterbury* ;
and Primate of all *England* :

Sir *HENRY ASHURST*,
Baronet ;

Sir *JOHN ROTHERAM*, Knight,
Serjeant at Law ;

JOHN EVELIN, Esquire ;

Trustees appointed by the Ho-
nourable *ROBERT BOYLE*,
Esquire.

This Discourse is humbly
Dedicated.

TO THE

Most Reverend Father in God

THOMAS

Lord Archbishop of Canterbury
and Primate of all England;

SIR HENRY ASHURST,
Barrister;

SIR JOHN KOTHELM, Knight,
Sergeant at Law;

JOHN EVELIN, Esquire;

Trustees appointed by the Ho-
nourable ROBERT BOYLE,
Esquire.

This Discourse is humbly
Dedicated.

A 2

THE PREFACE.

THere being already published many and good Books, to prove the Being and Attributes of God; I have chosen to contract, what was requisite for me to say upon this Subject, into as narrow a Compass; and to express what I had to offer, in as few Words as I could with Perspicuity. For which Reason I have also confined my self to One only Method or continued Thread of Arguing, which I have endeavoured should be as near to Mathematical as the Nature of
A 3 such

The PREFACE.

such a Discourse would allow : Omitting some other Arguments, which I could not discern to be so evidently conclusive : Because it seems not to be at any time for the real Advantage of Truth, to use Arguments in its behalf, founded only on such Hypotheses, as the Adversaries apprehend they cannot be compelled to grant. Yet I have not made it my business, to oppose any of those Arguments ; because I think it is not the best way for any One to recommend his own Performance by endeavouring to discover the Imperfections of Others, who are engaged in the same Design with himself, of promoting the Interest of true Religion and Virtue. But every Man ought to use such Arguments only, as appear to Him to be clear and strong, and the Readers must judge whether they truly prove the Conclusion.

T H E

THE CONTENTS.

THE Introduction concerning the
Causes of Atheism. Page I

PROP. I. That Something has ex-
isted from Eternity. p. 14

*Of the Difficulty of Conceiving Eter-
nity.* 15

*That Difficulties of Apprehension on
the one side, ought not to be opposed
to evident Demonstration on the
other : as in our Conceptions of E-
ternity, Infinity, of the Divisibili-
ty of Quantity, &c.* 16

Prop. II. That there has existed from
Eternity some one Immutable and
Independent Being. p. 19

*Of the Absolute Impossibility of an
Eternal Succession of Dependent
Beings, existing without any Original*
A 4

The Contents.

nal Independent Cause at all. 20

Prop. III. *That That Immutable and Independent Being, which has existed from Eternity, without any External Cause of its Existence, must be Self-existent, that is, Necessarily-Existing.* p. 23

*Of the true Idea of Self-Existence :
That it is the Idea of a Being, the
Supposition of whose Non-Existence
is an express Contradiction* 26

*That every Man may be more certain
of the Being of a Supreme Independent
Cause, than he can be of any
thing else besides his own Existence.*

29
*Of the Idea of God including Self-
Existence.* 31

*That the Material World cannot
possibly be the First, Original and
Independent Being.* 34

*The Form of the World not Necessa-
ry.* 36

Nor the Motion. 37

*Mr. Toland's pernicious Opinion of
Motion being essential to Matter,
confuted.* 38

The

The Contents.

The Matter of the World not Necessarily-existing. 39

A Confutation of Spinoza's Opinion concerning one only Substance. 41

Concerning the Eternity of the World; And that the Opinion of the best Antient Philosophers in that Matter, did not at all favour the Sentiments of our Modern Atheists. 46

Prop. IV. What the Substance or Essence of that Being, which is Self-Existent or Necessarily-Existing, is ; we have no Idea, neither is it at all possible for us to comprehend it. p. 59

Of Infinite Space. 62

Of the Vanity of explaining things by such School-Terms, as have really no Signification at all. 64

Prop. V. That though the Substance or Essence of the Self-Existent Being, is it self absolutely incomprehensible to us : Yet many of the Essential Attributes of his Nature are strictly Demonstrable, as well as his Existence. *As in the First Place,*

The Contents.

*Place, that He must of Necessity
be Eternal.* p. 64

*Of the manner of our Conceiving the
Eternity of God, with respect to
Succession.* 66, 67

Prop. VI. *That the Self-Existent Be-
ing, must of Necessity be Infinite
and Omnipresent.* p. 69

*Of the Simplicity, Unchangeableness,
Incorruptibility, &c. of his Nature.* 71

*Of the Manner of our Conceiving the
Immensity of God.* 72

Prop. VII. *That the Self-Existent Be-
ing must of Necessity be but One.* p. 74

*Of the Trinity of Persons, in Unity
of Nature.* 75

*Of the Absolute Impossibility of two
different Self-Existent Independent
Principles, such as God and Mat-
ter.* 76

The

The Contents.

*The Error of Spinoza, concerning
One Uniform Substance.* 76

Prop. VIII. *That the Self-Existent
and Original Cause of all Things,
must be an Intelligent Being.* p. 80

*This, the main Question between us
and the Atheists.* ibid.

Not easily proved a priori. 81

*But demonstrably proved a postero-
ri, from the Variety and Degrees of
Perfection in Things, and the Or-
der of Causes and Effects.* 82

*From the Intelligence that Created
Beings are confessedly indued with.*
84

*That, if Intelligence be a real di-
stinct Quality or Perfection; and
not a mere Effect or Composition of
Unintelligent Figure and Motion;
then Beings indued with Intelli-
gence, can never possibly have arisen
purely out of that which it self had
no such Perfection.* 86

*That Intelligence is such a real di-
stinct Perfection; and not possible
to be a mere Effect or Composition
of*

The Contents.

of Unintelligent Figure and Motion. 90

Mr. Hobbs forced to recur to that prodigiously absurd Opinion, that all Matter, as Matter, is endued with Thought. 93

The Proposition demonstrated further, from the Beauty, Order and Final Causes of Things. ibid.

From the Original of Motion. 96

That the Material World cannot possibly have been Self-Existent. 99

Prop. IX. *That the Self-Existent and Original Cause of all Things, is not a Necessary Agent, but a Being indued with Liberty and Choice.* p. 100

This Proposition a Necessary Consequence of the foregoing. ibid

Proved further, from the Arbitrary Disposition of Things in the World; with a full Answer to Spinoza's Arguments for the Necessity of all Things. 103

Also from Final Causes. 111

And from the Finiteness of Created Beings. 112

And

The Contents.

And from the Impossibility of an Infinite Succession of Causes. 113

That Liberty is not in it self an impossible and contradictory Notion. 117

Prop. X. *That the Self-Existent Being, the Supreme Cause of all Things, must of Necessity have Infinite Power.* p. 119

Of working Contradictions, and Natural or Moral Evils. 122

Of the Power of Creating Matter. 123

Of the Power of Creating Immaterial Cogitative Substances, and those indu'd with Liberty of Will or Choice. 126

Of the Immateriality of Humane Souls. 130

That the Power of Perception is not confined to Bodily Senses. 132

Of the Possibility of communicating to a Creature the Power of beginning Motion. 135

Of the Possibility of induing a Creature with Freedom of Will. 141

An Answer to Spinoza's and Mr. Hobbs's

The Contents.

Hobbs's Arguments against the Possibility of Liberty.	143
That there must be somewhere a Beginning of Operation.	144
That Thinking and Willing, neither are, nor can possibly be, Qualities or Affections of Matter.	148
That, supposing they were Affections of Matter, yet even that most absurd Supposition would not at all affect the Question about the Possibility of Liberty.	157
A shameful Fallacy of Mr. Hobbs and his Followers arguing; who, when they would prove the Soul to be mere Matter, then they suppose Matter to be a Substance capable, not only of Figure and Motion, but also of other unknown Properties: And when they would prove the Will and all other Operations of the Soul to be Necessary, then they devest Matter of all its Unknown Properties, and make it Mere Solidity indued only with Figure and Motion again.	158
Of the Necessity of the Will's being determined by the last Judgment of the Understanding.	162
Of	

The Contents.

*Of the Certainty of Divine Fore-
knowledge, not repugnant to the
Liberty of Mens Actions.* 165

Of the Original of Evil. 171

Prop. XI. *That the Supreme Cause
and Author of all things, must of
Necessity be Infinitely Wise.* p. 174

Proved a Priori. 175

*And a Posteriori, from the Wisdom
and Perfection of the Works of God,
evidenced more illustriously in the
late Discoveries in Astronomy and
Natural Philosophy.* 177

Prop. XII. *That the Supreme Cause
and Author of all Things, must
of Necessity be a Being of Infinite
Goodness, Justice and Truth, and
all other Moral Perfections ; such
as become the Supreme Gover-
nour and Judge of the World.*
p. 183

Of Providence. 189

*The Necessity of God's Moral Attri-
butes, consistent with perfect Liber-
ty.* 190

Of

The Contents.

<i>Of the Necessity of God's doing al- ways what is Best and Fittest in the whole.</i>	194
<i>Of the Impossibility of his doing E- vil.</i>	196
<i>That Liberty is not in it self an Im- perfection, but a Perfection.</i>	197
<i>Of the highest moral Perfection of Rational Creatures, not excluding Natural Liberty.</i>	199
<i>That the Grounds of all Moral Obli- gations are Eternal and Necessary, and depend not on any Laws.</i>	200

<i>The Conclusion.</i>	202
------------------------	-----

ERRATA.

Pag.	Line	Read.
2	20	vitious and
9	10	their
43	1	Locis
48	22	long
85	1	can be any
93	ult.	Order
95	3	I think it is
111	28	illuminandum, mare
136	19	Thing. I add; As
141	12	Cause, (as
147	10	possibly
150	11	Motus
151	22	to Blueness.
176	15	all their
182	15	later
188	10	ἀλνδῆς
204	19	reduced

A
 DEMONSTRATION
 OF THE
 Being and Attributes
 OF
 GOD:

More particularly in Answer to
 Mr *Hobbs*, *Spinoza*, and their
 Followers.

ALL those who either are or *The Intro-*
 pretend to be *Atheists*; who *duction.*
 either disbelieve the Being
 of God, or would be thought to do
 so; or, which is all one, who deny
 the Principal Attributes of the Di-
 vine Nature, and suppose God to be
 an Unintelligent Being, which acts
 B merely

A Demonstration of the

merely by Necessity ; that is, which, in any tolerable Propriety of Speech, acts not at all, but is only acted upon : All Men that are *Atheists*, I say, in this Sense, must be so upon one or other of these three Accounts.

*Atheism arises from
stupid Ignorance :*

Either, *First*, because being extremely ignorant and stupid, they have never duly considered any thing at all ; nor made any just use of their natural Reason, to discover even the plainest and most obvious Truths ; but have spent their time in a manner of Life very little Superiour to that of Beasts.

*Or from
gross Corruption of
Manners :*

Or, *Secondly*, because being totally debauched and corrupted in their Practice, they have, by a vicious degenerate Life, corrupted the Principles of their Nature, and defaced the Reason of their own Minds ; and instead of fairly and impartially enquiring into the Rules and Obligations of Nature, and the Reason and Fitness of Things, have accustomed themselves only to mock and scoff at Religion ; and being under the Power of Evil Habits,
and

Being and Attributes of God. 3

and the Slavery of Unreasonable and Indulged Lusts, are resolved not to hearken to any Reasoning which would oblige them to forsake their beloved Vices.

Or, *Thirdly*, because in the way of Speculative Reasoning, and upon the Principles of Philosophy, they pretend that the Arguments used against the Being or Attributes of God, seem to them, after the strictest and fullest inquiry, to be more strong and conclusive, than those by which we endeavour to prove these great Truths. *Or from false Philosophy.*

These seem the only Causes that can be imagined, of any Man's disbelieving the Being or Attributes of God; and no Man can be supposed to be an Atheist, but upon one or other of these three Accounts. Now to the two former of these three sorts of Men; namely, to such as are wholly ignorant and stupid, or to such as through habitual Debauchery have brought themselves to a Custom of mocking and scoffing at all Religion, and will not hearken to any fair Reasoning; it is not my

present Business to apply my self. The One of these wants to be instructed in the first Principles of *Reason*, as well as of *Religion* : The Other disbelieves only for a present false *Interest*, and because he is desirous that the Thing should not be true. The One has *not yet arrived* to the use of his natural Faculties : The other has *renounced* them, and declares he will not be argued with, as a rational Creature. 'Tis therefore the third sort of Atheists only, namely those who in the Way of Speculative Reasoning, and upon the Principles of Philosophy, pretend that the Arguments brought against the Being or Attributes of God, do, upon the strictest and fullest Examination, appear to them to be more strong and conclusive, than those by which these great Truths are attempted to be proved ; These, I say, are the only Atheistical Persons, to whom my present Discourse can be supposed to be directed, or indeed who are capable of being reasoned with at all.

Now

Being and Attributes of God. 5

Now before I enter upon the main Argument, I shall premise several Concessions, which these Men, upon their own Principles, are unavoidably obliged to make.

And, *First*, they must of necessity own, that supposing it cannot be proved to be true, yet at least 'tis a thing very desirable, and which any wise Man would wish to be true, for the great Benefit and Happiness of Men; that there was a God, an Intelligent and Wise, a Just and Good Being, to govern the World. Whatever Hypothesis these Men can possibly frame; whatever Argument they can invent, by which they would exclude God and Providence out of the World; That very Argument or Hypothesis will of necessity lead them to this Concession. If they argue, that our Notion of God arises not from Nature and Reason, but from the Art and Contrivance of Politicians; that Argument it self forces them to confess, that 'tis manifestly for the Interest of Humane Society, that it should be believed there is a God. If they

The Being of God very desirable.

A Demonstration of the

suppose that the World was made by Chance, and is every Moment sub'ect to be destroyed by Chance again ; no Man can be so absurd as to contend, that 'tis as comfortable and desirable to live in such an

* Maria ac Terras Cælumq;
Una dies dabit exitio, mul-
tosq; per annos
Sustentata ruet moles & ma-
china Mundi.

— Dictis dabit ipsa fidem
res

Forſitan, & graviter terra-
rum motibus orbis

Omnia conquaſſari in parvo
tempore cernes.

Lucret. Lib. 5.

uncertain State of things, and * so continually li-
able to Ruin, without
any Hope of Renovati-
on ; as in a World that
were under the Preser-
vation and Conduct of
a Powerful, Wise and
Good God. If they
argue against the Being

of God, from the Faults and De-
fects which they imagine they can
find in the Frame and Constitution
of the *Visible* and *Material* World ;
this Supposition obliges them to ac-
knowledge, that it would have been
better the World had been made by
an Intelligent and Wise Being, who
might have prevented all Faults and
Imperfections. If they argue against
Providence, from the Faultiness and
Inequality which they think they
discover in the Management of the

Moral

Being and Attributes of God. 7

Moral World ; this is a plain Confession, that 'tis a thing more fit and desirable in it self, that the World should be governed by a Just and Good Being, than by mere Chance or Unintelligent Necessity. Lastly, If they suppose the World to be eternally and necessarily Self-Existent, and consequently that every thing in it is established by a Blind and Eternal Fatality ; No rational Man can at the same time deny, but that Liberty and Choice, or a Free Power of Acting, is a more eligible State, than to be determined thus in all our Actions, as a Stone is to move downward, by an absolute and inevitable Fate. In a word, which way soever they turn themselves, and whatever Hypothesis they make, concerning the Original and Frame of things ; Nothing is so certain and undeniable, as that *Man*, considered without the Protection and Conduct of a Superiour Being, is in a far worse Case, than upon Supposition of the Being and Government of God, and of Mens being under his peculiar Conduct,

A Demonstration of the

* Archb.
Tillotson's
Sermon on
Job 28.
28.

Protection and Favour. Man of himself is infinitely insufficient for his own Happiness : * He is liable to many Evils and Miseries, which he can neither prevent nor redress : He is full of Wants which he cannot supply, and compassed about with Infirmities which he cannot remove, and obnoxious to Dangers which he can never sufficiently provide against : He is secure of nothing that he enjoys in this World, and uncertain of every thing that he hopes for : He is apt to grieve for what he cannot help, and eagerly to desire what he is never likely to obtain, &c. Under which evil Circumstances 'tis manifest there can be no sufficient Support, but in the Belief of a Wise and Good God, and in the Hopes which true Religion affords. Whether therefore the Being and Attributes of God can be demonstrated or not ; it must at least be confessed by all rational and wise Men, to be a thing very Desirable, and which they would heartily Wish to be true, that there were a God, an Intelligent and Wise, a Just and Good Being, to Govern the World. Now

Being and Attributes of God. 9

Now the use I desire to make of this Concession, is only this: That since the Men I am arguing with, are unavoidably obliged to confess, that 'tis a thing very desirable at least, that there should be a God; they must of necessity, upon their own Principles, be very willing, nay, desirous above all things, to be convinced that thier present Opinion is an Errour, and sincerely hope that the contrary may be demonstrated to them to be true; and consequently they are bound with all seriousness, attention and impartiality, to consider the weight of the Arguments, by which the Being and Attributes of God may be proved to them.

Secondly, All such Persons as I am speaking of, who profess themselves to be Atheists, not upon any present Interest or Lust, but purely upon the Principles of Reason and Philosophy; are bound by these Principles to acknowledge, that all mocking and scoffing at Religion, all jesting and turning Arguments of Reason into Drollery and Ridicule,

Scoffing at Religion, inexcusable.

cule, is the most unmanly and unreasonable thing in the World ; And consequently they are obliged to exclude out of their Number, as Irrational and Selfcondemned Persons, and unworthy to be argued with, all such Scoffers at Religion, who deride at a venture, without hearing Reason ; and will not use the Means, of being convinced and satisfied. Hearing the Reason of the Case with Patience and Unprejudicedness, is an Equity which Men owe to every Truth that can in any manner concern them ; and which is necessary to the Discovery of every Kind of Error : How much more in things of the utmost Importance !

*Virtue and
good Man-
ners abso-
lutely ne-
cessary.*

Thirdly, Since the Persons I am discoursing to, cannot but own, that the Supposition of the Being of God, is in it self most desirable, and for the benefit of the World, that it should be true ; They must of Necessity grant further, that supposing the Being and Attributes of God, to be things not indeed Demonstrable to be true, but only
Possible,

Being and Attributes of God. 11

Possible, and such as cannot be demonstrated to be false ; as most certainly they cannot : And much more, supposing them once made to appear *Probable*, and but more likely to be true, than the contrary Opinion : Nothing is more evident, even upon these Suppositions only, than that Men ought in all Reason to live piously and virtuously in the World ; and that Vice and Immorality are, upon all Accounts, and under all Hypotheses, the most absurd and inexcusable Things in Nature.

Thus much being premised, which no Atheist who pretends to be a rational and fair Inquirer into Things, can possibly avoid granting ; (and other Atheists, I have before said, are not to be disputed with at all ; as being Enemies to *Reason*, no less than to *Religion*, and therefore absolutely Self-condemned :) I proceed now to the main Thing I at first proposed ; namely, to endeavour to show, to such considering Persons as I have already described, that the Being and Attributes of
God

God, are not only possible or barely probable in themselves, but also strictly demonstrable to any unprejudiced Mind, from the most uncontestable Principles of right Reason.

And here, because the Persons I am at present dealing with, must be supposed not to believe any Revelation, nor acknowledge any Authority which they will submit to, but only the bare force of Reasoning : I shall not, at this time, draw any Testimony from Scripture, nor make use of any sort of Authorities, nor lay any stress upon any popular Arguments in the Matter before us ; but confine my self to the Rules of strict and demonstrative Argumentation.

Now many Arguments there are, by which the Being and Attributes of God have been undertaken to be *Demonstrated* : And perhaps most of those Arguments, if thoroughly understood, rightly stated, fully pursued, and duly separated from the false or uncertain Reasonings, which have sometimes been intermix'd with them,

Being and Attributes of God. 13

them, would at length appear to be substantial and conclusive. But because I would endeavour, as far as possible, to avoid all manner of perplexity and confusion; therefore I shall not at this Time use any Variety of Arguments, but endeavour by One clear and plain Series of Propositions necessarily connected and following one from another, to demonstrate the Certainty of the Being of God, and to deduce in order the Necessary Attributes of his Nature, so far as by our Finite Reason we are enabled to discover and apprehend them: And because it is not to my present purpose to explain or illustrate things to Them that Believe, but only to convince Unbelievers, and settle them that Doubt, by strict and undeniable Reasoning; therefore I shall not alledge any thing, which however really true and useful, may yet be liable to contradiction or dispute; but shall endeavour to urge such Propositions only, as cannot be denied without departing from that Reason, which all Atheists pretend to be the
Foun^d

Foundation of their Unbelief. Only it is absolutely Necessary before all Things, that they consent to lay aside all manner of Prejudices ; and especially such, as have been apt to arise from the too frequent Use of *Terms of Art*, which have no *Idea's* belonging to them ; and from the common receiving certain *Maxims of Philosophy* as true, which at the Bottom seem to be only *Propositions without any Meaning or Signification at all.*

*Something
must have
Existed
from Eter-
nity.*

I. First then, it is Absolutely and Undeniably certain, that *Something has existed from all Eternity.* This is so evident and undeniable a Proposition, that no Atheist in any Age has ever presumed to assert the contrary ; and therefore there is little need of being particular in the Proof of it. For since Something Now Is ; 'tis manifest that Something always Was : Otherwise the Things that Now Are, must have risen out of Nothing, absolutely and without Cause : Which is a flat Contradiction
in

Being and Attributes of God. 15

in Terms. For to say a Thing is produced, and yet that there is no Cause at all of that Production, is to say that Something is *Effected* when it is *Effected by Nothing*, that is, at the same time when it is *not Effected at all*. Whatever Exists, has a Cause of its Existence, either in the Necessity of its own Nature; and then it must have been of itself Eternal: Or in the Will of some other Being; and then that Other Being must, at least in the Order of Nature and Causality, have Existed before it.

That *Something* therefore *has really* of the Diff.
Existed from Eternity, is one of ^{faculty of} the certainest and most evident ^{Conceiving} Truths in the World; acknowledged by all Men, and disputed by none. Yet as to the *Manner* How it can be; there is nothing in Nature more difficult for the Mind of Man to conceive, than this very first Plain and Self-evident Truth. For, *How any thing can have existed eternally*; that is, *How an Eternal Duration can Now be actually Past*, is a thing utterly as impossible for our narrow Under-

Understandings to comprehend, as any thing that is not an express Contradiction *in Terms*, can be imagined to be: And yet to deny the Truth of the Proposition, that *an Eternal Duration is now actually past*; would be to assert *something still far more Unintelligible*.

Difficulties arising merely from the Nature of Eternity, not to be regarded, because equal in all Suppositions.

The use I would make of this Observation is This. That since in all Questions concerning the Nature and Perfections of God, or concerning any Thing to which the Idea of Eternity or Infinity is joined; tho' we can indeed Demonstrate certain Propositions to be true; yet it is impossible for us to comprehend or frame any adæquate or complete Ideas of the *Manner How* the Things so demonstrated can Be: Therefore when once any Proposition is clearly Demonstrated to be true; it ought not to disturb us, that there be perhaps perplexing Objections on the other side, which for want of adæquate Ideas of the Manner of the Existence of the Things demonstrated, are not easy to be answered. Indeed, were it possible there

Being and Attributes of God. 17

there should be any Proposition which could equally be *Demonstrated* on both sides of the Question, or which could on both sides be *reduced to imply a Contradiction*. ; This it must be confessed, would alter the Case : Upon this absurd Supposition, all Difference of True and False, all Thinking and Reasoning, and the use of all our Faculties, would be entirely at an end. But when to Demonstration on the one side, there are opposed on the other, only Objections raised from our want of having adæquate Ideas of the Things themselves ; this ought not to be esteemed a Real Difficulty. 'Tis directly and clearly Demonstrable, that Something has been from Eternity : All the Objections therefore raised against the Eternity of any thing, grounded merely on our want of having an adæquate Idea of Eternity ; ought to be looked upon as of no real Solidity. Thus in other the like Instances : 'Tis Demonstrable, for Example, that Something must be actually Infinite : All the Metaphysical

C cal

cal Difficulties therefore, which arise usually from applying the Measures and Relations of Things Finite, to what is Infinite; and from supposing *Finities* to be *Parts* of *Infinite*, when indeed they are not properly so, but only as Mathematical Points to Quantity, which have no Proportion at all; ought to be esteemed vain and of no Force. Again, 'tis in like manner Demonstrable, that Quantity is infinitely Divisible: All the Objections therefore raised by comparing the imaginary *Equality or Inequality of the Number of the Parts of Unequal Quantities*, whose Parts have really *no Number at all*, they all having Parts *without Number*; ought to be lookt upon as weak and altogether Inconclusive: To ask whether the Parts of unequal Quantities be *equal in Number* or not, when they have *no Number at all*; being the same thing as to ask whether two infinite Lines be equal in length or not, that is, whether they *End* together, when neither of them have *any End at all*.

H. There

Being and Attributes of God. 19

II. *There has Existed from Eternity Some One Unchangeable and Independent Being.* For since *Something must needs have been from Eternity ; as hath been already proved, and is granted on all Hands:* *There must have existed from Eternity One Independent Being.* Either there has always Existed some One Unchangeable and *Independent* Being, from which all other Beings that are or ever were in the Universe, have received their Original ; or else there has been an infinite Succession of changeable and *dependent* Beings, produced one from another in an endless Progression, without any Original Cause at all. Now this latter Supposition is so very absurd, that tho' all Atheism must in its Account of most Things (as shall be shown hereafter) terminate in it, yet I think very few Atheists ever were so weak as openly and directly to defend it. For it is plainly impossible and contradictory to it self. I shall not argue against it from the supposed Impossibility of Infinite Succession, *barely and absolutely considered in it self ;* *C 2* *for*

for a Reason which shall be mentioned hereafter. But, if we consider such an infinite Progression, as *One entire Endless Series of Dependent Beings*; 'tis plain this whole *Series of Beings* can have no Cause *from without*, of its Existence; because in it are supposed to be included *All Things* that are or ever were in the Universe: And 'tis plain it can have no Reason *within it self*, of its Existence; because no *One Being* in this Infinite Succession is supposed to be Self-existent or *Necessary* (which is the only Ground or Reason of Existence of any thing, that can be imagined *within the thing it self*, as will presently more fully appear,) but every one *Dependent* on the foregoing: And where *no Part* is necessary, 'tis manifest *the whole* cannot be necessary; absolute Necessity of Existence, not being an outward, relative, and accidental Determination; but an inward and essential Property of the Nature of the Thing which so Exists. An infinite Succession therefore of merely *Dependent Beings*, without any Original

Being and Attributes of God. 21

nal Independent Cause ; is a *Series* of Beings, that has neither Necessity nor Cause, nor any Reason *at all* of its Existence, neither *within it self* nor *from without*: that is, 'tis an express Contradiction and Impossibility ; 'tis a supposing *Something* to be *caused*, (because it's granted in every one of its Stages of Succession, not to be necessarily and from it self ;) and yet that in the whole it is caused *absolutely by Nothing*: Which every Man knows is a Contradiction to be done *in Time* ; and because Duration in this Case makes no Difference, 'tis equally a Contradiction to suppose it done from Eternity : And consequently there must *on the contrary*, of Necessity have Existed from Eternity, some *One* Immutable and *Independent* Being.

Otherwise, Thus. Either there has always existed some *One* Unchangeable and *Independent* Being, from which all other Beings have received their Original ; or else there has been an infinite Succession of changeable and *dependent* Beings, produced one from another in an

A Demonstration of the

endless Progression, without any Original Cause at all. According to this latter Supposition, there is nothing in the Universe, Self-Existent or Necessarily-existing. And if so; then it was originally equally possible, that from Eternity there should never have existed any thing at all; as that there should from Eternity have existed a Succession of changeable and dependent Beings. Which being supposed; then *What* is it that has from Eternity determined such a Succession of Beings to exist, rather than that from Eternity there should never have existed any thing at all? *Necessity* it was not; because it was equally possible, in this Supposition, that they should not have existed at all: *Chance*, is nothing but a mere Word without any Signification: and *Other Being* it is supposed there was none, to determine the Existence of these. Their Existence therefore was determined by *Nothing*; neither by any *Necessity* in the nature of the Things themselves, because it is supposed that none of them are Self-existent; not

nor by any Other Being, because no Other is supposed to Exist. That is to say; Of two equally possible things, (*viz.* whether *any thing* or *nothing* should from eternity have existed,) the one is determined, rather than the other, *absolutely by Nothing* : Which is an express Contradiction : And consequently, as before, there must on the contrary, of Necessity have existed from Eternity, some *One* Immutable and *Independent* Being. Which, what it is, remains in the next place to be inquired.

III. *That Unchangeable and Inde-* The One Independent Being, must be necessarily Existing.
pendent Being, which has Existed from Eternity, without any external Cause of its Existence; must be Self-Existent, that is, Necessarily-existing.

For whatever Exists, must either have come into Being out of Nothing, absolutely without Cause; or it must have been produced by some External Cause; or it must be Self-Existent. Now to arise out of Nothing, absolutely without any Cause;

has been already shown to be a plain contradiction. To have been produced by some External Cause, cannot possibly be true of every thing; but Something must have existed Eternally and Independently; as has likewise been shown already. It remains therefore, that That Being which has existed Independently from Eternity must of Necessity be Self-existent. Now to be *Self-existent*, is not, *to be Produced by it self*; for that is an express Contradiction: But it is, (which is the only Idea we can frame of Self-existence, and without which the Word seems to have no Signification at all: It is, I say,) *to exist by an Absolute Necessity originally in the Nature of the Thing it self*. And this Necessity must be *Antecedent*; not indeed in time, to the Existence of the Being it self; because That is Eternal: but it must be *Antecedent* in the Natural Order of our Ideas, to our Supposition of its Being: That is; This Necessity must not barely be *consequent* upon our Supposition of the Existence of such a Being: (For then it could

Being and Attributes of God. 25

could not be a Necessity Absolutely such in it self, nor be the Ground or Foundation of the Existence of any thing, being on the contrary only a Consequent of it ;) But it must *antecedently* force it self upon us, whether we will or no, even when we are endeavouring to suppose that no such Being Exists. For Example : When we are endeavouring to suppose that there is no Being in the Universe that exists Necessarily ; we always find in our Minds (besides the foregoing Demonstration of Something being Self-existent, from the Impossibility of every Thing's being dependent ; We always find in our Minds, I say,) some Ideas, as of Infinity and Eternity ; which to remove, that is, to suppose that there is no Being in the Universe, to which these Attributes are necessarily inherent, is a Contradiction in the very Terms. For He that can suppose Eternity and Immenstity removed out of the Universe, may, if he please, as easily remove the Relation of Equality between twice two and four.

From

From hence it follows.

*The True
Notion of
Self-Exist-
ence.*

1st. That *the only true Idea of a Self-existent or Necessarily Existing Being, is the Idea of a Being, the Supposition of whose Non-existence is an express Contradiction.* For since it is absolutely impossible but that there must be Somewhat Self-existent ; that is, which exists by the Necessity of its own Nature ; 'tis plain, that That Necessity cannot be a Necessity consequent upon any foregoing Supposition, (because Nothing can be Antecedent to that which is Self-Existent, no not its own Will, so as to be the Cause of its own Existence,) but it must be a Necessity absolutely such in its own Nature. Now a Necessity, not relatively or consequentially, but absolutely such in its own Nature ; is nothing else, but its being a plain Impossibility or Implying a Contradiction to suppose the contrary. For instance ; the Relation of Equality between twice two and four, is an absolute Necessity ; only because it is an immediate Contradiction in Terms to suppose them unequal

Being and Attributes of God. 27

unequal. This is the only Idea we can frame, of an absolute Necessity ; and to use the Word in any other Sense, seems to be using it without any Signification at all.

If any one now asks, what sort of Idea the Idea of that Being is, the Supposition of whose Non-Existence is thus an express Contradiction : I answer, 'Tis the First and Simplest Idea we can possibly frame, or rather which (unless we forbear thinking at all) we cannot possibly extirpate or remove out of our Minds, of *a most Simple Being, absolutely Eternal and Infinite, Original and Independent*. For, that he who supposes, there is no *Original Independent* Being in the Universe, supposes a Contradiction ; has been shown already : And that he who supposes there may possibly be no *Eternal and Infinite* Being in the Universe, supposes likewise a Contradiction, is evident from hence ; (besides that these two Attributes do necessarily follow from Self-original Independent Existence, as shall be known hereafter ;) that when he has done his utmost, in endeavouring to

to imagine that no such Being Exists; he cannot avoid imagining an Eternal and Infinite Nothing; that is, he will imagine Eternity and Immensity removed out of the Universe, and yet that at the same time they still continue there

*The Error
of the Car-
tesians.*

This Argument, the *Cartesians* who supposed the Idea of *Immensity* to be the Idea of *Matter*, have been greatly perplexed with. For (however *in Words* they have contradicted themselves, yet *in Reality*) it has been easier for them to be driven even to that most intolerable Absur-

* *Mais peut etre que je raisonne mal &c. i. e.* But perhaps I argue ill, when I conclude that the Property my Idea hath to represent Extension, [*that is, in the Sense of the Cartesians, Matter,*] comes from Extension it self as its Cause; For what hinders me from believing that it this Property comes not from my self, yet at least it may come from some Spirit [*or Being*] Superiour to me, which produces in Me the Idea of Extension, though Extension does not actually exist? Yet when I consider the thing attentively, I find

dity, of asserting *Matter* * to be a Necessary Being; than to be able to remove out of their Minds the Idea of *Immensity*, as Existing Necessarily and inseparably from Eternity. Which Absurdity and inextricable Perplexity of theirs, in respect of the Idea of *Immensity*, shows that they found *That* indeed to be Necessary and

Being and Attributes of God. 29

and impossible to be removed; but, in respect of *Matter*, 'twas only a perverse applying an Idea to an Object whereto it no ways belongs: For, that it is indeed absolutely impossible and contradictory to suppose *Matter* necessarily-existing, shall be demonstrated presently.

Extension, supposes an Object actually existing; For it seems that I have Ideas, which do not suppose any Object; I have, for Example, the Idea of an Enchanted Castle; though no such thing really Exists. Yet when I consider the difficulty still more attentively; I find there is this difference between the Idea of Extension, and that of an Enchanted Castle; that the first being natural, that is, independent on my Will, supposes an Object which is necessarily such as it represents; whereas the other being artificial, supposes indeed an Object, but it is not necessary that That Object be absolutely such as the Idea represents, because my Will can add to that Object, or diminish from it, as it pleases; as I have before said, and as shall be proved hereafter, when I come to treat of the Origin of Ideas. *Regis Metaphys. Lib. I. Par. 1. Chap. 3.*

Puto implicare contradictionem, ut Mundus sit finitus. Cartes. epist. 69, primæ Partis.

2dly. From hence it follows, ^{Nothing so} That there is no Man whatsoever, ^{certain as} who ^{the Ex-} makes any use of his Reason, but ^{istence of a} may ^{Suprema} easily become more certain of the Being ^{Indepen-} of a Supreme Independent Cause, ^{dent Cause.} than he can be of any Thing else besides his

own

that my Conclusion is good; and that no Spirit [or Being] how excellent soever, can cause the Idea which I have of Extension to represent to me Extension rather than any thing else, if Extension does not actually Exist; because if he should do so, the Idea which I should then have of Extension, would not be a representation of Extension, but a representation of Nothing; which is impossible.

But it may be I still deceive my self, when I say that the Idea I have of

own Existence. For how much Thought soever it may require to demonstrate the *Other* Attributes of such a Being, as it may do to demonstrate the greatest Mathematical Certainties ; (of which more hereafter :) Yet as to its *Existence* ; that ~~there~~ *Is* Somewhat Eternal, Infinite, and Self-existing, which must be the Cause and Original of all other Things ; this is one of the First and most natural Conclusions, that any Man, who thinks at all, can frame in his Mind : And no Man can any more doubt of this, than he can doubt whether twice two be equal to four. 'Tis possible indeed a Man may in some Sense be ignorant of this first and plain Truth, by being utterly stupid, and not thinking at all : (For though it is absolutely impossible for him to imagine the contrary, yet he may possibly neglect to conceive this : Though no Man can possibly think that twice two is not four, yet he may possibly be stupid, and never have thought at all whether it be so or not :) But this I say ; There is no Man, who thinks or reasons at all,

Being and Attributes of God. 31

all, but may easily become more certain, that there is Something Eternal, Infinite, and Self-existing; than he can be certain of any Thing else.

3dly. Hence we may observe, ^{Of the Idea of God including Self-Existence.} That Our first Certainty of the Existence of God, arises not from this, that in the Idea we frame of him in our own Minds, or rather in the Definition that we make of the Word, [God] as signifying a Being of all possible Perfections, we include Self-Existence; but from hence, that 'tis demonstrable both Negatively, that neither can All Things have arisen out of Nothing, nor can they have depended one on another in an endless Succession; and also positively, that there is Something in the Universe, actually existing without us, the Supposition of whose Non-Existence plainly implies a Contradiction. I do not here say positively, that the Argument drawn from our including Self-Existence in the Idea of God, or our comprehending it in the Definition or Notion we frame of him; is wholly inconclusive and ineffectual, to prove his actual Existence

ence. But that it is not a Clear and Obvious Demonstration, fitted to convince and put the Atheist to Silence ; appears from the endless Disputes maintained by Learned Men concerning it, without being able fully to understand or satisfy each other on either side of the Question. The Obscurity and Defect of that Argument, seems to lie in this ; that it extends only to the *Nominal Idea* or *Definition* of a Self-existent Being, and does not with a sufficiently evident Connexion refer and apply that *Nominal Idea, Definition, or Notion* which we frame *in our own Mind*, to the *Real Idea* of a Being *actually existing without us*. For it is not Satisfactory, that I have in my Mind an Idea of the *Proposition* ; *There exists a Being, indued with all possible Perfections* ; Or, *There is a Self-Existent Being* : But I must also have an Idea of *the Thing*. I must have an Idea of Something actually existing without me ; and I must see wherein consists the Absolute Impossibility of removing that Idea, and consequently of supposing the Non-existence

Being and Attributes of God. 33

istence of the Thing ; before I can be satisfied from that Idea, that the thing actually exists. The bare having an Idea of the Proposition, *There Is a Self-Existent Being*, proves indeed the Thing not to be impossible: (For of an impossible Proposition there is properly no Idea :) But that it actually Is, cannot be proved from the Idea ; unless the *Certainty* of the Actual Existence of a Necessarily-existing Being, follows from the *Possibility* of the Existence of such a Being : Which that it does in this particular Case, many Learned Men have indeed thought ; and their subtle arguings upon this Head, are not perhaps very easy to be disproved. But it is a much *Clearer* and *more Convincing* way of Arguing, to demonstrate that there does actually exist without us a Being, whose Existence is Necessary and of it self ; by showing the manifest Contradiction contained in the contrary Supposition, (as I have before done ;) and at the same time the absolute Impossibility of destroying or removing some Ideas, as of Eternity and

D

Im-

Immensities, which therefore must needs be the Attributes of a Necessary Being actually Existing. For if I have in my Mind an Idea of a Thing, and cannot possibly in my Imagination take away the Idea of that Thing as actually Existing, any more than I can change or take away the Idea of the Equality of twice two to four; the Certainty of the *Existence* of that Thing, is the same, and stands on the same Foundation, as the Certainty of the other *Relation*: For the Relation of Equality between twice two and four, has no other Certainty but this, that I cannot, without a Contradiction, change or take away the Idea of that Relation. We are *Certain* therefore of the Being of a Supreme Independent Cause; because 'tis strictly demonstrable, that there is Something in the Universe, actually existing without us, the Supposition of whose Non-existence plainly implies a Contradiction.

*That the
Material
World cannot
possibly
be the
Self-Ex-
istent Be-
ing.*

*4thly, From hence it follows,
that The material World cannot possibly
be the First and Original Being, Un-
created,*

Being and Attributes of God. 35

created, Independent, and of it self Eternal. For since it hath been already demonstrated, that whatever Being hath Existed from Eternity, Independent, and without any External Cause of its Existence; must be Self-Existent: And that whatever is Self-Existent, must Exist Necessarily by an absolute Necessity in the Nature of the Thing it self: It follows evidently, that unless the Material World Exists Necessarily, by an Absolute Necessity in its own Nature, so as that it must be an Express Contradiction to suppose it not to Exist; it cannot be Independent, and of it self Eternal. Now that the Material World does not Exist thus necessarily, is very Evident. For Absolute Necessity of Existing, and a Possibility of not Existing, being contradictory Ideas; 'tis manifest the Material World cannot Exist Necessarily, if without a Contradiction we can Conceive it either Not to Be, or to be in any respect otherwise than it Now is. Than which nothing is more easy. For whether we Consider the *Form* of the World,

D 2

with

with the *Disposition* and *Motion* of its Parts; or whether we consider the *Matter* of it, as such, without respect to its present Form; every Thing in it, both the *Whole* and every one of its *Parts*, their *Situation* and *Motion*, the *Form* and also the *Matter*, are the most Arbitrary and Dependent Things, and the farthest removed from Necessity, that can possibly be imagined. A Necessity indeed of *Fitness*, that is, a Necessity that Things should be as they are, in order to the *Well-being* of the whole, there may be in all these Things: But an Absolute Necessity of *Nature* in any of them, (which is what the Atheist must maintain,) there is not the least appearance of. If any Man will say in this Sense, (as every Atheist must do,) either that the *Form* of the World, or at least the *Matter* and *Motion* of it, is necessary; Nothing can possibly be invented more Absurd.

*The Form
of the
World not
necessary.*

If he says that the particular *Form* is Necessary; that is, that the World, and *all Things* that are therein, exist by a Necessity of Nature;

Being and Attributes of God. 37

ture ; he must affirm it to be a Contradiction to suppose that any Part of the World can be in any respect otherwise than it now is : It must be a contradiction in Terms, to suppose more or fewer Stars, more or fewer Planets, or to suppose their Size, Figure or Motion, Different from what it now is ; or to suppose more or fewer Plants and Animals upon Earth, or the present ones of different Shape and Bigness from what they now are : In all which things there is the greatest Arbitrariness, in respect of Power and Possibility, that can be imagined ; however necessary any of them may be, in respect of Wisdom, and Preservation of the Beauty and Order of the whole.

If the Atheist will say, that the *Motion in general* of all Matter is necessary : It follows that it must be a Contradiction in Terms, to suppose any matter to be at Rest ; Which is so absurd and ridiculous, that I think hardly any Atheists, either Antient or Modern, have presumed directly to suppose it. *Nor its Motion.*

* Mr. Toland Let.
III.

One late * Author indeed has ventur'd to assert, and pretended to prove, that *Motion*, that is, the *Conatus to Motion*, is essential to all Matter: But how Philosophically, may appear from this One Consideration. The essential *Conatus to Motion* of every one or of any one Particle of Matter in this Author's imaginary infinite *Plenum*, must be either a *Conatus* to move some one determinate way at once, or to move every way at once: A *Conatus* to move some one determinate way, cannot be essential to any Particle of Matter, but must arise from some External Cause; because there is nothing in the pretended Necessary Nature of any Particle, to determine its Motion necessarily and essentially one way rather than another: And a *Conatus* equally to move every way at once, is either an absolute Contradiction, or at least could produce nothing in Matter but an Eternal Rest of all and every one of its Parts. But to proceed.

If the Atheist will suppose Motion necessary and essential to *some* Matter,

Being and Attributes of God. 39

Matter, but not to *all*: The same Absurdity as to the *Determination* of Motion, still follows; And now he moreover supposes an Absolute Necessity not Universal; that is, that it shall be a Contradiction to suppose some certain Matter at Rest, tho' at the same time some other Matter actually be so.

If he only affirms bare *Matter* to be Necessary: Then, besides the extreme Folly of his attributing *Motion* and the *Form* of the World to Chance; (which Opinion I think all Atheists have now given up; and therefore I shall not think my self obliged to take any Notice of it in the Sequel of this Discourse;) it may be demonstrated by many Arguments drawn from the Nature and Affections of the Thing it self, that Matter is not a Necessary Being. For instance thus. If Matter be supposed to exist Necessarily; then in that Necessary Existence, there is either included the Power of Gravitation, or not: If not, then in a World *merely Material*, and in which no *Intelligent Being* presides, there

Nor the
bare Mat-
ter.

D 4

never

never could have been any Motion; because Motion, as has been already shown, and is now granted in the Question, is not necessary of it self: But if the Power of Gravitation be included in the pretended Necessary Existence of Matter; then, it following necessarily that there must be a *Vacuum*, (as the incomparable Sir *Isaac Newton* has abundantly demonstrated that there must, if Gravitation be an Universal Quality or Affection of Matter;) it follows likewise, that Matter is not a Necessary Being: For if a *Vacuum* actually be, then it is plainly more than possible for Matter *not to Be*. If an Atheist will yet Assert, that Matter may be necessary, though not necessary to be every where: I answer; this is an express Contradiction: For *absolute* Necessity, is absolute Necessity every where alike: And if it be no Impossibility for Matter to be absent from one Place, 'tis no Impossibility (absolutely in the Nature of the Thing; For no Relative or Consequential Necessity, can have any Room in this Argument: 'Tis

Being and Attributes of God. 41

'Tis, no absolute Impossibility, I say, in the Nature of the Thing,) that Matter should be absent from any other Place, or from every Place.

Spinoza, the most celebrated Patron of Atheism in our Time, who ^{Spinoza's Opinion} ~~confuted~~.

taught that * there is no Difference of Substances; but that the Whole and every Part of *the Material World* is a Necessarily existing Being; and that † there is no other God, but the Universe: That he might seemingly avoid the manifold Absurdities of that Opinion; endeavours by an Ambiguity of Expression in the Progress of his Discourse, to elude the Arguments by which he foresaw his Assertion would be confuted: For, having at first plainly asserted, that * All Substance is Necessarily-existing; he would afterward seem to explain it away, by asserting, that the

* Una substantia non potest produci ab alia substantia. *Ethic. Par. I. Prop. 6.*

Omnis substantia est necessario infinita. *Ibid. Prop. 8.*

Ad naturam substantiæ pertinet existere. *Ibid. Prop. 7.*

† Præter Deum nulla dari neq; concipi potest substantia. *Ibid. Prop. 14.*

* Ad naturam substantiæ pertinet existere. *Prop. 7.*

Reason

† Res nullo alio modo, neq; alio ordine a Deo produci potuerunt, quam productæ sunt. *Prop. 33.*

Ex Necessitate Divinæ Naturæ, infinita infinitis modis, (hoc est, omnia quæ sub intellectum infinitum cadere possunt) sequi debent. *Prop. 16.*

Reason why every thing thing † exists necessarily, and could not possibly have been in any respect different from what it Now is, is because every thing flows from the *Necessity of the Divine*

Nature. By which if the unwary Reader understands, that he means things are therefore Necessarily such as they are, because Infinite Wisdom and Goodness could not possibly make Things but in that Order which is Fittest and Wisest in the Whole ; he is very much mistaken : For such a Necessity, is not a Natural, but only a Moral and Consequential Necessity ; and directly contrary to the Author's true Intention. Further, if the Reader hereby understands, that God was determined, not by a Necessity of Wisdom and Goodness, but by a mere Natural Necessity, exclusive of Will and Choice, to make all Things just as they now are ; neither is this the whole of *Spinoza's* meaning : For this, as absurd as it is, is still supposing God, as a Substance distinct from the

Being and Attributes of God. 43

the Material World ; which * He^{* Loc supra citatis.} expressly denies. Nay further, if any one thinks his meaning to be, that all Substances in the World, are only Modifications of the Divine Essence ; neither is This *All* : For thus God may still be supposed as an Agent, acting upon *himself* at least, and manifesting *himself* in different manners, according to his own Will :

Which † *Spinoza* expressly denies. But his true meaning therefore, however darkly and ambiguously he sometimes speaks, must be this ; and if he means any thing at all consistent with himself, can be no other than this : That, since it is absolutely * impossible for any thing to be created or produced by another ; and † also absolutely impossible for God to have caused any thing to be in any respect different from what it now is ; every thing that exists, must need be so a || Part of the Divine Substance, not as a Modifi-

† Deum non operari ex libertate voluntatis. *Prop.* 32. *Corol.* I. & *Scholium ad Prop.* 17.

* Una substantia non potest produci ab alia substantia. *Prop.* 6.

† Res nullo alio modo neq; alio ordine a Deo produci potuerunt, quam productæ sunt. *Prop.* 33.

|| Præter Deum nulla dari, neq; concipi potest substantia. *Prop.* 14.

cation

† Res nullo alio modo, neq; alio ordine a Deo produci potuerunt, quam productæ sunt. *Prop. 33.*

Ex Necessitate Divinæ Naturæ, infinita infinitis modis, (hoc est, omnia quæ sub intellectum infinitum cadere possunt) sequi debent. *Prop. 16.*

Reason why every thing thing † exists necessarily, and could not possibly have been in any respect different from what it Now is, is because every thing flows from the

Necessity of the Divine

Nature. By which if the unwary Reader understands, that he means things are therefore Necessarily such as they are, because Infinite Wisdom and Goodness could not possibly make Things but in that Order which is Fittest and Wisest in the Whole ; he is very much mistaken : For such a Necessity, is not a Natural, but only a Moral and Consequential Necessity ; and directly contrary to the Author's true Intention. Further, if the Reader hereby understands, that God was determined, not by a Necessity of Wisdom and Goodness, but by a mere Natural Necessity, exclusive of Will and Choice, to make all Things just as they now are ; neither is this the whole of *Spinoza's* meaning : For this, as absurd as it is, is still supposing God, as a Substance distinct from
the

Being and Attributes of God. 43

the Material World ; which * He ^{* Loc supra citatis.} expressly denies. Nay further, if any one thinks his meaning to be, that all Substances in the World, are only Modifications of the Divine Essence ; neither is This *All* : For thus God may still be supposed as an Agent, acting upon *himself* at least, and manifesting *himself* in different manners, according to his own Will :

Which † *Spinoza* expressly denies. But his true meaning therefore, however darkly and am-

† Deum non operari ex libertate voluntatis. *Prop.* 32. *Corol.* 1. & *Scholium* ad *Prop.* 17.

biguously he sometimes speaks, must be this ; and if he means any thing at all consistent with himself, can be no other than this : That, since it is ab-

solutely * impossible for any thing to be created

* Una substantia non potest produci ab alia substantia. *Prop.* 6.

or produced by another ; and † also absolutely impossible for God to have caused any thing

† Res nullo alio modo neq; alio ordine a Deo produci potuerunt, quam productæ sunt. *Prop.* 33.

to be in any respect different from what it now is ; every thing that exists, must need be so a ||

Part of the Divine Substance, not as a Modifi-

|| Præter Deum nulla dari, neq; concipi potest substantia. *Prop.* 14.

cation

* Deum non operari ex
Libertate voluntatis. *Prop.*
32. *Coroll.* 1.

† Nullo alio *Modo*, neq;
Ordine, &c.

cation caused in it by
any * Will or Good-
Pleasure or Wisdom in
the whole, but as of Absolute Ne-
cessity in it self, with respect to the
† *manner* of the Ex-
istence of each Part, no
less than with respect to
the Self-Existence of the whole.
Thus the Opinion of *Spinoza*, when
expressed plainly and consistently,
comes evidently to this: That *the*
Material World, and every Part of it,
with the order and manner of Being
of each Part, is the only Self-Existent,
or Necessarily-Existing Being. And
now Consequently, he must of Ne-
cessity affirm all the Conclusions,
which I have before shown to follow
demonstrably from that Opinion.
He cannot possibly avoid affirming,
that 'tis a Contradiction, (not to *the*
Perfections of God; For that is mere
senseless Cant and Amusement in
Him who maintains that there is but
One Substance in the Universe; But
he must affirm that it is *in it self* and
in Terms a Contradiction,) for any
thing to be, or to be imagined, in
any

Being and Attributes of God. 45

any respect otherwise than it Now is. He must say 'tis a Contradiction, to suppose the *Number*, or *Figure*, or *Order* of the Principal Parts of the World, could possibly have been different from what they Now are. He must say Motion is necessary *of it self*; and consequently that 'tis a Contradiction in Terms, to suppose any Matter to be at Rest: Or else He must affirm, (which is rather the more absurd of the two; as may appear from what has been already said in proof of the *Second General Head* of this Discourse: And yet he has * chosen to af-

firm it;) that Motion, as a Dependent Being, has been eternally communicated from one piece of Matter to another; without having at all any Original Cause of its Being, either within it self or from without. Which, with other the like Consequences, touching the Necessity of the Existence of Things; the very mention of which, is a sufficient Confu-

* Corpus motum, vel quiescens, ad motum vel quietem determinari debuit ab alio corpore, quod etiam ad motum vel quietem determinatum fuit ab alio, & illud iterum ab alio, & sic in infinitum. *Par. II. Prop. 13. Lemma 3.*

Confutation of any Opinion they follow from ; do, as I have said, unavoidably follow from the fore-mention'd Opinion of *Spinoza*. And consequently that Opinion, viz. *That the Universe or Whole World is the Self-existent or Necessarily-existing Being*, is demonstrated to be false.

I have in this Attempt to show, that *The Material World cannot possibly be the First and Original Being, Uncreated, Independent, and Self-existent* ; designedly omitted the Argument usually drawn from the supposed absolute Impossibility in the Nature of the Thing it self, of the World's being Eternal, or having existed through an Infinite Succession of Time. And this I have done for the two following Reasons.

Of the Opinion concerning the Eternity of the World.

1st. Because the Question between us and the Atheists, is not *whether the World can possibly have been Eternal* ; but *whether it can possibly be the Original, Independent and Self-existing Being* : Which is a very different Question : For many, who have affirmed

Being and Attributes of God. 47

firmed the One, have still utterly denied the Other : And almost all the Antient Philosophers that held the Eternity of the World, in whose Authority and Reasons our Modern Atheists do so mightily Boast and Triumph ; defended that their Opinion by such Arguments, as show plainly that they did by no means thereby intend to assert, that the Material World was the Original, Independent, Self-existing Being, in Opposition to the Belief of the Existence of a Supreme All-governing *Mind*, which is the Notion of God. So that the Deniers of the Being of God, have no manner of Advantage from that Opinion of the Eternity of the World, even supposing it could not be disproved. Almost all the old Philosophers, I say, who held the Eternity of the World, did not thereby mean (at least their Arguments do not tend to prove) that it was Independent and Self-existent ; but their Arguments are wholly levelled, either to prove barely that Something must needs be Eternal, and that the Universe could not possibly

sibly arise out of Nothing absolutely and without Cause ; which is all that *Ocellus Lucanus's* Arguments amount to : Or else that the World is an Eternal and Necessary Effect, flowing from the Essential and Immutable Energy of the Divine Nature ; which seems to have been *Aristotle's* Opinion : Or else that the World is an Eternal Voluntary Emanation from the All-Wise and Supreme Cause ; which was the Opinion of many of *Plato's Followers*. None of which Opinions or Arguments, will in the least help out our Modern Atheists ; who would exclude Supreme *Mind* and Intelligence out of the Universe. For however the Opinion of the Eternity of the World, is really inconsistent with the Belief of its Being Created in time : yet so logn as the Defenders of that Opinion, either did not think it Inconsistent with the Belief of the World's being the Effect and Work of an *Eternal*, All-Wise and All-Powerful Mind ; or at least could defend that Opinion by such Arguments only, as did not in the least prove the
Self-

Being and Attributes of God. 49

Self-Existence or Independency of the World, but most of them rather quite the contrary; 'Tis with the greatest Injustice and Unreasonableness in the World, that our Modern Atheists (to whose Purpose the Eternity or Non-Eternity of the World would signifie nothing, unless at the same Time the Existence and Sovereignty of Eternal Intelligence or Mind were likewise disproved,) pretend either the Authority or the Reasons of these Men to be on their side.

Ocellus Lucanus, one of the ancientest Asserters of the Eternity of the World; whose Antiquity and Authority * Mr Blount

opposes to that of *Moses*; in delivering his Opinion, speaks indeed like one that believed the Material World to be Self-existent; asserting,

† that it is utterly incapable either of Generation or Corruption, of Beginning or End; that it is

* Oracles of Reason; Letter to Mr. Gildon, p. 216.

† Ἀχρόνιτον τὸ πᾶν καὶ ἀνώλεθρον.

Ἀναρχον καὶ ἀπληκτικόν.

Κόσμος αὐτὸς ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ πάντα αἰῶνα.

αἰδιός ἐστι καὶ αὐτοτελής καὶ διαμένων ἢ πάντα αἰῶνα. Αἰὶ ὄντ' ὅτε κόσμος, αναρχαῖον καὶ τὰ μέρη αὐτοῦ συνεπάρχειν. Λέγω ὃ μέρη, ἔρανδον, γῆν, &c. *Ocel. Lucan. Psel.* ἢ ὅτε παντὸς φύσεως.

E

of

of it self Eternal and Perfect and Permanent for ever ; and that the Frame and Parts of the World must needs be Eternal, as well as the Substance and Matter of the Whole. But when he comes to produce his Arguments or Reasons for his Opinion ; they are either so very absurd and ridiculous, that even any Atheist in this Age ought to be ashamed to repeat them ; as when he proves

* Τὸ ἀναρχὸν καὶ ἀτελεύτητον τὸ γῆμα καὶ τὴ κινήσεως, πῶς δὲ διότι ἀρχὴν καὶ τέλος καὶ ἀφθαρτόν. ἢ τε γὰρ τὸ γῆμα καὶ ἰδέα, κύκλος καὶ οὐκ ἔστι πᾶν ποθεν ἴσθαι καὶ ὁμοίως, διὸ ἀναρχὸν καὶ ἀτελεύτητον. ἢ τε τὴ κινήσεως &c. *Ibid.*

Thus Translated : Nay that the Figure, Motion, &c, thereof, are without Beginning and End ; thereby it plainly appears, that the World admitteth neither Production nor Dissolution : For the Figure is Spherical, and consequently on every side equal, and therefore without Beginning or Ending. Also the motion is circular, &c.

* *that the World must needs be Eternal, without Beginning or End, because both its Figure and Motion are a Circle which has neither Beginning nor End : Or else they are such Arguments as prove only what no Man ever really denied ; viz. that Something must needs be Eternal, because 'tis impossible for every Thing to arise out of Nothing, or to fall into Nothing ;*

Oracles of Reason p. 255.

As

Being and Attributes of God. 50

As when he says † that *the World must have been Eternal, because 'tis a Contradiction for the Universe to have had a Beginning; since if it had a Beginning, it must have been caused by Something, and then it is not the Universe.* To which One Argument, all that he says in his whole Book, is plainly reducible. So that 'tis evident, all that he really proves, is only this; that there must needs be an Eternal Being in the Universe: and not, that Matter is Self-existent, in Opposition to Intelligence and Mind. For, all that he asserts about the absolute Necessity of the *Order and Parts* of the World, is confessedly most ridiculous, not at all proved by the Arguments he alledges: And in some Passages of this very Book, as well as in other Fragments, He himself supposes, and is forced expressly to confess, that, however Eternal and Necessary every thing in the World be imagined to be; yet even That Necessity must flow from

† Ἀλλ' ὅτι τὸ πᾶν. —
 ὅτι ὁ γὰρ γένεσιν, ἐκείνο
 πρῶτον τῶ παντός ἐστι. —
 Τό γε ὅτι πᾶν κινούμενον ὡς
 πᾶσι γίνεθ'· καὶ τὸ το γένε-
 ὅτι ἀδύνατον. — Ἐκ τούτου γὰρ
 τῶ Παντός ἐστίν. Ocell. ibid.

of it self *Eternal* and *Perfect* and *Permanent* for ever ; and that the *Frame* and *Parts* of the *World* must needs be *Eternal*, as well as the *Substance* and *Matter* of the *Whole*. But when he comes to produce his Arguments or Reasons for his Opinion ; they are either so very absurd and ridiculous, that even any *Atheist* in this Age ought to be ashamed to repeat them ; as when he proves

* Τὸ ἀναρχὸν καὶ ἀτελευ-
τητὸν τὸ γήμαλ' καὶ τὴν κινή-
σεως, πρὸς τὸ διότι ἀρχή-
ν καὶ ὁ κόσμος καὶ ἀφ' ὧν
ἦτε καὶ τὸ γήμαλ' ἰδί-
α, καὶ κλ'· ἐκτ' ὃ πάν-
τοθεν ἴσ' καὶ ὁμοί', δι-
ὅτι ἀναρχ' καὶ ἀτελευτη-
τ'. ἢ τε τὴν κινήσεως &c.
Ibid.

Thus Translated : Nay that the Figure, Motion, &c, thereof, are without Beginning and End ; thereby it plainly appears, that the World admitteth neither Production nor Dissolution : For the Figure is Spherical, and consequently on every side equal, and therefore without Beginning or Ending. Also the motion is circular, &c.

* that the *World* must needs be *Eternal*, without Beginning or End, because both its *Figure* and *Motion* are a *Circle* which has neither Beginning nor End : Or else they are such Arguments as prove only what no Man ever really denied ; viz. that Something must needs be *Eternal*, because 'tis impossible for every Thing to arise out of Nothing, or to fall into Nothing ;

Oracles of Reason p. 215.

As

Being and Attributes of God. 50

As when he says † that the World must have been Eternal, because 'tis a Contradiction for the Universe to have had a Beginning; since if it had a Beginning, it must have been caused by Something, and then it is not the Universe. To which One Argument, all that he says in his whole Book, is plainly reducible. So that 'tis evident, all that he really proves, is only this; that there must needs be an Eternal Being in the Universe: and not, that Matter is Self-existent, in Opposition to Intelligence and Mind. For, all that he asserts about the absolute Necessity of the Order and Parts of the World, is confessedly most ridiculous, not at all proved by the Arguments he alledges: And in some Passages of this very Book, as well as in other Fragments, He himself supposes, and is forced expressly to confess, that, however Eternal and Necessary every thing in the World be imagined to be; yet even That Necessity must flow from

† Ἀρχήν ἔχει τὸ πᾶν. —
 ὅς ἐστι γένεσιν, ἐκείνο
 πρῶτον τῷ παντός ἐστι. —
 Τό γε ὅτι πᾶν κενόμηνον ὡς
 πᾶσι γίνεσθαι καὶ τὸ το γένεσθαι
 ὁ ἀδύνατον. — Ἐκ τῶς γὰρ
 τῷ Παντός ἐδέν. Ocell. ibid.

* Τὸ αἰκίνητον, θῆον
μῶν, καὶ λόγον ἔχον καὶ ἔμ-
φρον. Ocell. Luc. de Leg.
fragm.

† Σωέχει ὁ κόσμον ἁρ-
μονία, ταύτης δ' αἰπὸς ὁ
Θεός. Ibid.

|| Τὰς δυνάμεις, καὶ τὰ
ὄργανα, καὶ τὰς ὁρέξεις ὑπὸ
Θεοῦ δεδομένας ἀνθρώ-
ποις, ἔχ' ἡδονῆς ἐνεκα δε-
δοται συμβέβηκεν, ἀλλὰ
&c. Idem Περὶ τῶ παν-
τός φύσεως.

an * *Eternal and In-*
telligent Mind, the Ne-
cessary Perfections of
whose Nature are the
Cause † of the *Harmony*
and *Beauty of the World*,
and particularly of Mens
having || *Faculties, Or-*
gans of Sense, Appetites,
&c, fitted even to *Fi-*
nal Causes.

Aristotle likewise, was a great Af-
ferter indeed of the Eternity of the
World : But not in Opposition to
the Belief of the Being, or of the
Power, Wisdom, or Goodness of
God : On the contrary, He for no
other Reason asserted the World to
be Eternal, but because he fancied
that such an Effect must needs eter-
nally proceed from such an eternal
Cause. And so far was he from
teaching, that Matter is the First and
Original Cause of all Things ; that
on the contrary he every where ex-

* Νῆς. presly describes God to be an * *In-*

† Θεὸν ἀσώματον ἀπέ-
φνε. Diog. in vita Aristot.

|| Τὸ πρῶτον κινῆν, αἰ-
κίνητον. Aristot. Metaph.

telligent Being : † *Incor-*
poreal ; || *The First Mo-*
ver of all Things, Him-
self

Being and Attributes of God. 53

self Immoveable ; and affirms, that

* if there were nothing

but Matter in the World,

there would be no Orig-

inal Cause, but an Infinite

Progression of Causes ; which is ab-

* Εἰ μὴ ἔσαι παρὰ τὰ
αἰδιότα ἀλλὰ, ἐκ ἔσαι ἀρ-
χὴ καὶ τάξις, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ τ' ἀρ-
χῆς ἀρχή. Ibid.

As to those Philosophers, who taught plainly and exprefly, that Matter was not only Eternal, but also Self-existent and entirely Independent, Co-existing from Eternity with God, independently as a Second Principle : I have already shown the Impossibility of this Opinion, at the Entrance upon the present Head of Discourse, where I proved that Matter could not possibly be *Self-existent* : And I shall further demonstrate it to be False, when I come to prove the *Unity* of the Self-existent Being.

Plato, whatever his Opinion was about the Original Matter, very largely and fully declares his Sentiments about the Formation of the World, viz. that it was composed and framed by an Intelligent and Wise God ; And there is no One of

all the Antient Philosophers, who in all his Writings speaks so excellently

and worthily * as He, concerning the Nature and Attributes of God. Yet as to the Time of the World's Beginning to be Formed, He seems to make it indefinite, when he says, † *The World must needs be an Eternal Resemblance of the Eternal Idea.* At least his Followers afterward so understood and explained it, as if by the Creation of the World, was not to be understood a Creation in Time; * but only in Order of Nature, Causa-

* Ὁ ποιητὴς καὶ πατὴρ τῶν πάντων.

Ὁ γὰρ, ἐργάων καὶ Θεός, καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐν ἐργάων καὶ τὰ ἐν αἰδέ, καὶ ὑπὸ γῆς ἅπαντα ἐργασάμενος. De Republ. Lib. 10.

† Πᾶσα ἀνάγκη τὸνδε κόσμον, εἶκόνα πνὸς εἶναι. Plato in Timæo. Which Words being very imperf. & in our Copies of the Original, are thus rendered by Cicero. Si ergo generatus [est mundus;] ad id effectus est, quod ratione sapientiaq; comprehenditur, atq; immutabili æternitate continetur. Ex quo efficitur, ut sit necesse hunc, quem cernimus, mundum, simulachrum æternum esse alicujus æterni. Cic. de Univers.

* Qui autem a Deo quidem factum fatentur, non tamen eum volunt Temporis habere, sed suæ Creationis initium; ut modo quodam vix intelligibili, Semper sit factus. Augustin. de Civit. Dei. Lib. 11. Cap. 4.

De mundo, & de his quos in mundo deos a Deo factos scribit Plato, apertissime dicit eos esse capisæ, & habere initium. — Verum id quomodo intelligant, invenerunt [Platonici;] non esse hoc videlicet Temporis, sed Substitutionis initium. Ibid. Lib. 10. Cap. 31.

Sed mundum quidem fuisse semper, Philosophia auctor est; conditore quidem Deo, sed non ex tempore. Macrob. in Somn. Scip. Lib. 2. Cap. 10.

Being and Attributes of God. 55

lity and Dependence : That is ; that the Will of God, and his Power of Acting, being necessarily as Eternal as his Essence ; † the Effects of that Will and Power might be supposed coeval to the Will and Power themselves ; in the same manner, as *Light* would eternally proceed from the *Sun*, or a *Shadow* from the *interposed Body*, or an *Impression* from an *imposed Seal*, if the respective Causes of these Effects were supposed Eternal.

rum altero prius esset, quamvis alterum ab altero factum esset : Sic, inquiunt, & mundus atq; in illo Dii creati, & semper fuerunt ; semper existente qui fecit ; & tamen facti sunt. *Augustin. de Civitate Dei. Lib. 10. Cap. 31.*

From all which, it plainly appears how little Reason our Modern Atheists have to boast either of the Authority or Reasons of those Antient Philosophers, who held the Eternity of the World. For since these Men neither proved, nor attempted to

E 4 prove,

† Καὶ, εἰ βέλει, παραδείγματι πνεύτων γυναικῶν, ξαναγῆσω πρὸς τὸ ζητήμα. φασὶ γὰρ ὅτι καὶ περ αἰτίον τοῦ σώματος τῆς ἐκείνης σκιάς γίνεται ὁμοχρον. ὅτι πρὸ σώματος ἡ σκιά, καὶ ἐκ ὁμοπρ. ἔπω δὲ καὶ ὅδε ὁ κόσμος παρακολούθημα ἐστὶ τῆς Θεῆς αἰνῆς ὄντος αὐτῶ τῆς εἰς, καὶ ζωαῖδος ἐστὶ πρὸ Θεῶ. ἐκείνη δὲ καὶ ὁμοπρ. *Zacharie Scholast. Disputat.*

Sicut enim. inquiunt [Platonici,] si Pes ex aternitate semper fuisset in pulvere, semper ei subesset vestigium ; quod tamen vestigium a calcante factum nemo dubitaret ; nec alte-

prove, that the Material World was Original to it self, Independent, or Self-existing ; but only that it was an Eternal Effect of an Eternal Cause, which is God ; 'tis evident that this their Opinion, even supposing it could by no means be refuted, could afford no manner of Advantage to the Cause of Atheists in our days, who excluding Supreme Mind and Intelligence out of the Universe, would fain make mere Matter and Necessity the Original and Eternal Cause of all Things.

2dly. The other Reason why in this Attempt to Prove that *the Material World cannot possibly be the First and Original Being, Uncreated, Independent and Self-Existent*, I have omitted the Argument usually drawn from the supposed absolute Impossibility of the World's being Eternal, or having Existed through an Infinite Succession of Time ; is *because that Argument*, supposing it were never so true in it self, yet *cannot be so stated, as to be of any use in Convincing or Affecting the Mind of an Atheist*, who must not be supposed to come prepared

pared beforehand with any transcendent Idea of the Eternity of God. For since an Atheist cannot be supposed to Believe the Nice and Subtle Distinctions of the Schools ; 'tis impossible by this Argument so to disprove the Possibility of the Eternity of the VWorld, but that an Atheist will understand it to prove equally against the Possibility of any thing's being Eternal ; and consequently that it proves nothing at all, but is only a Difficulty arising from our not being able to comprehend adequately the Notion of Eternity. That the Material VWorld is not Self-Existent or Necessarily-Existing, but the Product of some distinct superior Agent, may (as I have already shown) be strictly demonstrated by bare Reason against the most Obstinate Atheist in the VWorld : But the *Time When* the VWorld was Created ; or whether its Creation was, properly speaking, *in Time* ; is not so easy to demonstrate strictly by bare Reason, (as appears from the Opinions of many of the Antient Philosophers concerning that matter,) but the Proof of it can be taken

* Cud-
worth Sy-
stem. p.
643.

taken only from Revelation. To endeavour to prove, that there cannot possibly be any such thing as *infinite Time* or *Space*, from the Impossibility of an * Addition of Finite Parts ever composing or exhausting an Infinite : or from the imaginary *inequality of the Number* of Years, Days, and Hours, that would be contained in the one ; or of the Miles, Yards, and Feet, that would be contained in the other : is supposing Infinites to be made up of *Numbers* of Finites ; that is, 'tis supposing Finite Quantities to be *Aliquot* or *Constituent* Parts of Infinite ; when indeed they are not so, but do all *Equally*, whether *Great* or *Small*, whether *Many* or *Few*, bear the very same proportion to an Infinite, as Mathematical Points do to a Line, or Lines to a Superficies, or as Moments do to Time ; that is, None at all. So that to argue absolutely against the Possibility of Infinite Space or Time, merely from the imaginary inequality of the *Numbers* of their Finite Parts ; which are not properly Constituent Parts, but mere Nothings in Proportion ;

Being and Attributes of God. 59

tion ; is the very same thing as it would be to argue against the Possibility of the Existence of any determinate Finite Quantity, from the imaginary Equality or Inequality of the *Number* of the Mathematical Lines and Points contained therein ; when indeed neither the one nor the other has (in propriety of Speech) any *Number* at all, but they are absolutely *without Number* : Neither can any Number or Quantity be any *Aliquot* or *Constituent* Part of Infinite, or be compared at all with it, or bear any kind of Proportion to it, or be the Foundation of any Argument in any Question concerning it.

IV. *What the Substance or Essence* The Es-
of that Being, which is Self-Existent, sence of the
or Necessarily-Existing, is ; we have Self-ex-
no Idea, neither is it at all possible for istent Being
us to comprehend it. Incompre-
That there is
such a Being, actually Existing with-
out us, we are sure (as I have already
shown) by strict and undeniable
Demonstration. Also what it is *not* ;
that

that is, that the Material World is *not* it, as our Modern Atheists would have it ; has been already Demonstrated But what it *is*, I mean as to its Substance and Essence ; this we are infinitely unable to comprehend. Yet does not this in the least Diminish the Certainty of the Demonstration of its Existence. For it is one Thing, to know certainly that a Being Exists ; and another, to know what the Essence of that Being is : And the one may be capable of the strictest Demonstration, when the other is absolutely beyond the Reach of all our Faculties to understand. A Blind or Deaf Man has infinitely more Reason to deny the Being, or the Possibility of the Being, of Light or Sounds ; than any Atheist can have to deny, or doubt of, the Existence of God. For the one can at the utmost have no other Proof, but credible Testimony, of the Existence of certain Things, whereof it is absolutely impossible that he himself should frame any manner of Idea, not only of their Essence, but even of their Effects or Properties : But
the

Being and Attributes of God. 61

the Other may with the least use of his Reason, be assured of the Existence of a Supreme Being, by undeniable Demonstration; and may also certainly know abundance of its Attributes, (as shall be made appear in the following Propositions,) though its Essence be intirely incomprehensible. Wherefore nothing can be more Unreasonable and Weak, than for an Atheist upon this account to deny the Being of God, merely because his weak and finite Understanding cannot frame to it self any adæquate Notion of the Substance or Essence of that First and Supreme Cause. We are utterly ignorant of the Substance or Essence of all other things; even of those things which we converse most familiarly with, and think we understand best. There is not so mean and contemptible a Plant or Animal, that does not confound the most enlarged Understanding upon Earth: Nay even the simplest and plainest of all inanimate Beings, have their Essence or Substance hidden from Us in the deepest and most impenetrable Obscurity.

How

How weak then and foolish is it to raise Objections against the Being of God, from the Incomprehensibleness of his Essence ! and to represent it as a strange and incredible thing, that there should Exist any Incorporeal Substance, the Essence of which we are not able to Comprehend ! As if it were not far more strange, that there should exist numberless Objects of our Senses, Things subject to our daily Inquiry, Search and Examination ; and yet we not be able, no not in any measure, to find out the real Essence of any one even of the least of *these* Things.

From what has been said upon this Head, we may observe,

*Of Infinite
Space.*

1st *The Weakness of Such, as have presumed to imagin Infinite Space to be a just Representation or adequate Idea of the Essence of the Supreme Cause.* This is a weak Imagination, arising from hence, that Men using themselves to Judge of all Things by their Senses only, fancy Spiritual or Immaterial Substances, because they are not Objects of their Corporeal Senses, to be, as it were, mere Nothings ;
Just

Being and Attributes of God. 63

Just as Children imagin Air, because they cannot see it, to be mere Emptiness and Nothing. But the Fallacy is too gross, to deserve being Insisted upon. There are perhaps Numberless Substances in the World, whose Essences are as intirely unknown and impossible to be represented to our Imaginations, as Colours are to a Man that was Born Blind, or Sounds to One that has been always Deaf : Nay, there is no Substance in the World, of which we know any thing further, than only a certain Number of its Properties or Attributes ; of which we know fewer in some things, and in Others more. Infinite Space, is nothing else but an abstract Idea of Immensity or Infinity ; even as Infinite Duration, is of Eternity : And it would be not much less proper, to say that Eternity is the Essence of the Supreme Cause ; than to say, that Immensity is so. Indeed they seem Both to be but Attributes of an Essence Incomprehensible to Us ; and when we endeavour to represent the real Substance of any Being whatsoever in our weak imaginations,

nations, we shall find our selves in like manner deceived.

*The Vanity
of the
School-
men.*

2dly. From hence appears, the *Vanity of the Schoolmen*; who as in other Matters, so in their Disputes about the Self-Existent Being; when they come at what they are by no means able to comprehend or explain; least they should seem ignorant of any thing, they give us Terms of Art, and Words of Amusement; which under pretense of explaining the matter before them, seem really to have no manner of Idea or Signification at all. Thus when they tell us concerning the Essence of God, that He is *Purus Actus, mera forma*, and the like; either the Words have no Meaning, and signifie nothing; or else they express only the Perfection of his *Power*, and other Attributes; which is not what these Men intend to express by them.

*That the
Self-ex-
istent Being
must be
Eternal.*

V. *Though the Substance or Essence of the Self-Existent Being, is it self absolutely Incomprehensible to us: yet many*

Being and Attributes of God. 65

many of the Essential Attributes of his Nature are strictly Demonstrable, as well as his Existence. Thus in the first place the Self-Existent Being must of necessity be Eternal. The Idea's of Eternity and Self-Existence are so closely connected, that because Something must of Necessity be Eternal *Independently and without any outward Cause of its Being*, therefore it must necessarily be Self-existent ; and because it is impossible but Something must be Self-existent, therefore it is necessary that it must likewise be Eternal. To be Self-existent is (as has been already shown) to Exist by an Absolute Necessity in the Nature of the Thing it self. Now this Necessity being Absolute, and not depending upon any thing External, must be always unalterably the same ; Nothing being alterable, but what is capable of being affected by Something without it self. That Being therefore , which has no other Cause of its Existence, but the absolute Necessity of its own Nature ; must of Necessity have existed from everlasting , without Beginning ;
F and

and must of Necessity exist to everlasting, without End.

*Of the
Manner of
our Conceiving the E-
ternity of
God.*

As to the *Manner* of this Eternal Existence, 'tis manifest it herein infinitely transcends the Manner of the Existence of all Created Beings, even of such as shall exist for ever ; that whereas it is not possible for their finite Minds to comprehend all that is past, or to understand perfectly all things that are at present, much less to know all that is future, or to have entirely in their Power any thing that is to come ; but their Thoughts, and Knowledge, and Power, must of Necessity have degrees and periods, and be successive and transient as the Things Themselves : The Eternal, Supreme Cause, on the contrary, (supposing him to be an *Intelligent Being*, which will hereafter be proved in the Sequel of this Discourse,) must of Necessity have such a perfect, independent and unchangeable Comprehension of all things, that there can be no One Point or Instant of his Eternal Duration, wherein all Things that are past, present, or to come, will not be as
entirely

Being and Attributes of God. 67

entirely known and represented to him in one single Thought or View; and all things present and future, be equally intirely in his Power and Direction; as if there was really no Succession at all, but all things were actually present at once. Thus far we can speak Intelligibly concerning the Eternal Duration of the Self-Existent Being; and no *Atheist* can say that this is an Impossible, Absurd or Insufficient Account: It is, in the most proper and intelligible Sense of the Words, to all the purposes of Excellency and Perfection, *Interminabilis vitæ tota simul & perfectæ Possessio*: The entire and perfect Possession of an endless Life.

Others have supposed that the Difference between the Manner of the Eternal Existence of the Supreme Cause, and that of the Existence of Created Beings, is this: That whereas the latter is a continual transient Succession of Duration; the former is one Point or Instant comprehending Eternity, and wherein all things are really co-existent. But this Distinction I shall not now insist upon;

F 2

as

* Crucem ingenio figere, ut rem capiat fugientem Captum. — Tam fieri non potest, ut instans [Temporis] coexistat rei successivæ, quam impossibile est punctum coexistere [coextendi] lineæ. — Lusus merus non intellectuum verborum. Gassend. Physic. lib. 1.

I shall not trouble you with the inconsistent and unintelligible Notions of the Schoolmen; that it [the Eternity of God] is *duratio tota simul*, in which we are not to conceive any Succession, but to imagine it in an Instant. We may as well conceive the Immensity of God to be a Point, as his Eternity to be an Instant. — And how that can be together, which must necessarily be imagined to be coexistent to Successions; let them that can, Conceive. Archbishop Tillotson, Vol. 7. Sermon. 13.

Others say, God sees and knows future things, by the presentia and co-existence of all things in Eternity; for they say that future things are actually present and existing to God, tho' not *in mensura propria*, yet *in mensura aliena*. The School-Men have much more of this Jargon and canting Language; and I envy no Man the understanding these Phrases; but to me they seem to signify nothing, but to have been Words invented by idle and conceited Men; which a great many ever since, lest they should seem to be ignorant, would seem to understand: But I wonder most, that Men, when they have amused and puzzled themselves and others with hard Words, should call this Explaining Things. Archbishop Tillotson, Vol. 6. Sermon. 6.

as being of no use in the present Dispute; because, supposing it never so true, yet it would be impossible to prove and explain it in such a manner, as ever to convince an Atheist that there is any thing in it. And besides; as on the one hand, the Schoolmen have indeed generally chosen to defend it; so on the other hand, there * are many Learned Men, of not less Understanding and Judgment than they; who have rejected and opposed it.

Being and Attributes of God. 69

VI. *The Self-Existent Being, must of Necessity be Infinite and Omnipresent.* That the Self-Existent Being must be Infinite and Omnipresent. The Idea of Infinity or Immenity, as well as of Eternity, is so closely connected with that of Self-Existence, that because it is impossible but Something must be Infinite *independently and of it self*, (for else it would be impossible there should be any Infinite at all, unless an Effect could be perfecter than its Cause;) therefore it must of Necessity be Self-existent; and because Something must of Necessity be Self-Existent, therefore it is necessary that it must likewise be Infinite. To be Self-Existent (as has been already shown,) is to Exist by an Absolute Necessity in the Nature of the Thing it self: Now this Necessity being Absolute in it self, and not depending on any Outward Cause; 'tis evident it must be *every where*, as well as *always*, unalterably the same: For a Necessity which is not every where the same, is plainly a Consequential Necessity only, depending upon some External Cause, and not an Absolute one

in its own Nature : For a Necessity absolutely such in it self, has no Relation to Time or Place, or any thing else : Whatever therefore Exists by an Absolute Necessity in its own Nature, must needs be Infinite as well as Eternal. To suppose a Finite Being, to be Self-Existent ; is to say that it is a Contradiction for that Being not to Exist, the Absence of which may yet be conceived without a Contradiction : which is the greatest Absurdity in the World : For if a Being can without a Contradiction be absent from One Place, it may without a Contradiction be absent likewise from another Place, and from all Places : And whatever Necessity it may have of Existing, must arise from some External Cause, and not absolutely from it self ; and consequently the Being, cannot be Self-Existent.

From hence it follows,

1st. That the Infinity of the Self-Existent Being, must be an Infinity of *Fulness* as well as of *Immensity* ; that is, it must not only be without *Limits*, but also without
Di-

Being and Attributes of God. 71

Diversity, Defect, or Interruption. For Instance : Could matter be supposed *Boundless*, it would not therefore follow that it was in this compleat Sense *Infinite* ; because though it had no Limits, yet it might have within it self any assignable Vacuities. But now whatever is Self-Existent, must of Necessity Exist absolutely in every Place alike, and be equally present every where ; and consequently must have a true and absolute Infinity, both of *Immensity* and *Fulness*.

2dly. From hence it follows, that the Self-Existent Being, must be a most *Simple, Unchangeable, Incorruptible* Being, without *Parts, Figure, Motion, Divisibility*, or any other such Properties as we find in Matter. For all these things do plainly and necessarily imply Finiteness in their very Notion, and are utterly inconsistent with complete Infinity. *Divisibility* is a separation of Parts, real or mental ; (meaning by mental Separation, not barely a *partial Apprehending*, but a removing, disjoining, or separating Parts one from another

in the Imagination ;) and any such Separation or Removing of Parts, is *really* or *mentally* a setting Bounds ; either of which, destroys Infinity. *Motion* for the same reason implies Finiteness : And *to have Parts*, properly speaking, signifies either Difference and Diversity of Existence ; which is inconsistent with Necessity : or else it signifies Divisibility, real or mental as before, which is inconsistent with complete Infinity. *Corruption, Change, or any Alteration whatsoever*, implies Motion, Separation of Parts, and Finiteness : And any Manner of *Composition*, in opposition to the most perfect *Simplicity*, signifies Difference and Diversity in the manner of Existence ; which is inconsistent with Necessity.

*Of the
Manner of
our Conceiving the
Immensity
of God.*

'Tis evident therefore, that the Self-Existent Being must be Infinite in the *strictest* and most *complete* Sense. But now as to the particular *Manner* of his being Infinite or everywhere present, in opposition to the manner of Created Things being present in such or such finite places : It is as impossible for our finite Understandings,

Being and Attributes of God. 73

standings to comprehend or explain ; as it is for us to form an adæquate Idea of Infinity : Yet that the thing is true, that he is actually Omnipresent, we are as certain as we are that there must Something be Infinite ; which no Man who has thought upon these things at all, ever denied. The Schoolmen indeed have presumed to assert, that the Immensity of God is a Point, as his Eternity is an Instant. But this being altogether Unintelligible ; That which we can more safely affirm, and which no Atheist can say is absurd, and which nevertheless is sufficient to all wise and good Purposes, is this : That whereas all Finite and Created Beings, can be present but in One definite Place at Once ; and Corporeal Beings even in that One place very imperfectly and unequally, to any Purpose of Power or Activity, only by the Successive Motion of different Members and Organs : The Supreme Cause on the contrary, being an Infinite and most Simple Essence, and comprehending all things perfectly in himself, is *at all times equally* present, both
both

both in his Simple Essence, and by the Immediate and Perfect Exercise of all his Attributes, *to every Point* of the Boundless Immensity, as if it were really all but one Single Point.

*That the
Self-ex-
istent Being
can be but
One.*

VII. *The Self-Existent Being, must of Necessity be but One.* This evidently follows from his being *Necessarily-Existent*. For Necessity Absolute in it self, is Simple and Uniform, without any possible Difference or Variety : And all Variety or Difference of Existence, must needs arise from some External Cause, and be *dependent* upon it. For to suppose *two* (or more) *different* Natures existing *of themselves*, necessarily, and *independent* from each other ; implies this plain *Contradiction* ; that each of them being independent from the other, they may either of them be supposed to exist alone, so that it will be no contradiction to imagine the other not to exist, and consequently neither of them will be *Necessarily-Existing*.
What-

Being and Attributes of God. 75

Whatsoever therefore exists necessarily, is the One Simple Essence of the Self-Existent Being : and whatsoever differs from that, is not Necessarily-Existing : Because in absolute Necessity there can be no Difference or Diversity of Existence. Other Beings, there may be innumerable, besides the One Infinite Self-Existent : But no Other Nature can be Self-Existent, because so it would be individually the same, at the same time that it is supposed to be different.

From hence it follows,

1st. That the *Unity* of God, is an *of the Tri-*
Unity of Nature or Essence : For *of*^{nity.}
This it is that we must be understood, if we would argue Intelligibly, when we speak of Necessity or Self-Existence. As to the *Diversity of Persons* in that One and the same Nature : That is ; whether in the Unity of the Divine Nature, there may not coexist with the First Supreme Cause, such Emanations from it, as may themselves be equally Eternal, Infinite, and Perfect, by an absolute and complete Communication

tion of all the Divine Attributes in an infinite and perfect degree, excepting only that of Self-Originati-
on : Of this, I say ; as there is no-
thing in bare Reason, by which it
can be demonstrated that there is
actually any such thing ; so neither
is there any Argument, by which it
can be proved impossible or unrea-
sonable to be supposed ; and there-
fore when declared and made known
to us by clear Revelation, it ought
to be believed.

*The Im-
possibility of
two Inde-
pendent
Principles.*

2dly. From hence it follows, That
*it is impossible there should be two dif-
ferent Self-existent Independent Princi-
ples, as some Philosophers have imagin-
ed ; such as God and Matter.* For
since Self Existence is Necessary Ex-
istence ; and since it is an express
Contradiction (as has already been
shown) that two different Natures
should each be Necessarily-existing ;
it evidently follows, that 'tis abso-
lutely impossible there should be
Two Independent Self-existent Prin-
ciples, such as *God and Matter.*

*The Error
of Spinoza.*

3dly. From hence we may observe
the Vanity, Folly and Weakness of
Spinoza :

Being and Attributes of God. 77

Spinoza : who because the Self-existent Being must necessarily be but One, concludes from thence, that the whole World, and every thing contained therein, is One Uniform Substance, Eternal, Uncreated and Necessary : Whereas just on the contrary he ought to have concluded, that because all things in the World are very different one from another, and have all manner of Variety and all the Marks of Will and Arbitrariness and Changeableness, (and none of Necessity) in them ; being plainly fitted with very different Powers, to very different Ends ; and distinguished one from another by a diversity, not only of Modes, but also of essential Attributes, and consequently (so far as 'tis possible for us, by the use of our present Faculties, to attain any Knowledge at all of them) of their Substances themselves also ; therefore none of these things are necessary or Self-existent, but must needs depend all upon some External Cause, that is,

Una substantia non potest produci ab alia. *Ethic.*

Par. I. Prop. 6.

Ad naturam substantiæ pertinet existere. *Prop. 7.*

Præter Deum nulla dari, neq; concipi potest substantia. *Prop. 14.*

on the One Supreme, Unchangeable, Self-existent Being. That which led *Spinoza* into his foolish and destructive Opinion, and on which alone all his *Argumentation* is entirely built, is that *absurd* Definition of Sub-

† Per substantiam Intel-
ligo id, quod in se est, &
per se concipitur; hoc
est, id cuius conceptus non
indiget conceptu alterius
rei, a quo formari debeat.
Definitio 3. Which presently
after he thus explains: Ad
naturam substantiæ perti-
net Existere, hoc est, ipsi-
us essentia involvit necessa-
rio existentiam. *Ethic.*
Par. I. Prop. 7.

stance; † that it is
Something, the Idea of
which does not depend on,
or pre-suppose, the Idea
of any other thing, from
which it might proceed;
but includes in it self Ne-
cessary-existence. Which
Definition is either false
and signifies nothing;
and then his whole Do-

ctrine built upon it, falls at once to
the Ground: Or if it be true; then
neither Matter, nor Spirit, nor any
Finite Being whatsoever, (as has
been before shown) is in that Sense
properly a Substance, but (*the ð ðv*)
the Self-existent Being alone; and
so it will prove Nothing (notwith-
standing all his *Show* and *Form* of
Demonstration,) to his main Pur-
pose; which was, to make us believe
that there is no such Thing as *Power*
or

Being and Attributes of God. 79

or *Liberty* in the Universe, but that

* every particular thing in the World is by an Absolute Necessity just what it is, and could

* Res nullo alio modo, neq; alio ordine, a Deo produci potuerunt, quam productæ sunt. *Prop. 33.*

not possibly have been in any respect otherwise : Supposing, I say, his Definition of Substance to be true ; yet even *That* would really conclude nothing to his main Purpose concerning the Necessity of all Things : For since, according to that Definition, neither Matter nor Spirit nor any Finite Beings whatsoever, are Substances, but only Modes ; how will it follow, that because Substance is Self-existent, therefore all these Modes are so too ? Why,

because † *from an Infinite Cause, Infinite Effects must needs follow.*

† Ex necessitate divinæ naturæ infinita infinitis modis (hoc est, omnia quæ sub intellectum infinitum cadere possunt,) sequi debent. *Prop. 16.*

Very true ; supposing That Infinite Self-existent Cause, not to be

a Voluntary, but a mere Necessary Agent, that is, no Agent at all ; which supposition (*in the present Argument*) is the Question begged ; And what he afterwards attempts to allege in proof of it,

it, shall afterwards be considered in its proper place.

*That the
Self-ex-
istent Being
must be In-
telligent.*

VIII. *The Self-Existent and Original Cause of all things, must be an Intelligent Being.* In this Proposition lies the main Question between us and the Atheists. For that Something must be Self-Existent ; and that That which is Self-existent, must necessarily be Eternal and Infinite and the Original Cause of all things ; will not bear much dispute. But all Atheists, whether they hold the World to be *of it self* Eternal both as to the Matter and Form, or whether they hold the Matter only to be Necessary and the Form Contingent, or whatever Hypothesis they frame ; have always asserted and must maintain, either directly or indirectly, that the Self-Existent Being is not an Intelligent Being, but either pure unactive *Matter*, or (which in other Words is the very same thing) a mere Necessary Agent. For a mere Necessary Agent must of necessity either be plainly and directly in the grossest Sense

Being and Attributes of God. 81

Sense Unintelligent ; which was the antient Atheist Notion of the Self-Existent Being : or else its Intelligence (which is the assertion of *Spinoza* and some Moderns,) must be wholly separate from any Power of Will and Choice ; which in Respect of any Excellency and Perfection, or indeed to any common Sense at all, is the very same thing as no Intelligence at all.

Now that the Self-existent Being is not such a Blind and Unintelligent Necessity, but in the most proper Sense an Understanding and really Active Being ; cannot indeed be Demonstrated strictly and properly *a priori* ; because we know not wherein Intelligence consists, nor can see the immediate and Necessary Connection of it with Self-existence, as we can that of Eternity, Infinity, Unity, &c. But *a posteriori*, almost every thing in the World Demonstrates to us this great Truth, and affords undeniable Arguments to prove that the World, and all things therein, are the Effects of an Intelligent and Knowing Cause.

G

And

*Proved
from the
Degrees of
Perfection
in Things,
and the Or-
der of
Causes and
Effects.*

And 1st, Since in general there are manifestly in Things, various kinds of Powers, and very different Excellencies and Degrees of Perfection; it must needs be, that in the Order of Causes and Effects, the Cause must always be more Excellent than the Effect; and consequently the Self-Existent Being, whatever That be Supposed to be, must of necessity (being the Original of all things) contain in it self the Sum and highest Degree of all the Perfections of all things. Not because that which is Self-Existent, must *therefore* have all possible Perfections: (For This, though most certainly true in it self, yet cannot be so clearly demonstrated *a priori*:) But because it is impossible that any effect should have any Perfection, which was not in the Cause: For if it had, then that Perfection would be caused by Nothing; which is a flat Contradiction. Now an *Unintelligent* Being, 'tis evident, cannot be indued with all the Perfections of all things in the World; because *Intelligence* is one of those Perfections.

Being and Attributes of God. 83

Perfections. All things therefore cannot arise from an Unintelligent Original : and consequently the Self-Existent Being, must of Necessity be Intelligent.

There is no Possibility for an Atheist to avoid the Force of this Argument any other way, than by asserting one of these two things : Either that there is no Intelligent Being at all in the Universe ; or that Intelligence is no distinct Perfection, but merely a Composition of Figure and Motion, as Colour and Sounds are vulgarly supposed to be. Of the former of these Suppositions, every Mans own Consciousness is an abundant Confutation : For they who contend that *Beasts* are mere Machines, have yet never presumed to conjecture that *Men* are so too. And that the latter, (in which the main strength of Atheism lies,) is most absurd and impossible, shall be shown immediately : Which nevertheless if it could be supposed to be True, yet even in That Supposition it would still unavoidably follow, that the Self-Existing Being must

needs be Intelligent ; as shall be proved in my 4th Argument upon this present Head. In the mean time, that it is most absurd and impossible to suppose Intelligence not to be any distinct Perfection, properly speaking, but merely a Composition of Unintelligent Figure and Motion ; will appear from what shall be said in the ensuing Argument.

*From the
Intelli-
gence that
is in crea-
ted Beings.*

2dly. Since *in Man in particular* there is undeniably that Power, which we call Thought, Intelligence, Consciousness, Perception or Knowledge ; there must of Necessity either have been from Eternity *without any Original Cause at all*, an infinite Succession of Men, whereof *no one* has had a *Necessary*, but *every one* a *Dependent and Communicated* Being ; or else these Beings, indued with Perception and Consciousness, must at some time or other have arisen purely out of that which had no such Quality as Sense, Perception or Consciousness ; or else they must have been produced by some *Intelligent* Superiour Being. There never
was

Being and Attributes of God. 85

was nor can by any Atheist whatsoever, that can deny but that One of these three Suppositions must be the Truth. If therefore the two former can be proved to be false and impossible, the latter must be owned to be Demonstrably true. Now that the first is impossible, is evident from what has been already said in proof of the *Second* General Head of this Discourse. And that the second is likewise impossible ; may be thus Demonstrated. If Perception or Intelligence, be a *distinct Quality* or Perfection ; and not a mere Effect or Composition of Unintelligent Figure and Motion ; then Beings indued with Perception and Consciousness, can never have arisen purely out of that which had no such Quality as Perception or Consciousness ; because Nothing can ever give to another any Perfection, which it hath not either actually in it self, or at least in a higher degree : *But* Perception or Intelligence, is a distinct Quality or Perfection ; and not a meer Effect or Composition of Unintelligent Figure and Motion.

needs be Intelligent ; as shall be proved in my 4th Argument upon this present Head. In the mean time, that it is most absurd and impossible to suppose Intelligence not to be any distinct Perfection, properly speaking, but merely a Composition of Unintelligent Figure and Motion ; will appear from what shall be said in the ensuing Argument.

*From the
Intelli-
gence that
is in crea-
ted Beings.*

2dly. Since *in Man in particular* there is undeniably that Power, which we call Thought, Intelligence, Consciousness, Perception or Knowledge ; there must of Necessity either have been from Eternity *without any Original Cause at all*, an infinite Succession of Men, whereof *no one* has had a *Necessary*, but *every one* a *Dependent and Communicated* Being ; or else these Beings, indued with Perception and Consciousness, must at some time or other have arisen purely out of that which had no such Quality as Sense, Perception or Consciousness ; or else they must have been produced by some *Intelligent* Superiour Being. There never
was

Being and Attributes of God. 85

was nor can by any Atheist whatsoever, that can deny but that One of these three Suppositions must be the Truth. If therefore the two former can be proved to be false and impossible, the latter must be owned to be Demonstrably true. Now that the first is impossible, is evident from what has been already said in proof of the *Second* General Head of this Discourse. And that the second is likewise impossible ; may be thus Demonstrated. If Perception or Intelligence, be a *distinct Quality* or Perfection ; and not a mere Effect or Composition of Unintelligent Figure and Motion ; then Beings indued with Perception and Consciousness, can never have arisen purely out of that which had no such Quality as Perception or Consciousness ; because Nothing can ever give to another any Perfection, which it hath not either actually in it self, or at least in a higher degree : *But* Perception or Intelligence, is a distinct Quality or Perfection ; and not a meer Effect or Composition of Unintelligent Figure and Motion.

*First, If Perception or Intelligence, be any real, distinct Quality or Perfection ; and not a mere Effect or Composition of Unintelligent Figure and Motion ; then Beings indued with Perception or Consciousness, can never possibly have arisen purely out of that which it self had no such Quality as Perception or Consciousness ; because nothing can ever give to another any Perfection, which it hath not either actually in it self, or at least in a higher degree. This is very evident ; because if any thing could give another any Perfection which it has not it self, that Perfection would be caused absolutely by Nothing ; which is a flat Contradiction. If any one here replies, (as Mr. Gildon has done * in a Letter to Mr. Blount,) that Colours, Sounds, Taste, and the like, arise from Figure and Motion, which have no such Qualities in themselves ; or that Figure, Divisibility, and other Qualities of Matter, are confessed to be given it by God, who yet cannot without extreme Blasphemy be said to have any such Qualities himself ; and that therefore*

* *Oracles
of Reason,
pag. 186.*

therefore in like manner Perception

or † Intelligence may

arise out of that which

has no Intelligence it

self: The Answer is

very easie: first, That

Colours, Sounds, Taste,

and the like, are by no

means Effects arising

from mere Figure and

Motion; there being

nothing in the Bodies

themselves, the Objects

of the Senses, that has

any manner of Similitude to any

of these Qualities; but they are

plainly *Thoughts* or Modifications

of the Mind it self, which is an

Intelligent Being; and are not pro-

perly *Caused*, but only *Occasioned*,

by the Impressions of Figure and

Motion: Nor will it at all help an

Atheist (as to the present Question,) *though*

we should make for his sake

(that we may allow him the greatest

possible Advantage) even That most

absurd Supposition, that the Mind

it self is nothing but mere Matter,

and not at all an Immaterial Sub-

† If with one of *Cicero's* Dialogists they would infer that the whole must have Understanding, because some Portions of it are Intelligent; — we may retort with the other Speaker in *Cicero*, that by the same Argument, the Whole must be a Courtier, a Musician, a Dancing-Master, or a Philosopher, because many of the Parts are such. *Mr. Toland's Letter, Motion essential to Matter.*

stance ; For even supposing it to be mere Matter, yet he must needs confess it to be such Matter, as is indued not only with bare Figure and Motion, but also with the Quality of Intelligence and Perception ; and then, as to the present Question, it will still come to the same thing ; that Colours, Sounds, and the like, which are not Qualities of Unintelligent Bodies, but Perceptions of Mind, can no more be caused by, or arise from, mere Unintelligent Figure and Motion, than Colour can be a Triangle, or Sound a Square, or Something be caused by Nothing. And then, as to the second Part of the Objection ; that Figure, Divisibility, and other Qualities of Matter are (as we our selves acknowledge) given it by God, who yet cannot without extreme Blasphemy be said to have any such Qualities himself ; and that therefore in like manner Perception or Intelligence may arise out of that which has no Intelligence it self ; The Answer is still easier ; That Figure, Divisibility, and other such like Qualities of Matter,

Being and Attributes of God. 89

Matter, are not real, proper, distinct and Positive Powers, but only Negative Qualities, Deficiencies or Imperfections ; And though no Cause can communicate to its Effect any real Perfection which it has not it self, yet the Effect may easily have many Imperfections, Deficiencies, or Negative Qualities, which are not in the Cause. Though therefore Figure, Divisibility and the like, (which are mere Negations, as all *Limitations* are,) may be in the Effect, and not in the Cause ; yet Intelligence, (which we now suppose, and shall prove immediately, to be a distinct Quality ; and which no Man can say is a mere Negation ;) cannot possibly be so. And now, having thus demonstrated, that if Perception or Intelligence be supposed to be a *distinct Quality* or Perfection, (though even but of *Matter* only, if the Atheist pleases,) and not a mere Effect or Composition of Unintelligent Figure and Motion ; then Beings indued with Perception or Consciousness can never have risen purely out of
that

A Demonstration of the

that which had no such Quality as Perception or Consciousness ; because nothing can ever give to another any Perfection, which it has not it self : It will easily appear, *secondly*, That Perception or Intelligence is really such a distinct Quality or Perfection ; and not possibly a mere Effect or Composition of Unintelligent Figure and Motion : And that for this plain Reason ; because Intelligence is not Figure, and Consciousness is not Motion. For whatever can arise from, or be compounded of any Things ; is still only those very Things, of which it was compounded : And if infinite Compositions or Divisions be made eternally, the Things will still be but eternally the same : And all their possible Effects, can never be any thing but Repetitions of the same. For instance : All possible Changes, Compositions or Divisions of *Figure*, are still nothing but *Figure* : And all possible Compositions or Effects of *Motion*, can eternally be nothing but mere *Motion*. If therefore there ever was a Time, when there was nothing in the Universe

verse but Matter and Motion ; there never could have been any thing else therein, but Matter and Motion : And it would have been as impossible, there should ever have existed any such thing as Intelligence or Consciousness ; or even any such thing as Light, or Heat, or Sound, or Colour, or any of those we call Secondary Qualities of Matter ; as it is now impossible for Motion to be Blue or Red, or for a Triangle to be transformed into a Sound. That which has been apt to deceive Men in this matter, is this ; that they imagine Compounds, to be somewhat really different from that of which they are compounded : Which is a very great Mistake. For all the Things, of which Men so judge ; either, if they be really different, are not Compounds nor Effects of what Men judge them to be, but are something totally distinct ; as when the Vulgar thinks Colours and Sounds to be Properties Inherent in Bodies, when indeed they are purely Thoughts of the Mind : Or else, if they be really Compounds
and

and Effects, then they are not different, but exactly the same that ever they were ; as when two Triangles put together make a Square, that Square is still nothing but two Triangles ; or when a Square cut in halves makes two Triangles, those two Triangles are still only the two halves of a Square ; or when the mixture of Blue and Yellow Powder makes a Green, that Green is still nothing but Blue and Yellow intermixed, as is plainly visible by the help of Microscopes : And, in short, every thing by Composition, Division, or Motion ; is nothing else but the very same it was before, taken either in whole or by Parts, or in different Place or Order. Mr. *Hobbs* seems to have been aware of this : And therefore, though he is very sparing, and as it were ashamed to speak out ; yet finding himself pressed in his own Mind with the Difficulty arising from the Impossibility of Sense or Consciousness being merely the Effect of Figure and Motion ; and it not serving *his* Purpose at all, (were the thing never so possible,)

Being and Attributes of God. 93

ble,) to suppose that God by an immediate and voluntary Act of his *Almighty* Power indues certain Systems of Matter with Consciousness and Thought, (of which Opinion I shall have Occasion to speak somewhat more hereafter ;) he is forced * to recur to that prodigiously absurd Supposition, that All Matter, as Matter, is indued not only with Figure and a Capacity of Motion, but also with an actual Sense or Perception ; and wants only the Organs and Memory of Animals, to express its Sensation.

ita tantum sentient, ut nunquam sensisse se recordentur. — Sensationi ergo, quæ vulgo ita appellatur, necessario adheret memoria aliqua, &c. *Hobbs Physic. Cap. 25. Sect. 5.*

* Scio fuisse Philosophos quosdam, eosdemque viros doctos, qui corpora omnia Sensu prædita esse sustinuerunt: nec video, si naturâ sensationis in reactione solâ collocaretur, quomodo refutari possint. Sed etsi ex reactione etiam corporum aliorum phantasma aliquod nasceretur, illud tamen remoto objecto statim cessaret: Nam nisi ad retinendum motum impressum, etiam remoto objecto, apta habeant Organâ, ut habent Animalia ;

3dly, That the Self-existent and Original Cause of all things, is an Intelligent Being ; appears abundantly from the excellent Variety, Order, Beauty and Wonderful Contrivance

From the Beauty, Order, and final Causes of Things

See Mr
Boyle of *fi-
nal Causes*,
and Mr
Ray of *the
Wisdom of
God in the
Creation*.

vance and Fitness of all things in the World, to their proper and respective Ends. This Argument has been so Learnedly and Fully handled, both by Ancient and Modern Writers; that I do but just mention it, without enlarging at all upon it. I shall only at this Time make this One Observation: That whereas *Des Cartes* and others have indeavoured to give a Possible Account, how the World might be formed by the Necessary Laws of Motion alone; they have by so seemingly Vast an Undertaking, really meant no more, than to explain Philosophically how the inanimate part, that is, infinitely the least considerable part of the World, might possibly have been framed: For as to Plants and Animals, in which the Wisdom of the Creator principally appears; they have never in any tolerable manner, or with any the least appearance of Success, pretended to give an account, how *They* were originally Formed. In these Things, Matter and the Laws of Motion, are able to do nothing at all: And how ridiculous the Epicurean Hypo-

Being and Attributes of God. 95

Hypothesis is, of the Earth producing them all at first by chance ; (besides that I think that it is now given up even by all Atheists ;) appears from the late Discovery made in Philosophy, that there is no such thing as equivocal Generation of any the meanest Animal or Plant ; the Sun and Earth and Water, and all the Powers of Nature in Conjunction, being able to do nothing at all towards the producing any thing indued with so much as even a Vegetable Life : (From which most excellent Discovery, we may *by the* ~~by~~ observe the Usefulness of Natural and Experimental Philosophy, sometimes even in Matters of Religion.) Since therefore things are thus, it must unavoidably be granted (even by the most Obstinate Atheist,) either that all Plants and Animals are originally the Work of an Intelligent Being, and Created by him in Time ; or that having been from Eternity in the same Order and Method they now are in, they are an Eternal Effect of an Eternal Intelligent Cause continually exerting his Infinite Power

et

er and Wisdom; or else that without any Self-existent Original at all, they have been derived one from another in an Eternal Succession, by an Infinite Progress of Dependent Causes. The first of these three ways, is the Conclusion we assert: The second, (so far as the Cause of Atheism is concerned,) comes to the very same thing: And the third I have already shown, (in the Proof of the Second General Head of this Discourse,) to be absolutely Impossible and a Contradiction.

*From the
Original of
Motion.*

4thly, Supposing it was possible that the Form of the World and all the Visible things contained therein, with the Order, Beauty, and exquisite Fitness of their Parts; nay, supposing that even Intelligence it self, with Consciousness and Thought, in all the Beings we know, could possible be the Result or Effect of mere Unintelligent Matter, Figure and Motion: (which is the most unreasonable and impossible Supposition in the World :) Yet even still there would remain an undeniable Demonstration,

Being and Attributes of God. 97

monstration, that the Self-existent Being, (whatever it be supposed to be,) must be Intelligent. For even these Principles themselves [*Unintelligent Figure and Motion*] could never have possibly existed without there having been before them an Intelligent Cause. I instance in *Motion*. 'Tis evident there is Now such a thing as Motion in the World : Which either began at some Time or other, or was Eternal : If it began at any Time, then the Question is granted, that the First Cause is an Intelligent Being ; For mere Unintelligent Matter, and that at Rest, 'tis manifest could never of it self begin to move : On the contrary, if Motion was Eternal ; either it was eternally caused by some Eternal Intelligent Being ; or it must of it self be Necessary and Self-existent ; or else, without any Necessity in its own Nature, and without any External Necessary Cause, it must have existed from Eternity by an Endless Successive Communication. If Motion was eternally Caused by some Eternal Intelligent Being ; this also

H

is

is granting the Question, as to the present Dispute. If it was of it self Necessary and Self-existent; then it follows, that it must be a Contradiction in Terms, to suppose any Matter to be at Rest; and it must also imply a Contradiction, to suppose that there might *possibly* have been originally more or less Motion in the Universe than there *actually* was; which is so very absurd a Consequence, that *Spinoza* himself, though he expressly asserts all Things to be

* *Spinoza* Ethic. Par. I. Prop. 33. compared with Par. II. Prop. 13. Lemma 3.

Necessary, yet seems ashamed * to speak out his Opinion, or rather plainly contradicts himself in the Question about the Original of Motion. But if it be said that Motion, without any Necessity in its own Nature, and without any External Necessary Cause, has existed from Eternity, merely by an Endless Successive Communication; as †

† *Corpus* motum vel quiescens, ad motum vel quietem determinari debuit ab alio corpore, quod etiam ad motum vel quietem determinatum fuit ab alio, & illud iterum ab alio, & sic in infinitum. Ethic. Par. II. Prop. 13. Lemma 3.

This

Being and Attributes of God. 99

This I have before shown, (in the Proof of the Second General Proposition of this Discourse,) to be a flat Contradiction. It remains therefore, that Motion must of Necessity be Originally Caused by Something that is Intelligent ; or else there never could have been any such Thing as Motion in the World : And consequently the Self-existent Being, the Original Cause of all Things, (whatever it be supposed to be,) must of Necessity be *an Intelligent Being.*

From hence it follows again, that the material World, cannot possibly be the Original Self-Existent Being. For since the Self-Existent Being, is demonstrated to be Intelligent ; and the Material World plainly is not so ; it follows that the Material World cannot possibly be Self-Existent. What some have fondly imagined concerning *a Soul of the World* ; if thereby they mean a Created, Dependent Being ; signifies nothing in the present Argument : But if they understand thereby Something Necessary and Self-Existent ; then it

is nothing else, but a false, corrupt, and imperfect Notion of God.

That the Self-existent Being must be a Free Agent. IX. *The Self-Existent and Original Cause of all Things, is not a necessary Agent, but a Being indued with Liberty and Choice.* The contrary to this Proposition, is the Foundation and the Sum of what *Spinoza* and his Followers have asserted, concerning the Nature of God. What Reasons or Arguments they have offered for their Opinion, I shall have occasion to consider briefly in my Proof of the Proposition it self. The Truth of which, appears

This a necessary Consequence of the foregoing Proposition. 1st, In that it is a Necessary Consequence of the foregoing Proposition. For *Intelligence* without *Liberty* (as I there hinted) is really (in respect of any Power, Excellence, or Perfection,) *no Intelligence* at all. It is indeed a *Consciousness*, but it is merely a *Passive One*; a *Consciousness*, not of Acting, but purely of being Acted upon. Without *Liberty*, nothing can in any tolerable Propriety

Being and Attributes of God. 101

Propriety of Speech, be said to be an Agent or Cause of any thing. For to Act necessarily, is really and properly not to Act at all, but only to be Acted upon. What therefore *Spinoza* and his Followers assert concerning the Production of all Things * from the Necessity of

the Divine Nature, is mere Cant and Words without any meaning at all. For if by the Ne-

cessity of the Divine Nature they understand not the Perfection and Rectitude of his Will, whereby God is unalterably determined to do always what is best in the whole ; (as confessedly they do not ; because this is consistent with the most perfect Liberty and Choice ;) but on the contrary they mean an Absolute and Strictly Natural Necessity : It follows evidently, that when they say God, by the Necessity of his Nature, is the Cause and Author of all things ; they understand him to be a Cause or Agent in no other Sense, than as if a Man should say that a Stone, by the Necessity of its Na-

H 3

ture,

* Ex necessitate Divinæ naturæ, infinita, infinitis modis sequi debent. *Ethic. Par. I. Prop. 16.*

ture, is the Cause of its own falling and striking the Ground ; which is really not to be an Agent or Cause at all ; but their Opinion amounts to this, that all things are equally Self-Existent, and consequently that the Material World is God ; which I have before proved to be a Contradiction. In like manner, when they speak of the Intelligence and Knowledge of God ; they mean to attribute these Powers to him in no other Sense, than the antient *Hylozoicks* attributed them to all Matter ; that is, that a Stone, when it falls, has a Sensation and Consciousness ; but That Consciousness is no Cause at all, or Power of Acting. Which kind of Intelligence, in any tolerable Propriety of Speech, is no Intelligence at all : And Consequently the Arguments that proved the Supreme Cause to be *properly* an Intelligent and Active Being, do also undeniably prove that he is likewise indued with Liberty and Choice, which alone is the Power of Acting.

2dly, If

Being and Attributes of God. 103

2dly, If the Supreme Cause, is not a Being indued with Liberty and Choice, but a mere Necessary Agent, whose Actions are all as absolutely and naturally Necessary as his Existence : Then it will follow, that nothing which is not, could possibly have been ; and that nothing which is, could possibly not have been ; and that no Mode or Circumstance of the Existence of any thing, could possibly have been in any respect otherwise, than it now actually is. All which being evidently most false and absurd : it follows on the contrary, that the Supreme Cause is not a mere necessary Agent, but a Being indued with Liberty and Choice.

* The Consequence ; viz. that if the Supreme Cause be a Necessary Agent, then nothing which is not, could possibly have been ; and nothing which is, could possibly either not have been, or have been different from what 'tis ; is expressly owned by Spinoza to

* Alii putant, Deum esse causam liberam, propterea quod potest, ut putant, efficere ut ea quæ ex ejus natura sequi diximus, hoc est, quæ in ejus potestate sunt, non fiant ; sed hoc idem est ac si dicerent, quod Deus potest efficere, ut ex natura trianguli non sequatur, ejus tres angulos aequales esse duobus rectis. — Ego me satis clare ostendisse puto, a

summa Dei Potentia Omnia necessario effluxisse, vel semper eadem necessitate sequi; eodem modo ac ex natura trianguli ab æterno & in æternum sequitur, ejus tres angulos æquari duobus rectis. *Ethic. Par. I. Schol. ad Prop. 17.*

Omnia ex necessitate naturæ divinæ determinata sunt, non tantum ad existendum, sed etiam ad certo modo existendum & operandum, nullumq; datur Contingens. *Demonstrat. Prop. 29.*

Si res alterius naturæ potuissent esse, vel alio modo ad operandum determinari; ut naturæ ordo alius esset: ergo Dei etiam natura alia posset esse quam jam est. *Prop. 33. Demonstrat.*

Quicquid concipimus in Dei Potestate esse, id necessario est. *Prop. 35.*

Deum non operari ex libertate Voluntatis: *Corol. ad Prop. 32.*

Rēs nullo alio modo, neq; alio ordine a Deo produci poterunt, quam productæ sunt. *Prop. 33.*

† Ex necessitate divinæ naturæ, infinita infinitis modis sequi debent. *Prop. 16.*

* Si res alterius naturæ potuissent esse, vel alio modo ad operandum determinari; ut naturæ Ordo alius esset: Ergo Dei etiam natura alia posset esse quam jam est. *Prop. 33. Demonstrat.*

be the unavoidable Consequence of his own Opinion: And accordingly he endeavours to maintain, that *no Thing, or Mode of Existence of any Thing, could possibly have been in any respect different from what it now actually is*: His Reasons are; (1.) because † *from an Infinitely perfect Nature, infinite Things in infinite Manners, must needs proceed*; and (2.) * *because, if any thing could possibly be otherwise than it is, the Will and Nature of God must be supposed capable of change*

and

Being and Attributes of God. 105

and (3.) † because, if all possible Things in all possible Manners do not always and necessarily exist, they never can All exist; but some Things, that do not exist, will still always be possible only, and never can actually exist; and so the Actual Omnipotence of God is taken away. The first of these Arguments, is a plain begging the Question: For, that an Infinitely Perfect Nature, is

able indeed to produce Infinite Things in Infinite Manners, is certainly true; but that it *must* always actually do so, by an *absolute Necessity of Nature*, without any Power of Choice, either as to Time or Manner or Circumstances, does by no means follow from the Perfection of its Nature, unless it be first *supposed* to be a *Necessary Agent*; which is the very Question begged, that was to be proved. The *second* Argument, is (if possible) still weaker;

† Imo adversarii, [qui negant, ex necessitate divinæ naturæ omnia necessario fluere,] Dei Omnipotentiam negare videntur. Coguntur enim fateri, Deum infinita creabilia intelligere, quæ tamen nunquam creare poterit. Nam alias, si scilicet omnia, quæ intelligit, crearet; suam, juxta ipsos, exhaustiret Omnipotentiam, & se imperfectum redderet. Ut igitur Deum perfectum stant, eo rediguntur, ut simul statuere debeant, ipsum non posse omnia efficere, ad quæ ejus potentia se extendit. *Coroll. ad Prop. 17.*

er ; For how does it follow, if God, according to his eternal unerring Purpose and Infinite Wisdom, produces different Things at different Times and in different Manners ; that therefore the Will and Nature of God, is changeable ; It might exactly as well be argued, that if God (according to *Spinoza's* Supposition) does *Always* necessarily produce all possible *Differences* and *Varieties* of Things ; therefore his Will and Nature is *Always* necessarily infinitely *various, unequal, and dissimilar to it self*. And as to the *third* Argument ; (which is only a mere Metaphysical Vanity,) it is just such Reasoning, as if a Man should argue, that if all possible [Eternal] Duration be not *Always* actually exhausted, it never can be All Exhausted ; and that therefore so the *Eternity* of God is taken away : Which sort of arguing, every one at first sight discerns the Weakness of. But whatever the Arguments were, and if they were never so much more plausible than they really are ; yet the

Being and Attributes of God. 107

the Assertion it self, [*viz: That no Thing or Mode of Existence of any Thing, could possibly have been made in any respect different from what it actually is,*] is so palpably absurd and false, so contradictory to experience and the Nature of Things, and to the most obvious and common Reason of Mankind; that of it self it immediately and upon the first hearing, sufficiently confutes any Principle of which it is a Consequence. For all Things in the World appear plainly to be the most Arbitrary that can be imagined; and to be wholly the Effects, not of *Necessity*, but of Wisdom and Choice. A *Necessity* indeed of *Fitness*; that is, that things could not have been Otherwise than they are, without diminishing the Beauty, Order, and well Being of the Whole; there may be, and (as far as we can apprehend) there certainly Is: But this is so far from serving our Adversaries Purpose, that on the contrary 'tis a direct Demonstration that all things were made and ordered by a Free and a Wise Agent. That there-

therefore which I affirm, contradictory to *Spinoza's* Assertion, is, That there is not the least appearance of an *Absolute Necessity of Nature*, (so as that any Variation would imply a Contradiction,) in any of these Things. *Motion* it self, and all its Quantities and Directions, with the Laws of *Gravitation*, are intirely Arbitrary; and might possibly have been altogether different from what they now are. The *Number* and *Motion* of the *Heavenly Bodies*, have no manner of Necessity in the Nature of the Things themselves. The number of the Planets might have been greater or less: Their Motions upon their own Axes, might have been in any porportion swifter or slower than it now is: And the Direction of all their progressive Motions, both of the primary and secondary Planets, uniformly from

* Nam dum Cometæ moventur in Orbibus valde eccentricis, undiq; & quoquoeversum in omnes cæli partes; utiq; nullo modo fieri potuit, ut cæco fato tribuendum sit, quod Planetæ in orbibus concentricis Motu consimili ferantur eodem omnes. — Tam miram uniformitatem in Planetarum Systemate, necessario fatendum est Intelligentia & Consilio fuisse effectam. *Neuton Optic. pag. 345.*

Being and Attributes of God. 109

on of Comets it appears there was no Necessity but that they might as easily have moved in all imaginable transverse Directions; is an evident proof that these things are solely the Effect of Wisdom and Choice. There is not the least appearance of Necessity, but that all these things might possibly have been infinitely varied from their present Constitution; and (as the late improvements in Astronomy discover) they *are* actually liable to very great Changes. Every thing upon *Earth*, is still more evidently arbitrary; and plainly the Product, not of Necessity, but Will. What absolute Necessity, for just such a Number of *Species* of *Animals* or *Plants*? or who without blushing dare affirm, that * neither the Form, nor Order, nor any the minutest Circumstance or Mode of Existence of any of these Things, could *possib'y* have been in the least diversified by the Supreme Cause?

* Res nullo alio modo, neq; alio Ordine, a Deo produci poterunt, quam productæ sunt: Spinoza ut supra.

To give but one Instance: In all the greater Species of Animals, Where was the Necessity for that

* con

* Idemq; dici possit de uniformitate illa, quæ est in corporibus Animalium, viz. necessario fatendum est, Intelligentia & Consilio fuisse effectam. *Newton Optic. pag. 346.*

* conformity we observe in the Number and Likeness of all their Principal Members? and how would it have been a Contradiction, to suppose any or all of them varied from what they now are? To suppose indeed the continuance of such Monsters as *Lucretius* imagines to have perished for want of their principal Organs of Life, is really a Contradiction; But how would it have been a Contradiction for a whole Species of *Horses* or *Oxen*, to have subsisted with *Six Legs* or *Four Eyes*? But 'tis a shame to insist longer upon so plain an Argument.

It might have been Objected with much more Plausibleness, that the Supreme Cause cannot be Free, because He must needs do always what is best in the whole. But this would not at all serve *Spinoza's* Purpose. For this is a Necessity, not of Nature and Fate, but of Fitness and Wisdom; a Necessity, consistent with the greatest Freedom

Being and Attributes of God. I I I

Freedom and most perfect Choice. For the only Foundation of this Necessity, is such an unalterable Rectitude of Will and Perfection of Wisdom, as makes it impossible for a Wise Being to resolve to Act Foolishly ; or for a Nature infinitely Good, to Choose to do that which is Evil. *Of which I shall have Occasion to speak more hereafter, when I come to Deduce the Moral Attributes of God.*

3dly. If there be any Final Cause of any thing in the Universe ; then the Supreme Cause, is not a Necessary, but a Free Agent. This Consequence also, *Spinoza* acknowledges to be unavoidable : And therefore he

The same proved also from Final Causes.

has no other way left, but with a

strange Confidence to † expose all Final Causes, as the Fictions of ignorant and superstitious Men : And to * laugh at those who are so foolish and childish as to fancy that *Eyes* were designed and fitted to see with, *Teeth* to chew with, *Food*

† Naturam finem nullum sibi præfixum habere ; & omnes causas Finales, nihil, nisi humana esse Figmenta. *Appendix ad Prop. 36.*

* Oculos ad Videndum, dentes ad masticandum, herbas & animalia ad alimentum, solem ad illuminandum mare ad alendum pisces, &c. *Ibid.*

to

to be eaten for Nourishment, the Sun to give Light, &c. I suppose it will not be thought, that when once a Man comes to this, he is to be disputed with any longer. Whoever pleases, may, for satisfaction on this Head, consult *Galen de Usu Partium*, *Tully de natura Deorum*, *Mr Boyle of Final Causes*, and *Mr Ray of the Wisdom of God in the Creation*. I shall only observe this One Thing, that the greater the Improvements and Discoveries are, which are daily made in Astronomy and Natural Philosophy; the more clearly is this Question continually determined, to the Shame and Confusion of Atheists.

*From the
finiteness of
Created
Beings.*

4thly. If the Supreme Cause be a mere Necessary Agent, it is impossible any Effect or Product of that Cause should be *Finite*. For since that which acts necessarily, cannot govern or direct its own Actions; but must necessarily produce whatever can be the Effect or Product of its Nature: 'Tis plain, every Effect of such an Infinite Uniform Nature, acting every where necessarily alike; must of necessity be Immense, or Infinite.

Being and Attributes of God. 113

finite in Extension : And so no Creature in the Universe could possibly be Finite ; which is infinitely Absurd and contrary to Experience.

Spinoza, to shuffle off this Absurdity, expresses the Consequence of his Doctrine thus ; That * from

the Necessity of the Divine Nature , infinite Things (meaning infinite

* Ex necessitate divinæ naturæ, infinita infinitis modis sequi debent. *Ethic. Par. I. Prop. 16.*

in number) in infinite Manners must needs follow : But whoever reads his Demonstration of this Proposition, can hardly miss to observe, (if he be at all used to such Speculations,) that if it proved any thing at all, it would equally prove, That from the Necessity of the Divine Nature, Only Infinite Things (meaning Infinite in Extension) can possibly arise. Which Demonstration alone, is a sufficient Confutation of the Opinion it was designed to establish.

5thly. If the Supreme Cause be not a Free and Voluntary Agent ; then in every Effect, (for instance, in Motion,) there must have been a Progression of Causes in infinitum, without any Original Cause at all.

And from the Impossibility of an Infinite Succession of Causes.

!

For

For if there be no Liberty any where ; then there is no Agent ; no Cause, Mover, Principle, or Beginning of *Motion* any where : Every thing in the Universe must be *Passive*, and nothing *Active* ; Every thing *Moved*, and no *Mover* ; Every thing *Effect*, and nothing *Cause*. *Spinoza* indeed, (as has been already Observed) refers all things to the *Necessity of the Divine Nature*, as their real Cause and Original : But this is mere Cant, and Words without any Signification ; and will not at all help him over the present Difficulty. For if by things Existing through the *Necessity of the Divine Nature*, he means *Absolutely a Necessity of Existence* ; so as to make the World, and every thing in it, *Self-existent* ; then it follows (as I have before shown) that it must be a Contradiction in Terms, to suppose *Motion*, &c. not to Exist ; which *Spinoza* himself is ashamed to assert. But if therefore by the *Necessity of the Divine Nature*, he means only the *Necessary following of an Effect from the Cause*, or, the *Cause necessarily producing*

Being and Attributes of God. 115

ducing its Effect ; this Necessity must still always be determined by something antecedent, and so on infinitely : And this, Spinoza (though sometimes he seems to mean the other and equally absurd Sense) expressly owns in some Places to be his meaning :

* *There can be no Volition, saith he, but from some Cause, which Cause must likewise be caused by some other Cause, and so on infinitely. Again, Will, † saith he, belongs to the Nature of God, no otherwise than Motion and Rest do ; So that God can no more properly be said to Act by the Liberty of his Will, then by the Liberty of Motion and Rest. And what the Original of Motion and Rest is, he tells us in these Words : * Every Body in Motion or at Rest, must have been determined to that Motion or Rest by some other Body, which must it self likewise have*

* Unaquaq; Volitio non potest existere, neq; ad operandum determinari ; nisi ab alia causa determinetur, & hæc rursus ab alia, & sic porro in infinitum. Prop. 32. Dem.

† Voluntas ad Dei naturam non magis pertinet, quam reliqua naturalia ; sed ad ipsam eodem modo sese habet, ut motus & Quies.

Deus non magis dici potest ex libertate Voluntatis agere, quam dici potest ex libertate Motus & Quietis agere. Coroll. ad Prop. 32.

* Corpus motum vel quiescens, ad motum vel quietem determinari debuit ab alio corpore, quod etiam ad motum vel quietem determinatum fuit ab alio ; & illud iterum ab alio ; & sic in infinitum. Ethic. Par. II. Prop. 13. Lemma 3.

116 *A Demonstration of the*

been determined by a third; and so on in infinitum. And thus, since Motion is not in any one of its Stages of Communication a Necessary Selfexisting Being, (because the Body moved, may always without a Contradiction have been imagined to be at Rest, and is supposed not to have Motion from it self, but from another;) the Opinion of Spinoza plainly recurs to An Infinite Succession of dependent Beings produced one from another in an endless Progression, without any Original Cause at all. Which Notion I have already (in the Proof of the second General Head of this Discourse) Demonstrated to imply a Contradiction. And since therefore there is no other possible way to avoid this Absurdity, but by granting that there must be somewhere a Principle of Motion and Action, which is Liberty; I suppose it by this time sufficiently proved, that the Supreme Cause must be a Being indued with Liberty and Choice.

From

Being and Attributes of God. 117

From what has been said upon this Head, it sufficiently appears, ^{That Liberty is not in it self} that Liberty is not in it self, and in the very Notion of the Thing, ^{an Impossible and contradictory} an absolute Contradiction and Impossibility; as the Pleaders for Necessity

and Fate contend that it is, and place the chief strength of their Arguments in that Supposition. For that which actually is, is certainly not impossible: And it has already been proved, that Liberty actually is; nay, that it is impossible for it not to be, in the First and Supreme Cause. The Principal Argument used by the Maintainers of Fate against the Possibility of Liberty, is this: That since every thing must have a Cause, † every Volition

or Determination of the Will of an Intelligent Being, must as all other things, arise from some Cause, and that Cause from some other Cause, and so on infinitely.

† Mens ad hoc vel illud volendum determinatur a Causa, quæ etiam ab alia determinata est, & hæc iterum ab alia, & sic in infinitum. *Spinoza Ethicæ Par. II. Prop. 48.*

But this very Argument really proves the direct contrary: For since every
I 3 thing

thing must indeed have a Cause of its Being, either from without, or in the Necessity of its own Nature; and it is a flat contradiction (as has already been demonstrated) to suppose an infinite Series of dependent Effects, none of which are Necessary in Themselves or Self-Existent; therefore it is impossible but there must be in the Universe Some Being, whose Existence is founded in the Necessity of its Own Nature, and who being acted upon by Nothing beyond it self, must of Necessity have *in it self* a Principle of Acting, or Power of beginning Motion, which is the Idea of Liberty. 'Tis true, this Argument proves only the Liberty of the First and Supreme Cause; and extends not indeed to any Created Being: But it evinces in General, (which is sufficient to my present purpose,) that Liberty is so far from being impossible and contradictory in it self, that on the contrary it is impossible but that it must really Be somewhere; and this being once established, it will be easie to shew here.

Being and Attributes of God. 119

hereafter, that it is a Power capable of being communicated to Created Beings ; of which in its proper place.

X. *The Self-Existent Being, the Supreme Cause of all Things, must of necessity have infinite Power.* This Proposition is evident, and undeniable. For since nothing (as has been already proved) can possibly be Self-existent, besides Himself ; and consequently all Things in the Universe were made by Him, and are entirely dependent upon Him ; and all the Powers of all Things are derived from Him, and must therefore be perfectly Subject and Subordinate to Him : 'Tis manifest that nothing can make any Difficulty or Resistance to the Execution of his Will ; but he must of necessity have absolute Power to do every thing he pleases, with the perfectest ease, and in the perfectest Manner, at once and in a Moment, whenever he Wills it. The Descriptions the Scripture gives of *this Power*, are so lively and emphatical, that I

That the Self-existent Being, must be All-powerful.

cannot forbear mentioning one or two Passages : Thus Job 9. 4. He is wise in Heart, and mighty in Strength; — which removeth the Mountains, and they know it not; which overturneth them in his Anger : Which shaketh the Earth out of her place, and the Pillars thereof tremble : which commandeth the Sun, and it riseth not; and Seal-eth up the Stars : Which alone spread-eth out the Heavens, and treadeth upon the Waves of the Sea : Which doth great things past finding out, yea and Wonders without number. Again, Hell is naked before him, and Destruction hath no covering : He stretcheth out the North over the empty place, and hang-eth the Earth upon nothing : He bind-eth up the Waters in his thick Clouds, and the Cloud is not rent under them : The Pillars of Heaven tremble, and are astonished at his Reproof : He divideth the Sea with his Power, and by his Understanding he smiteth through the Proud : Lo, these are part of his Ways, but how little a Portion is heard of him? but the Thunder of his Power, who can understand? Job 26. 6. So likewise, Isaiah 40. 12. Who has measured the Waters

Being and Attributes of God. 121

*Waters in the hollow of his Hand? and meted out Heaven with the Span? and comprehended the Dust of the Earth in a Measure? and weighed the Mountains in Scales, and the Hills in a Balance? Behold, the Nations are as a drop of the Bucket, and are counted as the small Dust of the Balance; behold, he taketh up the Isles as a very little thing: All Nations before him are as nothing, and they are counted to him less than nothing and Vanity: To whom then will ye liken God, or what likeness will ye compare unto him? But I do not urge Authority to the Persons I am at present speaking to: 'Tis sufficiently evident from Reason, that the Supreme Cause must of Necessity be Infinitely Powerful. The only Question is, what the true meaning of what we call *Infinite Power* is, and to what things it must be understood to extend, or not to extend.*

Now in determining this Question, there are some Propositions, about which there is no dispute. Which therefore I shall but just mention:
As

1st.

*Of working
Contradi-
ctions.*

1st. That infinite Power reaches to all *Possible* things; but cannot be said to extend to the working any thing which implies a Contradiction: As, that a Thing should *be* and *not be* at the same time; that the same thing should *be made* and *not be made*, or *have been* and *not have been*; that *twice two* should *not make four*, or that *That which is necessarily False*, should *be True*. The Reason whereof is plain: Because a Power of making a Thing to be, at the same time that it is not; is only a Power of doing that which is Nothing, that is, no Power at all.

*Or Natu-
ral and
Moral
Evils.*

2^{dly}. Infinite Power cannot be said to extend to those things, which imply *Natural* Imperfection in the Being to whom such Power is ascribed: As, that it should destroy its own Being, weaken it self, or the like. These Things imply *Natural* Imperfection; and are by all Men confessed to be such, as cannot possibly belong to the Necessary Self-existent Being. There are also other things which imply Imperfection in another kind, *viz.* *Moral* Imperfection:

Being and Attributes of God. 123

tion : Concerning which, Atheism takes away the Subject of the Question, by denying wholly the Difference of Moral Good and Evil ; and therefore I shall omit the Consideration of them, till I come to deduce the *Moral* Attributes of God.

But some other Instances there are, in the Question about the Extent of *Infinite Power* ; wherein the Principal Difference between us and the Atheists, (next to the Question, whether the Supreme Cause be an *Intelligent Being*, or not,) does in a great measure consist. As

1st. That infinite Power includes a Power of Creating Matter. This has been constantly denied by all Atheists, both Ancient and Modern ; and as constantly affirmed by all who believe the Being, and have just Notions of the Attributes of God. The only Reason which the Atheists have, or can pretend to allege for *their* Opinion ; is, that the Thing is in its own Nature absolutely *Impossible*. But how does it

Of the Power of Creating Matter.

it appear to be impossible? Why, Only because They are not able to comprehend *How* it can be. For, to reduce it to a Contradiction, (which is the alone real Impossibility,) this they are by no means able to do. For to say, that Something which once was not, may since have begun to exist; is neither directly, nor by any Consequence whatsoever, to assert that That which *is not*, can *be*, while it *is Not*; or that That which *is*, can *Not be*, while it *is*. 'Tis true, We, who have been used to converse only with Generations and Corruptions; and never saw any thing *Made* or *Created*, but only *Formed* or *Framed*; are apt to endeavour to conform our Idea of *Creation*, to that of *Formation*; and to imagine, that as in all *Formations* there is some *Præ-existing Matter*, out of which a thing is *Formed*; so in *Creation* there must be considered a *Præ-existent Nothing*, out of which, as out of a real *Material Cause*, a thing is *Created*; which looks indeed somewhat like a Contradiction: But this is only a Confusion of Idea's;
just

Being and Attributes of God. 125

just like Childrens imagining that Darknes is some real thing, which in the Morning is driven away by the Light, or transformed into it : Whereas the true Notion of Creation, is not a *Forming* Something *Out of* Nothing, as out of a *Material Cause* ; but only a Bringing Something into Being, that before had no Being at all ; or a Causing Something to Exist Now, that did not Exist Before ; or which without this Cause, would not have Existed : VVhich no Man can ever reduce to a Contradiction ; any more than the *Formation* of any thing into a Shape which it had not before, can be reduced to a Contradiction. And indeed, if they would speak out the Truth, the Sum of what all Atheists, whether Antient or Modern, have ever said upon this Head, amounts to no more but this One foolish Argument : That Matter could not begin to exist, when *it was not* ; because this is supposing it to Be, before it was : and that it could not begin to Exist, when *it was* ; because this is supposing it not to Be, after
it

it was. Which is just such an Argument, as That whereby a certain Philosopher Demonstrated, that there can be no such thing as *Motion* at all; because a Body can neither move in the Place where *it is*, nor in the place where *it is not*. The Arguments are exactly alike: And the same Answer will serve indifferently for them Both.

Of the
Power of
Creating
Immate-
rial Cog-
itative
Substan-
ces.

2dly. 'Tis Possible to Infinite Power, to Create an *Immaterial* Cogitative Substance, indued with a Power of beginning *Motion*, and with a *Liberty of Will or Choice*. This also has been always denied by all Atheists. And because it is a Proposition of the greatest Consequence to Religion and Morality, therefore I shall be particular in endeavouring the Proof of the several Parts of it.

First then, it is possible to infinite Power, to Create an *Immaterial* Cogitative Substance. That there can be such a Thing as a Cogitative Substance, that is, a Substance indued with Consciousness and Thought, is granted by all; because every
Man's

Being and Attributes of God. 127

Man's own Experience convinces him, that He himself is such a Substance. Further, That if there be, or can be, any such thing as Immaterial Substances ; that then it is most reasonable to Believe, that such Substances as are indued with Consciousness and Thought, [Properties the farthest distant from the known Properties of Matter, and the most unlike them, that can possibly be imagined,] are those Immaterial Substances ; will also, I think, be granted by all Men. The only thing therefore, that remains to be proved, is this ; That *Immaterial* Substances are not impossible, or, That a Substance *Immaterial* is not a contradictory Notion. Now whoever asserts that it is contradictory ; must affirm, that whatever is not Matter , is nothing ; and that to say Any thing Exists which is not Matter, is saying that there Exists something which is nothing. Which in Other Words is plainly this ; That whatever we have not an Idea of, is nothing, and impossible to Be. For there is no other way to reduce *Immaterial* Sub-

Substance to a Contradiction, but by supposing *Immaterial* to Signifie the same as *Having no Existence* ; And there is no possible way to prove That, but by saying we have no Idea of it, and therefore it neither has nor can have any Existence. By which same Argument (even supposing it true, which yet is indeed most false, that we have a clear Idea of the Essence of Matter, and none at all of any Immaterial Substance,) a Man Born Blind may Demonstrate irrefragably, that *Light* or *Colour* is an Impossible and Contradictory Notion, because it is not a *Sound* or a *Smell*. For the Power of *seeing Light* or *Colour*, is to a Man Born Blind, altogether as incomprehensible and absolutely beyond the Reach of all his Ideas, as either the Operations and Perceptions, or even the Simple Essence of a Pure Immaterial Substance or Spirit, can be to any of Us. If therefore the Blind Mans want of Idea's be not a sufficient Proof of the Impossibility of *Light* or *Colour* ; how comes our bare want of Idea's, to be a Demonstration

Being and Attributes of God. 129

tion of the Impossibility of the Being of Immaterial Substances? A Blind Man, they will say, has *Testimony* of the Existence of Light: Very true; so also have we, of the Existence of Immaterial Substances: But, I hope, an Atheist will not put the Issue of his Cause upon *Testimony* whatever he does. But there is this further advantage on our side in the Comparison; that a Blind Man, excepting the Testimony of *Others*, finds not by any reasoning with himself, the least likelihood or probability, no not in the lowest possible degree, that there can be any such thing as Light or Colour; But we, besides Testimony, have great and strong Arguments both from Experience and Reason, that there are such things as Immaterial Substances, though we have no Knowledge of their Simple Essence. Even the very first and most universal Principle of Gravitation it self in all inanimate Matter; since it is ever Proportional, not at all to the *Surfaces* of Bodies, or of their Particles in any possible Supposition, but ex-
K actly

actly to the *Solid Content* of Bodies ; 'tis evident it cannot be caused by Matter acting upon the *Surfaces* of Matter, which is all *It* can do ; but must be caused by something which continually penetrates its *Solid Substance*. But in *Animals*, which have a Power of Self-motion ; and in the perfecter Sorts of them, which have still higher Faculties ; the thing is yet more evident. For we see and feel and observe daily in our selves and others, such Powers and Operations and Perceptions, as undeniably evince themselves either to be the Properties of Immaterial Substances : Or else it will follow that Matter is something, of whose inmost Substance and Essential Powers we have altogether as little Idea, as we have of Immaterial Beings ; and then how are Immaterial Substances more impossible than Material ? But of this, more hereafter.

Of the Immateriality of Human Souls.

From what has been said on this Head, it will be easy to answer all the Objections that have been brought

Being and Attributes of God. 131

brought by any Atheists, against the Notion of Human Souls being Immaterial Substances distinct from Body. For since 'tis possible there may be such things as Immaterial Substances; and since if any such Substance *Can Be*, there is all the Reason in the World to Believe that Conscious and Thinking Substance *Is* such; these Properties being the most Remote from the known Properties of Matter, that are possible to be conceived; The Foundation of all the Objections against the Immateriality of the Soul, is entirely taken away. I shall not now Tarry to Consider the Objections in particular, which have been often and fully answered by learned Pens; but shall only mention One, on which all the rest depend, and to which they may all be reduced.

And it is This: * That seeing the only means we have of Perception, are the Five Senses; and these all plainly depend upon the Organs of the Body; therefore the

* ——— Si immortalis
natura animai est,

Et sentire potest secreta
a corpore nostro;

Quinq; (ut opinor) eam
faciundum est *Sensibus* au-
ctam:

Nec ratione alia nosmet
proponere nobis

K 2

Soul

Possumus infernas animas Acherunte vagare :

Pictores itaq; & scriptorum secla priora

Sic animas introduce-
rant sensibus auctas.

At neq; seorsum oculi,
&c. —

Nec sensus ipsi seorsum
consistere possunt

Naribus atq; manu, atq;
oculis, atq; auribus, atq;

Lingua ; nec per se pos-
sunt sentire, nec esse. Lu-
cret. lib. 3

"Ὅσων γὰρ ἐστὶν αἰσθητῶν ἡ
ἐνέργεια σωματικὴ. ὅλον
ὅτι πάντας ἀνευ σώματος
ἀδύνατον ὑπάρχειν εἶον
βασίζεν ἀνευ ποδῶν. Ari-
stot.

Soul without the Body,
can have no Perception,
and consequently is No-
thing. Now (besides
that these very Senses or
Perceptions, however
they may be obstructed
by bodily Indisposition,
and so do indeed depend
upon the Organs of the
Body as to their present
Exercise, yet in their
Nature are really entire-
ly distinct Powers, and
cannot possibly, as has
been before shown, be
absolutely founded in, or arise from,
any of the known Properties or
Qualities of Matter: Besides this,
I say ;) of Him that thus argues, I
would only ask this one Question:
Are our Five Senses, by an Abso-
lute *Necessity* in the Nature of the
Thing, All and the only Possible
Ways of Perception? And is it im-
possible and contradictory, that
there should be any Being in the
Universe, indued with ways of Per-
ception different from these that are
the

Being and Attributes of God. 133

the result of *Our* present Composition? Or are these things, on the contrary, purely *Arbitrary*; and the same Power that gave *Us* these, may have given Others to *Other Beings*, and might (if he had pleas'd) have given *Us* Others in this *present* State, and may yet have made us capable of different Ones in *Another* State? If they be purely *Arbitrary*; then the want of these, does by no means infer a total want of Perception; but the same Soul, which in the present State has the Powers of *Reflection, Reason and Judgment*, which are Faculties entirely different from Sense; may as easily in another State have different ways even of *Perception* also: But if any one say, that these Senses of ours are *Necessarily* the only ways of Perception; how does that appear? And is it not infinitely more reasonable to suppose, that this is a

* Has tamen imagines [mortuorum] Loqui volebant; quod fieri nec sine lingua, nec sine palato, nec sine faucibus, laterum, pulmonum vi & figura potest. Nihil enim *Animo* (speaking of such as attributed to Spirits the same Powers and Senses only, as they saw Men endued with in this present State,) videre poterant: Ad oculos omnia referebant. Magni autem ingenii est, revocare mentem a sensibus, & cogitationem a Consuetudine abducere. Cicero *Tuscul.* Quæst. 1.

mere Prejudice, arising from Custom and an attending to bare Sense in opposition to Reason? For suppose Men had been created only with Four Senses, and had never known the use of *Sight*; would they not then have had the same Reason to conclude there were but *Four* possible ways of Perception, as they have Now to fancy that there are but *Five*? And would they not then have thought *Sight* to have been an Impossible, Chimerical, and merely imaginary Power; with absolutely the *same Reason*, as they now presume the Faculties of immaterial Beings to be so? that is, with *no Reason at all*. One would think, Men should be ashamed therefore to be so Vain, as merely from their own Negative *Ignorance*, without any appearance or pretense of any *Positive* Argument, to argue against the *Possibility* of the Being of Things, which (excepting Only that they cannot frame to themselves an *Image* or *Notion* of them) there is a Concurrence of all the Reasons in the World to perswade them that such Things

Being and Attributes of God. 135

Things Really are. And then as to the Difficulty of Conceiving the Nature and Manner of the *Union* between Soul and Body ; We know altogether as much of That, as we do of the Nature of the Union or Cohæſion of the infinitely diviſible parts of Body to Body ; which yet no Man doubts of : And therefore our Ignorance can be no more an Argument againſt the Truth of the One, than it is a Bar to our Belief of the Other.

Secondly, It is poſſible to Infinite *of induing* Power, to indue a Creature with *the* *Creatures* *Power of Beginning Motion*. This is *with the* *Power of* *beginning* *Motion.* constantly denied by all Atheiſts ; becauſe the Conſequence of it, is a *Liberty of Will*, of which I ſhall have Occaſion to ſpeak preſently. But that the Propoſition is true, I thus prove. If the Power of Beginning Motion be in it ſelf a *Poſſible Thing* ; and alſo be *Poſſible to be communi-* *cated* ; Then a Creature may be indued with That Power. Now that the Power of Beginning Motion is in it ſelf a *Poſſible Thing*, I have already proved, by ſhowing that there muſt

36 *A Demonstration of the*

Necessarily be *somewhere* a Power of Beginning Motion ; because otherwise *Motion* must have been from Eternity , without any *External* Cause of its Being ; and yet it is a Thing that has no Necessity of Existence in its *own Nature* : So that if there be not *somewhere* a Principle or Power of beginning Motion ; *Motion* must Exist, without any Cause or Reason at all of its Existence, either *within* it self or *from without* ; which, as I have before shown, is an Express Contradiction : Wherefore a Principle or Power of Beginning Motion, there must of necessity *Be*, somewhere or Other ; and Consequently it is not in it self an Impossible Thing : I add. As a Power of Beginning Motion, is not in it self an impossible Thing ; because it must of Necessity *Be* in the Supreme Cause : So neither is it impossible to be *Communicated* to Created Beings. The Reason is plain : Because no Powers are Impossible to be Communicated, but only those which imply Self-existence and absolute Independency. That a Subordinate Being should be
Self.

Being and Attributes of God. 137

Self-existent or absolutely Independent, is indeed a Contradiction; but 'tis no Contradiction to suppose it indued with any Other Power whatsoever, seperate from these. I know the Maintainers of Fate, are very Confident that a Power of Beginning Motion, is nothing less than being really Independent, or being able to act Independently from any Superior Cause. But this is only a childish trifling with Words. For a Power of Acting independently *in this Sense*, Communicated at the Pleasure of the Supreme Cause, and continued only during the same good Pleasure, is no more a real and absolute Independency; than the Power of *Existing*, (which I suppose the Defenders of Fate are not so fond to make a Continual Creation, as they are to make the Power of Self-motion a Continual External Impulse;) or than the Power of *being Conscious*, or any other *Power* whatsoever, can be said to imply Independency. In reality, 'tis altogether as hard to conceive, how *Consciousness* or the Power of *Perception*, should be communicated
to

to a Created Being ; as how the Power of *Self-Motion* should be so ; Unless Perception be Nothing else but a mere Passive Reception of Impulse ; which I suppose is as clear that it is not, as that a Triangle is not a Sound, or that a Globe is not a Colour. Yet no Man doubts, but that He Himself and all others have truly a Power of Perception : And therefore in like manner, (however hard it may be to Conceive, as to the manner of it ; yet since, as has now been proved, it can never be shown to be impossible and expressly contradictory, that a Power of *Self-Motion* should be communicated,) I suppose no considering Man can doubt, but that he actually has also a Power of *Self-Motion*. For the Arguments drawn from continual Experience and Observation, to prove that we have such a Power, are so strong ; that nothing less than a strict Demonstration that the thing is absolutely impossible and implies an express Contradiction, can make us in the least doubt that we have it not. We have all the same Experi-
ence

Being and Attributes of God. 139

ence, the same Marks and Evidence exactly, of our having really a Power of Self-motion ; as the rigidest Fatalist could possibly contrive to require, if he was to make a *Supposition* of a Man's being indued with that power : There is no one Thing which such a Man can imagine ought to follow from the Supposition of Liberty, which every Man does not Now as much Feel and actually Experience in Himself, as it can possibly be imagined any Man would do, supposing the Thing were true. Wherefore to affirm, notwithstanding all this, that the Spirits by which a Man moves the Members of his Body, and ranges the Thoughts of his Mind, are themselves moved wholly by Air or Subtler Matter inspired into the Body ; and That again by other External Matter, and so on ; as the Wheels of a Clock are moved by the Weights, and those Weights by Gravitation, and so on ; without a Man's having the least Power by any Principle within himself, to think any one Thought, or impell his own Spirits in order to move any Member

ber

ber of his Body : All this is so contrary to experience and the Reason of Things, that unless the Idea of Self-motion were in it self as evidently and *Clearly* a Contradiction, as that two and two should make fifteen, a Man ought to be ashamed to talk at that Rate. Nay a Man of any considerable degree of Modesty, would even in that Case be almost tempted rather to doubt the Truth of his Faculties ; than venture boldly to assert one so intolerable an Absurdity, merely for the avoiding of another. There are some indeed, who denying Men the Power of *Beginning Motion*, would yet seem in some Manner to account for their Actions, by allowing them a Power of *Determining Motion*. But this also is a mere ludicrous trifling with Words. For if that Power of *Determining Motion* be no other in a Man, than that which is in a Stone of Reflecting a Ball *one certain way* ; this is just nothing at all : But if he has a Power of determining the Motion of his Spirits *any way*, as he himself pleases ; this is in all Respects the very same

Being and Attributes of God. 141

as the Power of Beginning Motion.

Thirdly, 'Tis Possible to Infinite Power, to endue a Creature with *Freedom or Liberty of Will*. It might suffice that this is at once proved by the same Arguments, and in the same Method, as I just now proved Self-Motion or a Power of beginning Motion, to be possible: viz, Because Liberty must of necessity Be in the Supreme Cause,) as is at large proved in the Ninth General Head of this Discourse.) and therefore cannot be impossible and contradictory in the Nature of the thing it self: And because it implies no Contradiction to suppose it communicated; as being no harder to conceive, than the forementioned Power of Beginning Motion: And because the Arguments drawn from Experience and Observation, are stronger on the one side of the Question, than those arising merely from the Difficulty of our apprehending the thing, can be on the other. But forasmuch as this is the Question of the greatest Concern of all, in Matters both of

of Religion and Humane Life ; and both *Spinoza* and Mr *Hobbs*, and their Followers, have with great Noise and Confidence denied it : I shall therefore, not contenting myself with this, endeavour to show moreover, in particular, the weakness of the Principal Arguments, by which these Men have pretended to demonstrate, that there cannot *possibly* be any such Power in Man, as a Liberty of Will. As to the Propriety of the Terms, whether the Will be properly the Seat of Liberty or not, it is not now to the purpose to inquire : The Question being, not where the Seat of Liberty is ; but whether there be *at all* in Man any such Power, as a Liberty of Choice and of Determining his own Actions ; or on the contrary his Actions be all as Necessary, as the Motions of a Clock. The Arguments by which *Spinoza* and Mr *Hobbs* have attempted to maintain this latter side of the Question, are all plainly reducible to these two.

157. That since every Effect must needs be produced by some Cause ;
there-

Being and Attributes of God. 143

therefore as every Motion in a Body must have been caused by the Impulse of some other Body, and the Motion of That by the Impulse of a Third ; so every Volition, or Determination of the Will of Man, must needs be produced by some External Cause, and That in like manner be the Effect of some Third : And consequently that there cannot possibly be any such Thing in Nature, as Liberty or Freedom of Will.

2dly. That Thinking, and all its Modes, as Willing and the like, are Qualities or Affections of Matter : and consequently, since 'tis manifest that Matter has not in it self a Power of Beginning Motion, or giving it self any manner of Determination whatsoever ; therefore 'tis evident likewise that 'tis impossible there should be any such Thing as Freedom of Will.

Now to these Arguments I oppose, and shall endeavour briefly to Demonstrate, the three following Propositions.

*An Answer
to Mr
Hobbs and
Spinoza's
Arguments
against the
Possibility
of Liberty.*

1st. That

144 *A Demonstration of the*

1st. That every Effect cannot possibly be the product of external Causes, but there must of Necessity be Somewhere a Beginning of Operation, or a Power of Acting without being antecedently acted upon : And that this Power may be, and is, in *Man*.

2^{dly}. That Thinking and Willing neither are, nor can be, Qualities or Affections of Matter ; and consequently not concluded under the Laws thereof.

3^{dly}. That even supposing the Soul not to be a distinct Substance from Body, but that Thinking and Willing could be, and were indeed, only Qualities or Affections of Matter ; yet even *This* would not at all Affect the present Question. nor prove Freedom of Will to be impossible.

That there must be somewhere a Beginning of Operation.

1st. Every Effect cannot possibly be the Product of external Causes ; but there must of Necessity be somewhere a Beginning of Operation, or a Power of Acting without being antecedently acted upon : And this Power may be, and Is, in *Man*.
The

Being and Attributes of God. 145

The several Parts of this Proposition have been already proved in the *Second* and *Ninth* General Heads of this Discourse, and in that part of this *Tenth* Head, which is concerning the Possibility of the Power of Self-Motion being communicated to Created Beings. I shall not therefore here repeat the Proofs; but only apply them to *Spinoza's* and *Mr Hobbs's* Arguments, so far as is necessary to show the weakness of what they have said upon this Head in Opposition to the Possibility of Liberty or Freedom of Will. The manner then of their Arguing upon this Head, is this. *That Every Effect must needs be owing to some Cause; and That Cause must produce the Effect* * *necessarily; because if it be a sufficient Cause, the Effect cannot but follow; and if it be not a sufficient Cause, it will not be at all a Cause of that Thing: Thus for in-*

* Quicumq; unquam Effectus productus sit, productus est a causa necessaria. Nam quod productum est, eo ipso quod productum est, causam habuit integram, hoc est, omnia ea quibus suppositis Effectum non sequi intelligi non

possit: ea vero causa necessaria est. *Hobbs Philosophia prima, cap. 9.*

L

stance,

† Corpus motum vel quiescens, ad Motum vel Quietem determinari debuit ab alio corpore, quod etiam ad Motum vel Quietem determinatum fuit ab alio, & illud iterum ab alio, & sic in infinitum. *Spinoza Ethic. Par. II. Prop. 13. Lemma 3.*

|| Unaquæque Volitio non potest Existere, neque ad operandum determinari, nisi ab alia causa determinetur, & hæc rursus ab alia; & sic porro in infinitum. *Id. Ethic. Par. I. Prop. 32. Demonstrat.*

I conceive, nothing taketh beginning from it self, but from the Action of some immediate Agent without it self. And that therefore when first a Man had an Appetite or Will to something, to which, immediately before, he had no Appetite or Will, the Cause of his Will, is not the Will it self, but something else not in his own disposing. *Hobbs's Debate with Bp. Bramhall, p. 289.*

In mente nulla est absoluta sive libera voluntas; sed mens ad hoc vel illud volendum determinatur a

causa, quæ etiam ab alia determinata est, & hæc iterum ab alia, & sic in infinitum. *Spinoza, Ethic. Par. II. Prop. 48.*

stance, † whatever Body is moved, must be moved by some other Body, which it self likewise must be moved by some Third, and so on without End: That the || Will, in like manner, of any voluntary Agent, must of necessity be determined by some external Cause, and not by any Power of determining it self, inherent in it self; And That External Cause must be determined necessarily by some other Cause, External to It; and so on without End. From all which it evidently appears, that All that these Men urge against the Possibility of Freedom, extends equally to all other Beings (not excepting the Supreme) as well as to Men; and

† Spinoza

Being and Attributes of God. 147

† Spinoza in express Words confesses it : Wherefore consequently, whatever noise they

† Hinc sequitur, Deum non operari ex libertate Voluntatis. *Ethic. Par. I. Coroll. ad Prop. 32.*

make of the mighty Strength and Demonstrative Force of their Arguments, All that they say, amounts to no more but this One most Absurd Conclusion ; That *there is no where, nor can possible be, any Principle of Motion or Beginning of Operation at all ; but every thing is caused necessarily by an eternal Chain of Dependent Causes and Effects, without any Independent Original.* All their Arguments therefore on this Head, are already answered in the *Second and Ninth* General Heads, of this Discourse ; (where I proved that there must of necessity be an *Original, Independent, and Free Principle of Motion or Action ;* and that to suppose an endless Succession of Dependent Causes and Effects, without any Original or First and Self-actuating Principle, is supposing a *Series of dependent Things to be from Eternity produced by Nothing ;* which is the very same Absurdity and Contradi-

tion, as to suppose Things produced by Nothing *at any definite Time*; the Ability of Nothing to produce any thing, being plainly the same *in Time or in Eternity.*) And I have moreover proved *ex abundanti*, in the foregoing part of this Tenth Head, that the Power of Beginning Motion is not only *possible and certain* in it self, but also *possible to be communicated* to Finite Beings, and *actually Is* in Man.

*That
Thinking
and Wil-
ling, nei-
ther are,
nor can be
Affections
of Matter.*

2dly, Thinking and Willing neither are, nor can be, Qualities or Affections of *Matter*; and consequently are not concluded under the Laws thereof. That 'tis possible there may be Immaterial Substances, the Notion not implying a Contradiction in it self; hath already been shown under the present General Proposition. Further, that Thinking and Willing are Powers entirely Different from Solidity, Figure and Motion; and if they be Different, that then they cannot possibly arise from them, or be compounded of them; hath likewise been already proved under the *Eighth General Head* of this Discourse.

Being and Attributes of God. 149

course. It follows therefore, that Thinking and Willing *may possibly be*, nay that they *certainly and necessarily* are Faculties or Powers of Immaterial Substances : Seeing they *cannot possibly* be Qualities or Affections of Matter ; unless we will confound (as some have done) the Ideas of things ; and mean by *Matter*, not what the Word commonly is used to signify, a Solid Substance, capable of Division, Figure and Motion, but an unknown Substance, capable of Powers or Properties entirely different from these : In which Sense of the Word, could *Matter* be supposed never so capable of Thinking and Willing ; yet in that Sense, (as I shall show presently) it would signify nothing at all, to the Purpose or Advantage of our Adversaries. In the meantime, how great an Absurdity it is, to suppose Thinking and Willing to be Qualities or Affections of *Matter*, in the Proper and Usual Sense of the Word ; may sufficiently appear, without any foreign Argument, from the Senselessness of Mr *Hobbs's Own* Explication of the Nature and Original of Sensation and Consciousness. *The*

* Ex quo intelligitur, Sensationis immediatam causam esse in eo, quod Sensationis Organum primum & tangit & premit. Si enim organi pars extrema prematur; illa cedente, premetur quoque pars quæ versus interiora illi proxima est; & ita propagabitur pressio, sive motus ille, per partes Organi Omnes, usque ad intimam. — Quoniam autem motui ab objecto per media ad Organi partem intimam propagato, fit aliqua totius Organi resistantia sive reactio, per motum ipsius Organi internum naturalem; fit propterea conatus ab objecto, conatus ab Organo contrarius: Ut cum conatus ille ad intima, ultimus actus sit eorum qui fiunt in actu Sensationis, tum deum ex ea reactione aliquandiu durante, ipsum existit Phantasma; quod propter conatum versus externa, semper videtur tanquam aliquid sicutum extra Organum. *Hobbs de Sensatione & motu animali.*

† Phantasma est sentiendi Actus. *Id. ibid.*

|| Causa sensationis est Externum Corpus sive Objectum quod premit Organum proprium; & premendo, (mediantibus Nervis & Membranis,) continuum efficit Motum introrsum ad Cerebrum & inde ad Cor; unde nascitur Cordis resistantia & contrapressio seu ἀντιπύσις, sive Conatus Cordis liberantis se a pressione per motum tendentem extrorsum; qui motus propterea apparet tanquam aliquid externum: Atque Apparitio hæc, sive Phantasma, est id quod vocamus Sensationem. *Leviathan Cap. 1.*

*Immediate Cause of Sensation, * saith he, is this: The Object, or Something flowing from it, presseth the outermost part of the Organ, and that Pressure is communicated to the innermost Parts of the Organ; Where by the Resistance or Reaction of the Organ, causing a Pressure outwards, contrary to the Pressure of the Object inwards, there is made up a Phantasm, or Image: which Phantasm, † saith he, is the Sensation it self. Again; The Cause of Sensation, || saith he, is an Object pressing the Organ; which*

Pres-

Being and Attributes of God. 151

Pressure is by means of the Nerves conveyed to the Brain, and so to the Heart ; where by the Resistance or Counter-pressure of the Heart outwards, is made an Image or Phantasm, which is Sensation. Now what is there in all this, that does in any the least measure tend to explain or make intelligible the real and inward Nature of Sense or Consciousness ? The Object, by communicating a Pressure through the Organ to the Sensory, does indeed raise a *Phantasm* or Image, that is, make a certain *Impression* on the Brain : But Wherein consists the Power of *Perceiving* this Impression, and of being *Sensible* of it ? Or what Similitude hath this Impression to the *Sense it self*, that is, to the *Thought* excited in the Mind ? why, exactly the very same, that a *Square* has no *Blueness*, or a *Triangle* to *Sound*, or a *Needle* to the Sense of *Pain* ; or the *Reflecting* of a *Tennis-Ball*, to the *Reason and Understanding* of a *Man*. So that Mr *Hobbs's* Definition of Sensation ; that it is it self, the inmost and formal Nature of it, nothing but the Phan-

tasm or Image made in the Brain by the Pressure communicated from the Object ; is in other Words, defining *Blueness* to be the Image of a *Square*, or *Sound* the Picture of a *Triangle*, or *Pain* the Similitude of a *Sharp pointed Needle*. I do not here misrepresent him in the least. For He himself

expressly confesses, * that *all Sensible Qualities, such as Colour, Sound and the like, are in the Objects themselves nothing but Motion ; And because Motion can produce Nothing but Motion, (as likewise 'tis evident that Figure and all its possi-*

* Quæ qualitates Omnes nominari solent sensibiles, & sunt in ipso objecto nihil aliud præter materiæ motum, quo Objectum in Organa Sensuum diversi modo operatur. Neq; in Nobis aliud sunt, quam diversi motus. Motus enim nihil generat præter motum: *Leviathan cap. 1.*

ble . Compositions can produce nothing but Figure.) *therefore in Us also the Perceptions of these sensible Qualities are nothing but different Motions.* If then the Phantasm, that is, the Image of the Object made in the Brain by Figure and Motion, be (as he says) the Sensation it self ; is not Sensation, bare Figure and Motion ? And are not all the forementioned Absurdities, unavoidable

Being and Attributes of God. 153

avoidable Consequences of his Opinion?

Mr *Hobbs*, (as I have elsewhere observed,) seems indeed not to have been altogether unaware of this insuperable Difficulty; But he industriously endeavours to conceal it from his Readers, and to impose upon them by the ambiguity of the Word *Phantasm*. Yet for a Reserve, in case he should be too hard pressed,

* he gives us a Hint, that possibly *Sensation may be something more, viz. a Power of Perception or Consciousness naturally and essentially inherent in all Matter; only that it wants the Organs and Memory of Animals to express its Sensation: And* † *that, as a Man, if he were supposed to have no other Sense but Seeing, and That so ordered, as that his Eyes were always immoveably fixed upon one and the same Object, and That also unchange-*

* Scio fuisse Philosophos quosdam, eosdemq; viros doctos, qui corpora omnia Sensu prædita esse sustinuerunt: Nec video, si natura Sensationis in reactione sola collocaretur, quomodo refutari possint. Sed etsi ex reactione etiam corporum aliorum phantasma aliquod nasceretur, illud tamen remoto objecto statim cessaret: Nam nisi ad retinendum Motum impressum, etiam remoto objecto, apta habeant Organa, ut habent Animalia; ita tantum sentient, ut nunquam sensisse se recordentur. — Sensiōni ergo, quæ vulgo ita appellatur, necessario adhæret memoria aliqua, &c. *Hobbs Phys. cap. 25. Sect. 5.*

† Itaq; & Sensiōni adhæret proprie dictæ, ut ei available

liqua insita sit perpetua phantasmatum varietas ; ita ut aliud ab alio discerni possit. Si supponemus enim esse hominem, oculis quidem clavis, cæterisque videndi Organis recte se habentibus compositum, nullo autem alio sensu præditum, eumque ad eandem rem eodem semper colore & specie sine ulla vel minima varietate apparentem obversum esse ; mihi certe, quicquid dicant alii, non Videre videretur. — Attonitum esse, & fortasse Aspectare eum, sed stupentem dicerem, videre non dicerem : Adeo Sentire semper idem, & Non Sentire, ad idem recidunt. *Id. ibid.*

able and without any the least variety ; such a Man could not properly be said to see, but only to be under an unintelligible kind of Amazement : So all unorganized Bodies may possibly have Sensation or Perception ; but because for want of Organs there is no Variety in it, neither any Memory or Means of expressing that Sensation, therefore to Us it seems as if they had no such Thing at all. This Opinion, I say, Mr

Hobbs mentions as possible : But he does it with such Hesitancy, Diffidence and Sparingness, as shows plainly that he meant it only as a last Refuge, or rather Subterfuge, to recur to, when he should be pressed with the fore-mentioned Absurdities unavoidably Consequent upon the Supposition of Sensation being only Figure and Motion. And indeed well might he be sparing, and, as it were, Ashamed of this Subterfuge :
For

Being and Attributes of God. 155

For it is a Thing altogether as absurd, as even the other Opinion it self, of Thought being mere Motion : For what can be more Ridiculous, than to imagine that Matter is as essentially Conscious, as it is extended ? Will it not follow from that Supposition, that every piece of Matter, being made up of endlessly divisible parts, (that is, of parts which are as really distinct Beings, notwithstanding their Contiguity, as if they had been at never so great a distance one from another,) is made up also of innumerable Consciousnesses and infinite Confusion ? But 'tis a shame to trouble the *Reader* with so much as the mention of any of the Numberless Absurdities following from that Monstrous Supposition. Others therefore, who would make Thinking to be an Affection of *Matter*, and yet are Ashamed to use either of the forementioned ways, Contend that *God* by his Almighty and Supreme Power indues certain Systems of Matter with a Faculty of Thinking, according to his own Good Pleasure. But this also amounts

156 *A Demonstration of the*

mounts to Nothing. For (besides the Absurdity of supposing God to make an *innumerable* company of distinct Beings, such as the particles of every System of Matter necessarily are, to be at the same time *One Individual* Conscious Being; Besides this, I say,) either our Idea of *Matter*, is a true and distinct Idea; or it is not. If it be a true and distinct Idea, that *Matter* is Nothing but a Solid Substance, capable only of Division, Figure and Motion, with the Effects of their several Compositions; as it appears to Us, upon the best Examination we are able to make of it; then it is absolutely Impossible for Thinking to belong to *Matter*, because Thinking cannot possibly arise from any Modification or Composition of any or all of these Qualities: But if any Man will say that our Idea of *Matter* is wrong; and that by *Matter* he will not mean, as other Men do, a Solid Substance, capable only of Division, Figure and Motion, with the Effects of their several Compositions; but an unknown Substance, capable of Thinking and
of

Being and Attributes of God. 157

of numberless unknown Properties besides ; then he trifles only, in putting an ambiguous Signification upon the Word *Matter*, and making it mean the same as we mean by *Substance* : And in that Sense to suppose Thinking or any other Active Property possible to be in *Matter*, as signifying only a Substance of whose Powers and Capacities we have no certain Idea ; would make Nothing at all to *the present* Purpose in our Adversaries Advantage, and is at least *Not a clearer and more Intelligible* way of Talking, than to Attribute the same Properties to an Immaterial Substance, and keep the Idea of *Matter* and *its* Properties clear and distinct. For I affirm,

3dly. That even supposing (in these Mens confused way) that the Soul was really not a distinct Substance from Body, but that Thinking and Willing could be, and were indeed only Qualities or Affections of *Matter* ; yet even *This* would not at all Affect the present Question about *Liberty*, nor prove Freedom of Will to be an impossible Thing. For, since

That if Thinking and Willing were Qualities of Matter, yet nevertheless Liberty might be possible.

since it has been already demonstrated, that Thinking and Willing cannot possibly be Effects or Compositions of Figure and Motion ; Whosoever will make Thinking and Willing to be Qualities or Affections of *Matter*, must suppose *Matter* capable of certain Properties entirely different from Figure and Motion ; And if it be capable of Properties entirely different from Figure and Motion, then it can never be proved from the Effects of Figure and Motion being all Necessary, that the Effects of other and totally distinct Properties must likewise be Necessary.

*A shameful
Fallacy of
Mr Hobbs
and his
Followers.*

Mr *Hobbs* therefore, and his Followers, are guilty of a most shameful Fallacy in that very Argument, wherein they place their main and chief strength. For, supposing *Matter* to be capable of Thinking and Willing, they contend that the Soul is mere Matter ; and Knowing that the Effects of Figure and Motion must needs be all necessary, they conclude that the Operations of the Mind must All therefore be Necessary : That is : When they would prove
the

Being and Attributes of God. 159

the Soul *to be* mere Matter; then they suppose Matter capable, not only of Figure and Motion, but also of other unknown Properties: And when they would prove the Will and all other Operations of the Soul to be *Necessary*; then they devest Matter again of all its Unknown Properties, and make it mere Solidity endued only with Figure and Motion, again. Wherefore, distinguishing their Ambiguous and Confused use of the Word *Matter*, they are unavoidably reduced to One of these two Concessions. If by *Matter*, they mean a Solid Substance endued only with Figure and Motion; then the Soul cannot be mere Matter; because (as Mr. *Hobbs* himself * confesses) Figure and Motion can produce nothing but Figure and Motion; and consequently (as hath been before demonstrated) they can never produce so much as any Secondary Quality, [*Sound, Colour, and the like,*] much less Thinking and Reasoning: From whence it follows, that the Soul being unavoidably something Immaterial, they have no Argument

* *Motus nō
hil generat
præter Mo-
tum. Levi-
ath. Cap.
I.*

Argument left to prove that it cannot have a *Power of Beginning Motion*, which is a plain Instance of *Liberty*. But if, on the other hand, they will mean by *Matter* an Unknown Substance, capable of Properties totally different from Figure and Motion; then they must no longer argue against the Possibility of Liberty, from the Effects of Figure and Motion being all unavoidably Necessary; because Liberty will not consist in the Effects of Figure and Motion, but in those Other Unknown Properties of Matter, which these Men can no more explain or argue about, than about Immaterial Substances. The Truth therefore is, they must needs Suppose Thinking to be merely an Effect or Composition of Figure and Motion, if they will give any strength to their Arguments against Liberty: And then the Question will be, not whether God can make *Matter* think, or no; (for in that Question they only trifle with a Word, abusing the Word *Matter* to signify *Substance* in general;) but the Question is, whether *Figure and Motion,*

Being and Attributes of God. 161

tion, in any Composition or Division, can possibly Be *Perception and Thought* : which (as has been before said) is just such a Question, as if a Man should ask, whether it be possible that a *Triangle* should be a *Sound*, or a *Globe* a *Colour*. The Sum is this : If the Soul be an Immaterial Substance, (as it must needs be, if we have any true Idea of Matter,) then Mr. *Hobbs's* Arguments against the Possibility of Liberty, drawn all from the Properties of Matter, are idle and nothing to the Purpose : But if our Adversaries will be so absurd as to contend, that the Soul is nothing but mere *Matter* ; Then either they must mean by *Matter* an unknown Substance indued with Active as well as Passive Properties ; which is confounding and taking away our Idea of *Matter*, and at the same Time destroying all their own Arguments against Liberty, which they have founded wholly on the known Properties of Matter : Or else they must speak out, as they mean, that Thinking and Willing are nothing but Effects and Compo-

M sitions

162 *A Demonstration of the*

sitions of Figure and Motion ; which I have already shown to be a Contradiction in Terms.

There are some other Arguments against the Possibility of *Liberty*, which Men by attempting to answer, have made to appear considerable ; when really they are altogether beside the Question. As for Instance, those drawn from *the Necessity of the Will's being determined by the last Judgement of the Understanding* ; And from the *Certainty of the Divine Præscience*.

Of the Will being necessarily determined by the last Judgement of the Understanding.

As to the former, viz : *The Necessity of the Will's being determined by the last Judgment of the Understanding* : This is only a Necessity upon Supposition ; that is to say, a Necessity that a Man should *Will* a Thing, when it is supposed that he *does Will* it ; just as if one should affirm, that every thing which Is, is therefore Necessary to Be, because when it Is, it cannot but Be. For *the last Judgment of the Understanding* is nothing else but a Man's final Determining, (after more or less Consi-

Being and Attributes of God. 163

Consideration,) either to Choose or not to Choose a thing ; that is, it is the very same with the *Act of Volition*. But besides ; supposing *the last Judgment of the Understanding* was really a different Thing from the *Act of Volition*, and that the One *Necessarily* produced the other ; yet this *Necessity* of a Man's *Willing* to act according to his last *Judgment*, would at most even upon That Supposition, be only a *Moral*, and not properly a *Natural Necessity* ; that is, it would be *no Necessity at all*, in the Sense of the Opposers of Liberty. For *Moral Necessity*, is evidently consistent with the most perfect *Natural Liberty*. For instance : A Man entirely free from all Pain of Body and Disorder of Mind, judges it unreasonable for him to Hurt or Destroy Himself ; and, being under no Temptation or External Violence, he *cannot possibly* Act contrary to this Judgment ; not because he wants a *Natural Power* to do so, but because it is absurd and Mischievous and *morally Impossible* for him to Choose to do it. Which also is the very

M 2

same

same Reason, why the most perfect Rational Creatures, Superiour to Men, *Cannot* do Evil; not because they want a *Natural Power* to perform the Material Action; but because it is *Morally Impossible*, that with a Perfect Knowledge of what is Best, and without any Temptation to Evil, their Will should determine it self to Choose to Act Foolishly and Unreasonably. I know, the Opposers of Liberty reply here, that there is no Difference between *Natural* and *Moral* Necessity; a Man free from all Pain of Body and Disorder of Mind, being (they say) under a *Natural* Impossibility of hurting or destroying himself; because neither his *Judgment* nor his *Will*, without some Impulse *External* to Both, can any more possibly be determined to any Action, than one Body can begin to move, without being impelled by another. But this is forsaking the Argument drawn from the Necessity of the *Will's* following the *Understanding*, and recurs to the former Argument of the absolute Impossibility of there being any-

Being and Attributes of God. 165

any-where a *First Principle of Motion* at all ; which has been abundantly answered already.

The other Argument which I said has also frequently been urged against the Possibility of Liberty, is the *Certainty of the Divine Præscience*. But this also is entirely beside the Question. For if there be no *Other Arguments*, by which it can be proved antecedently, That All Actions are *Necessary* ; 'tis certain it can never be made appear to follow from *Præscience alone*, that they must be so. That is ; if upon *Other Accounts* there be no Impossibility, but that the Actions of Men may be free ; *the bare certainty of the Divine Fore-Knowledge*, can never be Proved to destroy that Freedom : And Consequently the *Certainty of Præscience*, separated from *Other Arguments*, is altogether beside the Question of Liberty. As to the *Other Arguments*, usually intermingled with this Question ; They have all, I think, been answered already : And now that, if upon other accounts there be no Impossibility for the Actions of Men to be free, the

The Certainty of Divine Fore-knowledge not inconsistent with the Liberty of Mens Actions.

bare Certainty of the Divine Fore-Knowledge can never be proved to destroy that Freedom; is very Evident. For *bare Fore-knowledge*, has no Influence at all in any Respect; nor affects in any measure the manner of the Existence of Any Thing. All that the greatest Opposers of Liberty have ever urged, or can urge, upon this Head, amounts only to This; that *Fore-Knowledge* implies *Certainty*, and *Certainty* implies *Necessity*. But Neither is it True, that *Certainty* implies *Necessity*; neither does *Fore-Knowledge* imply any other *Certainty*, than such a *Certainty* only as would be equally in Things though there was no *Fore-Knowledge*.

For (1st) the *Certainty of Fore-Knowledge* does not Cause the *Certainty of Things*, but is it self founded on the Reality of their Existence. Whatever Now Is, 'tis *Certain* that it is; and it was yesterday and from Eternity as *certainly* true, that the Thing *would be* to day, as it is Now *certain* that it *Is*. And this *Certainty of Event* is equally the same, whether it be supposed that the Thing could
be

Being and Attributes of God. 167

be Fore-known, or not. For whatever at any Time *Is* ; it was *certainly* True from Eternity, as to the Event, that That Thing *would be* : And this Certain Truth of every future Event, would not at all have been the less, though there had been no such Thing as Fore-Knowledge. Bare Præscience therefore has no Influence at all upon any Thing ; nor contributes in the least towards the making it Necessary. We may illustrate this in some measure by the Comparison of our own Knowledge. We know certainly that some Things are ; and when we Know that they are, they cannot but Be : Yet 'tis manifest our Knowledge does not at all affect the Things, to make them more Necessary or more Certain. Now Fore-Knowledge in God, is the very same as Knowledge. All things are to Him as if they were equally present, to all the Purposes of Knowledge and Power. He Knows perfectly every thing that *Is* : And he fore-knows whatever shall be, in the same Manner as he Knows what *Is*. As therefore Knowledge has no Influence on Things that are ; so neither has

Fore-knowledge, on Things that shall be. 'Tis true : the *Manner* how God can foresee Future Things, without a Chain of Necessary Causes ; is impossible for us to explain : But so also are Numberless other Things, which yet no Man doubts of the Truth of : And if there were any Strength in this Argument ; it would prove, not against *Liberty*, but against *Præscience* it self. For if these two things were really inconsistent, and one of them must be destroyed ; the introducing an absolute and universal Fatality, which evidently destroys all Religion and Morality, would tend more of the two to the Dishonour of God, than denying him a Fore-knowledge, which upon this Supposition would be impossible and imply a Contradiction to conceive him to have. But the Case is not thus. For tho' we cannot indeed explain the *manner* of God's foreseeing the Actions of Free Agents ; yet thus much we know, that the bare Fore-knowledge of any Action, that would upon all other Accounts be Free, cannot alter or diminish that Freedom ; it being evident

Being and Attributes of God. 169

dent that Fore-knowledge adds no other Certainty to any thing, than what it would equally have though there were no Fore-knowledge. Unless therefore we be antecedently certain, that nothing can possibly be free; and that Liberty is in it self absolutely an Inconsistent and Contradictory Notion; (as I have above shown that it is not;) bare Fore-knowledge, which makes no alteration at all in any thing, will not be in any wise Inconsistent with Liberty; how great Difficulty so ever there may be, in comprehending the *manner* of such Fore-knowledge. For if Liberty be in it self possible; The bare *Fore-sight* of a free Action, *before it be done*; is nothing different (to any Purpose in the present Question) from a simple *Knowledge* of it, *when it is done*: Both these Kinds of Knowledge, implying plainly a *Certainty only* of the Event, (which would be the same tho' there were no such Knowledge) and not at all any *Necessity* of the Thing.

For (2dly.) As *Fore-knowledge* implies not any other Certainty, than
such

such as would be equally in Things though there were *no Fore-knowledge*: So neither does this *Certainty of Event*, in any sort imply *Necessity*. For, let a Fatalist *suppose*, (what he does *not yet grant*,) that there was in Man (as we assert) a Power of Beginning Motion, that is, of acting freely; and let him suppose further, if he please, that those Actions could not possibly be fore-known: Will there not yet, notwithstanding this Supposition, be in the Nature of things the same *Certainty of Event* in every one of the Man's Actions, as if they were never so Fatal and Necessary? For Instance: Suppose the Man by an internal Principle of Motion and an Absolute Freedom of Will, without any External Cause or Impulse at all, does some particular Action *to Day*; and suppose it was not possible that this Action should have been fore-seen *Yesterday*; was there not nevertheless the same *Certainty of Event*, as if it had been fore-seen? That is; would it not, notwithstanding the *supposed* Freedom, have been as *Certain a Truth Yesterday* and from Eternity,

Being and Attributes of God. 171

Eternity, that this Action *was* in Event *to be performed to Day*, (though supposed never so impossible to have been fore-known,) as it is now a *Certain and Infallible Truth* that it *is* performed? Mere *Certainty of Event* therefore, does not in any measure imply *Necessity*: And consequently *Fore-knowledge*, however impossible to be explained as to the *Manner* of it, yet since 'tis evident it implies no other *Certainty* but only that *Certainty of Event* which the Thing would equally have without being fore-known, 'tis evident that *It* also implies no *Necessity*.

And Now having, as I hope, sufficiently proved both the Possibility ^{*Of the Original of Evil.*} and the Real Existence of *Liberty*: I shall, from what has been said on this Head, draw only this One Inference; that hereby we are inabled to Answer that Antient and Great Question, [Πότεν τὸ κακὸν ;] what is the Cause and Original of *Evil*. For *Liberty* implying a *Natural Power* of doing *Evil*, as well as *Good*; and the Imperfect Nature of Finite Beings making it possible for them to abuse that

that their Liberty to an actual Commission of Evil ; and it being Necessary to the Order and Beauty of the Whole, and for displaying the Infinite Wisdom of the Creator, that there should be different and various degrees of Creatures, whereof consequently some must be *less Perfect* than others ; Hence there necessarily arises a Possibility of Evil, notwithstanding that the Creator is infinitely Good. In short, thus : All that we call *Evil*, is either an *Evil of Imperfection*, as the *Want of certain Faculties and Excellencies which other Creatures have* ; or *Natural Evil*, as *Pain, Death*, and the like ; or *Moral Evil*, as all kind of *Vice*. The *First* of these, is not properly an Evil : For every Power, Faculty or Perfection, which any Creature enjoys, being the Free Gift of God, which he was no more obliged to bestow, than he was to confer Being or Existence it self ; 'tis plain, the want of any certain Faculty or Perfection in any Kind of Creatures, which never belonged to their Nature, is no more an Evil to Them, than their never having been

Being and Attributes of God. 173

been Created or brought into Being at all, could properly have been called an Evil. The *Second* Kind of Evil, which we call Natural Evil, is either a Necessary Consequence of the former ; as *Death*, to a Creature on whose Nature Immortality was never conferred ; and then 'tis no more properly an Evil, than the Former : Or else it is counterpoised in the whole, with as Great or Greater Good ; as the *Afflictions and Sufferings of Good Men* ; and then also it is not properly an Evil : Or else lastly 'tis a *Punishment* ; and then 'tis a Necessary Consequent of the *Third* and last sort of Evil, viz. *Moral Evil* : And This arises wholly from the abuse of *Liberty* ; which God gave to his Creatures for other Purposes, and which 'twas reasonable and fit to give them for the Perfection and Order of the whole Creation ; Only they, contrary to Gods Intention and Command, have abused what was Necessary for the Perfection of the whole, to the Corruption and Depravation of themselves ; And thus all Sorts of Evils have entred into the World, without any Diminution

174 *A Demonstration of the*

tion to the infinite Goodness of the Creator and Governour thereof.

*That the
Supreme
Cause of all
Things
must be
infinitely
Wise.*

XI. *The Supreme Cause and Author of all Things, must of Necessity be infinitely Wise.* This Proposition is evidently Consequent upon those that have already been proved ; And they being established, This, as admitting no further Dispute, needs not to be largely insisted upon. For nothing is more evident, than that an *Infinite, Omnipresent, Intelligent Being*, must Know perfectly *all things that Are* ; and that He who alone is *Self-existent and Eternal, the Sole Cause and Author of all Things* ; from whom alone all the Powers of all Things are derived, and on whom they continually depend ; must also Know perfectly all the Consequences of those Powers, that is, *all Possibilities of Things to come*, and what in every respect is Best and Wisest to be done ; and having Infinite Power, can never be controuled or prevented from doing what he so knows to be Fittest : From all which, it manifestly follows, that every Effect

Being and Attributes of God. 175

fect of the Supreme Cause, must be the Product of Infinite Wisdom. More particularly : The Supreme Being, because he is *Infinite*, must be every where present : And because he is an Infinite *Mind* or *Intelligence* ; therefore where-ever he Is, his Knowledge Is, which is inseparable from his Being, and must therefore be infinite likewise : And where-ever his Infinite Knowledge is, it must necessarily have a *full and perfect* Prospect of all things, and nothing can be concealed from its Inspection : He includes and surrounds every thing with his boundless Presence ; and penetrates every part of their Substance with his All-seeing Eye : So that the inmost Nature and Essence of all things, are perfectly Naked and Open to his View ; and even the deepest Thoughts of Intelligent Beings themselves, manifest in his sight. Further, All Things being not only present to him, but also entirely *Depending* upon him ; and having *received* both their Being it self, and all their Powers and Faculties *from Him* ; 'tis manifest that, as he knows all things
that

that *are*, so he must likewise know all Possibilities of Things; that is, All Effects that *Can be*. For, being himself only Self-Existent, and having Alone *given* to all Things all the Powers and Faculties they are indued with; 'tis evident He must of Necessity know perfectly what All and Each of those Powers and Faculties, which are *derived wholly from himself*, can possibly Produce: And Seeing at one boundless View, all the Possible Compositions and Divisions, Variations and Changes, Circumstances and Dependencies of Things; all the possible Relations one to another, and Dispositions or Fittests to certain and respective Ends: He must without Possibility of Error, know exactly what is Best and Properest in every one of the Infinite Possible Cases or Methods of Disposing Things; and understand perfectly how to Order and Direct the respective Means, to bring about what he so knows to be in its Kind or in the Whole the Best and Fittest in the End. This is what we mean by *Infinite Wisdom*. And having before shown,

Being and Attributes of God. 177

shown, (which indeed is also Evident of it self,) that the Supreme Cause is moreover *All Powerful* ; so that He can no more be Prevented by Force or Opposition, than he can be hindered by Error or Mistake, from *Effecting* always what is absolutely Fittest and Wisest to be done ; It follows undeniably, that he is *actually and effectually*, in the Highest and most complete Sense, *Infinitely Wise* ; and that the World, and all Things therein, must be and are Effects of Infinite Wisdom. This is Demonstration *a priori*. The Proof *a posteriori*, of the Infinite Wisdom of God, from the Consideration of the Exquisite Perfection and Consummate Excellency of his Works ; is no less strong and undeniable : But I shall not enlarge upon this Argument ; because it has often already been accurately and strongly urged, to the everlasting shame and confusion of Atheists, by the ablest and learnedest Writers both of Antient and Modern Times. I shall here observe only this One Thing ; That the Older the World grows, and the deeper Men

N inquire

178 *A Demonstration of the*

inquire into Things, and the more Accurate Observations they make, and the more and greater Discoveries they find out; the stronger this Argument continually grows: Which is a certain Evidence of its being founded in Truth. If *Galen* so many Ages ago, could find in the Construction and Constitution of the parts of a Humane Body, such undeniable marks of Contrivance and Design; as forced him *Then* to acknowledge and admire the Wisdom of its Author; What would he have said, if he had known the *Late* Discoveries in Anatomy and Physick, the Circulation of the Blood, the exact Structure of the Heart and Brain, the Uses of Numberless Glands and Valves for the Secretion and Motion of the Juices in the Body, besides several Veins and other Vessels and Receptacles not at all known, or so much as imagined to have any Existence, *in his Days*; but which *Now* are discovered to serve the Wisest and most exquisite Ends imaginable? If the Arguments against the Belief of the Being of an All-wise Creator and

Being and Attributes of God. 179

and Governor of the World, which *Epicurus* and his Follower *Lucretius* drew from the Faults which they imagined they could Find in the Frame and Constitution of the *Earth*, were so Poor and Inconsiderable, that even in that Infancy of Natural Philosophy, the Generality of Men contemned and despised them as of no force; How would they have been ashamed, if they had lived in these Days; when those very things, which they thought to be Faults and Blunders in the Constitution of Things, are discovered to be very useful and of exceeding Benefit to the Preservation and Well-Being of the whole? And, to mention no more: If *Tully*, from the partial and very imperfect Knowledge in Astronomy, which *His* Times afforded, could be so confident of the Heavenly Bodies being Disposed and Moved by a Wise and Understanding Mind, as to Declare, that in his Opinion, whoever asserted the contrary, was himself

* *Calestem ergo admirabilem ordinem incredibilemque constantiam, ex qua conservatio & salus omnium omnis oritur, qui vacare mente putat, is ipse mentis expertus habendus est. De Natura Deorum, lib. 2:*

N 2

Void

Void of all Understanding ; What wou'd He have said, if he had known the *Modern Discoveries* in Astronomy ? The *Immense Greatness* of the World ; (I mean of that Part of it, which falls under our Observation ;) which is Now known to be as much Greater than what in his Time they imagined it to be, as the World it self, according to their System, was Greater than *Archimedes's* Sphere ? The *Exquisite Regularity* of all the Planets Motions, without Epicycles, Stations, Retrogradations, or any other Deviation or Confusion whatsoever ? The *inexpressible Nicety* of the Adjustment of the Primary Velocity and Original Direction of the *Annual Motion* of the Planets, with their Distance from the Central Body and their force of Gravitation towards it ? The *wonderful Proportion* of the *Diurnal Motion* of the Earth and other Planets about their own Centers ; for the Distinction of Light and Darkness ; without that monstrously disproportionate Whirling of the whole Heavens, which the Antient Astronomers were forced to suppose ? The
exact

Being and Attributes of God. 181

exact Accommodating the
* *Densities* of the Planets, to their Distances from the Sun, and consequently to the Proportion of Heat which each of them is to bear respectively ; so that neither Those which are nearest to the Sun, are destroyed by the Heat ; nor Those which are farthest off, by the Cold ; but each one enjoys a Temperature suited to its proper Uses, as the Earth is to ours ? The *Admirable Order, Number and Usefulness*, of the several *Moons*, (as I may very properly call them,) never dreamt of by Antiquity, but Now by the Help of Telescopes *clearly and distinctly seen* to move about their respective Planets ; and whose Motions are so exactly Known, that their very Eclipses are as certainly calculated and foretold, as those of our own Moon ? The *strange Adjustment* of our Moon's *Motion about its own Center* once in a Month, with its Motion about the Earth in the same Period of Time,

* Planetarum densitates fere sunt, ut radices diametrorum apparentium applicatæ ad diametros veras, hoc est, reciproce ut distantia Planetarum a sole, ductæ in radices diametrorum apparentium. Collocavit igitur Deus Planetas in diversis distantis a sole, ut quilibet pro gradu densitatis, calore solis majore vel minore fruatur. Newton. Princip. Lib. 3. Prop. 8.

to such a degree of Exactness, that *by that means* the same Face is always Obverted to the Earth without any Sensible Variation? What, I say, would *Tully*, that great Master of Reason, have thought and said; if these and other Newly Discovered Instances of the Unexpressible Accuracy and Wisdom of the Works of God, had been found out and Known in *His* Time? Certainly Atheism, which *Then* was infinitely unable to withstand the Arguments drawn from this Topick; must *Now*, upon the additional Strength of these latter Observations, which are every one an unanswerable Proof of the incomprehensible Wisdom of the Creator, be utterly ashamed to show its Head. We *Now* see with how great reason the Author of the Book of *Ecclesiasticks*, after he had described the Beauty of the Sun and Stars, and all the then Visible Works of God in Heaven and Earth; concluded, *ch.* 43, *v.* 32, (as *We* after all the Discoveries of later Ages, may no doubt still truly say,) *There are yet hid greater things than these,*
and

Being and Attributes of God. 183

and we have seen but a few of his Works.

XII. Lastly, *The Supreme Cause and Author of all Things, must of Necessity be a Being of Infinite Goodness, Justice and Truth, and all other Moral Perfections; such as Become the Supreme Governour and Judge of the World.*

The Supreme Author of all Things, must be infinitely Good. Just and True.

That there are different Relations of Things one towards another, is as certain as that there are Different Things in the World. That from these Different Relations of Different Things, there necessarily arises an Agreement or Disagreement of some Things to others, or a Fitness or Unfitness of the Application of Different Things or Different Relations one to another; is likewise as certain, as that there is any Difference in the Nature of Things, or that Different Things do Exist. Further, that there is a Fitness or Suitableness of certain Circumstances to certain Persons, and an Unsuitableness of Others, Founded in the Nature of Things and the Qualifications of Per-

184 *A Demonstration of the*

sons, antecedent to *Will* and to all *Arbitrary or Positive Appointment whatsoever* ; must unavoidably be acknowledged by every one, who will not affirm that 'tis *equally Fit and Suitable*, in the *Nature and Reason of Things*, that an Innocent Being should be *extremely and eternally Miserable*, as that it should be Free from such Misery. There is therefore such a Thing as *Fitness and Unfitness*, eternally, necessarily and unchangeably, in the *Nature and Reason of Things*. Now what these *Relations of Things* absolutely and Necessarily Are in Themselves ; That also they *Appear to be*, to the Understanding of all Intelligent Beings ; except Those only, who Understand Things to Be what they Are not, that is, whose Understandings are either very imperfect or very much depraved. And by this *Understanding or Knowledge* of the Natural and Necessary Relations of Things, the *Actions likewise* of all Intelligent Beings are constantly Directed ; (which *by the by* is the true Ground and Foundation of all Morality :) unless their *Will* be corrupted

Being and Attributes of God. 185

rupted by particular *Interest or Affection*, or swayed by some unreasonable and prevailing Lust. The Supreme Cause therefore, and Author of all Things; since (as has already been Proved) he must of necessity have Infinite *Knowledge*, and the Perfection of *Wisdom*; so that 'tis absolutely impossible he should *Err* or be in any respect *Ignorant* of the True Relations and Fitness or Unfitness of Things, or be by any means *Deceived* or Imposed upon herein: And since he is likewise *Self-Existent*, Absolutely *Independent* and *All-Powerful*; so that, having no *want* of any thing, 'tis impossible his *Will* should be influenced by any wrong *Affection*; and, having no Dependence, 'tis impossible his *Power* should be limited by any Superiour Strength; 'Tis evident He must of Necessity (meaning, not a *Necessity of Fate*, but such a *Moral Necessity* as I before said was consistent with the most perfect Liberty,) *Do* always what he *Knows* to be *Fittest to be Done*; that is, He must Act always according to the strictest Rules of Infinite *Goodness*,
Justice

186 *A Demonstration of the*

Justice and Truth, and all other Moral Perfections. In Particular ; The Supreme Cause must in the first place be infinitely Good ; that is, he must have an unalterable Disposition to Do and to Communicate Good or Happiness ; Because being Himself necessarily Happy in the Eternal injoyment of his own Infinite Perfections, he cannot possibly have any other Motives to make any Creatures at all, but only that He may Communicate to Them His Own Perfections ; according to their different Capacities, arising from that Variety of Natures, which it was Fit for Infinite Wisdom to produce ; and according to their different Improvements, arising from that Liberty, which is essentially Necessary to the Constitution of Intelligent and Active Beings. That he must be Infinitely Good, appears likewise further from hence ; that being Necessarily All-Sufficient, he must consequently be infinitely removed from all Malice and Envy, and from all other Possible Causes or Temptations of doing Evil ; which, it is evident, can only be Effects of Want
and

Being and Attributes of God. 187

and Weakness, of Imperfection or Depravation. Again ; The Supreme Cause and Author of all things, must in like manner be infinitely *Just* ; Because the *Rule of Equity* being nothing else but the *Very Nature* of Things, and their *necessary Relations* one to Another ; and the *Execution of Justice*, being nothing else but a suiting the *Circumstances of Things* to the *Qualifications of Persons*, according to the *Original Fitness and Agreeableness*, which I have before shown to be *Necessarily in Nature*, Antecedent to *Will and all Positive Appointment* ; 'tis evident that He who *knows perfectly* this Rule of Equity, and necessarily *Judges of Things as they Are* ; who has *complete Power* to Execute Justice according to that Knowledge, and *No possible Temptation* to deviate in the least there-from ; who can neither be *imposed upon* by any *Deceit*, nor *swayed* by any *Byass*, nor *awed* by any *Power* ; must of Necessity do always that which is *Right* ; without Iniquity, and without Partiality ; without Prejudice, and without Respect of Persons. Lastly ; That the Supreme Cause

188 *A Demonstration of the*

Cause and Author of all things, must be *True and Faithful*, in all his *Declarations* and all his *Promises*; is most evident: For the only Possible Reason of Falsifying, is either *Rashness* or *Forgetfulness*, *Inconstancy* or *Impotency*, *Fear of Evil* or *Hope of Gain*; From * all which

*** Οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ ἐνέργεια αὐτοῦ
θεοῦ ψεύδοιτο. ---- Κομίδης
ἀρετὴ ὁ θεὸς ἀπλῶς καὶ ἀλη-
θῆς ἐν τε ἔργῳ καὶ ἐν λόγῳ.
καὶ ὅτε αὐτὸς μεδίσσεται,
ὅτε ἄλλους ἐξαπατᾷ, ὅτε
κατὰ φαντασίας, ὅτε κατὰ
λόγους, ὅτε κατὰ σημείων
πομπὰς. ἢ δ' ὅ παρ' ἐλ' ὁ-
ναρ. Plato de Repub. Lib.
2. Sub finem.

an infinitely *Wise, All-sufficient* and *Good Being*, must of Necessity be infinitely removed; and consequently, as it is impossible for him to be deceived himself, so * neither is it possible for

Him in any wise to deceive Others. In a Word: All Evil and all Imperfection whatsoever, arise plainly either from *Shortness of Understanding*, *Defect of Power*, or *Faultiness of Will*; and this last, evidently from some *Impotency*, *Corruption* or *Depravation*; being nothing else, but a direct Choosing to Act contrary to the known Reason and Nature of Things: From all which, it being manifest that the Supreme Cause and Author of all Things, cannot but be infinitely Re-
moved;

Being and Attributes of God. 189

moved ; it follows undeniably, that he must of Necessity be *a Being of Infinite Goodness, Justice and Truth, and all other Moral Perfections.*

To this Argumentation *a priori*, there can be opposed but one Objection that I know of, drawn on the contrary *a posteriori*, from Experience and Observation of the Unequal Distributions of Providence in the World. But (besides the just Vindication of the Wisdom and Goodness of Providence in its Dispensations even with Respect to this present World only, which *Plutarch* and other Heathen Writers have judiciously made) the Objection itself is entirely wide of the Question. For concerning the Justice and Goodness of God, (as of any Governour whatsoever,) no Judgment is to be made from a partial View of a few small Portions of his Dispensations, but from an Entire Consideration of the Whole ; and consequently not only the short Duration of this present State, but moreover all that is past and that is still to come, must be taken into the Observation : and
Then

Then every thing will clearly appear just and right.

From this Account of the Moral Attributes of God, it follows,

*The Necessity of
God's Moral Attri-
butes, con-
sistent with
perfect
Liberty.*

157. That though All the Actions of God, are entirely Free ; and consequently the Exercise of his Moral Attributes cannot be said to be Necessary, in the same Sense of Necessity as his Existence and Eternity are Necessary ; yet these Moral Attributes are *really and truly* Necessary, by such a Necessity, as, though it be not at all inconsistent with Liberty, yet is equally Certain, Infallible, and to be Depended upon, as even the Existence it self, or the Eternity of God. For though nothing is more Certain (*as has been already Proved in the Ninth Proposition of this Discourse*) than that God acts, *not necessarily*, but *voluntarily*, with particular intention and design, knowing that he does Good, and intending to do so, freely and out of choice, and when he has no other constraint upon him but this, that his Goodness inclines his Will to communicate himself and
to

Being and Attributes of God. 191

to do Good ; so that the Divine Nature is under no Necessity, but such as is consistent with the most perfect Liberty and Freest Choice : (which is the Ground of all our Prayers and Thanksgivings :) yet it is nevertheless as *truly and absolutely impossible* for God not to do (or to do any thing contrary to,) what his Moral Attributes require him to do ; as if he was really, not a Free, but a Necessary Agent. And the Reason hereof, is plain : Because Infinite Knowledge, Power, and Goodness in Conjunction, may, notwithstanding the most perfect Freedom and Choice, Act with altogether as much *Certainty and Unalterable Steadiness* ; as even the Necessity of Fate can be supposed to do. Nay they cannot possibly but so Act ; because Free Choice, in a Being of Infinite Knowledge, Power, and Goodness, can no more Choose to Act contrary to these Perfections ; than *Knowledge* can be *Ignorance*, *Power* be *Weakness*, or *Goodness* *Malice* ; So that *Free Choice*, in such a Being, may be as *Certain* and *Steady* a Principle

ciple of Action, as the Necessity of Fate. We may therefore as certainly and infallibly rely upon the *Moral*, as upon the *Natural* Attributes of God : It being as absolutely impossible for Him to Act contrary to the One, as to Devest himself of the Other ; And as much a Contradiction, to suppose him choosing to Do any thing inconsistent with his Justice, Goodness and Truth ; as to suppose him devested of Infinity, Power, or Existence. The One is contrary to the *Immediate and Absolute Necessity of his Nature* ; The other to the unalterable *Rectitude of his Will* : The One is in it self an *Immediate Contradiction in the Terms* ; The other is an *express Contradiction to the Necessary Perfections of the Divine Nature* : To suppose the One, is saying absolutely that *Something Is at the same Time that it is not* : To suppose the Other, is saying that *Infinite Knowledge can Act Ignorantly, Infinite Power Weakly, or that Infinite Wisdom and Goodness can Do Things Not Good or Wise to be done* : All which,

Being and Attributes of God. 193

which are *equally Great*, and *equally Manifest* Absurdities. This, I humbly conceive, is a very Intelligible Account of the Moral Attributes of God ; satisfactory to the Mind, and without Perplexity and Confusion of Ideas. I might have said it at once, (as the Truth most certainly is,) that Justice, Goodness, and all the other Moral Attributes of God, are as *Essential* to the Divine Nature, as the Natural Attributes of Eternity, Infinity, and the like. But because all Atheistical Persons, after they are fully convinced that there must needs be in the Universe some one Eternal, Necessary, Infinite, and All-powerful Being ; will still with unreasonable Obstinacy contend, that they can by no means see any necessary Connexion of Goodness, Justice, or any other Moral Attribute, with these Natural Perfections ; Therefore I chose to endeavour to Demonstrate the Moral Attributes by a particular Deduction, in the manner I have now Done.

194 *A Demonstration of the*

*Of the Ne-
cessity of
God's doing
always
what is
Best and
Fittest in
the whole.*

2dly. From hence it follows, that though God is a most perfectly free Agent, yet he cannot but do always what is Best and Wisest in the whole. The Reason is evident: Because Perfect Wisdom and Goodness, are as *Steady and Certain* Principles of Action, as Necessity it self: And an Infinitely Wise and Good Being, indued with the most perfect Liberty, can no more Choose to act in contradiction to Wisdom and Goodness; than a Necessary Being can Act contrary to the Necessity, by which it is acted: It being as great an Absurdity and Impossibility *in Choice*, for Infinite Wisdom to choose to act Unwisely, or Infinite Goodness to choose what is not Good; as it is in *Nature*, for absolute Necessity to fail of producing its necessary Effect. There was indeed no *Necessity in Nature*, that God should at first Create such Beings as he has Created, or indeed any Being at all; because He is in Himself infinitely Happy, and All-sufficient: There was also no *Necessity in Nature*

Being and Attributes of God. 195

ture that he should preserve and continue Things in Being, after they were created ; because He would be as Self-sufficient without their Continuance, as he was before their Creation : But it was Fit, and Wise, and Good, that Infinite Wisdom should Manifest, and Infinite Goodness Communicate it self : And therefore it was *Necessary* (*in the Sense of Necessity I am now speaking of,*) that Things should be made at such time, and continued so long, and indued with various Perfections in such Degrees, as Infinite Wisdom and Goodness saw it Wisest and Best that they should be : And *when* and *whilst* Things are in Being, the same Moral Perfections make it Necessary, that they should be disposed and governed according to the exactest and most unchangeable Laws of Eternal Justice, Goodness and Truth ; Because while *Things* and their *several Relations* are, they cannot but be what they are ; and an infinitely Wise Being, cannot but know them to be what they
O 2 are,

196 *A Demonstration of the*

are, and judge always rightly concerning the several Fitnesses or Unfitnesses of them ; and an Infinitely Good Being, cannot but choose to act always according to this Knowledge of the respective Fitness of Things : It being as truly impossible for such a *Free Agent*, who is absolutely incapable of being Deceived or Depraved, *to Choose*, by acting contrary to these Laws, to destroy its own *Perfections* ; as for *Necessary Existence to be able to destroy its own Being*.

Of the Impossibility of his doing Evil.

3dly. From hence it follows, that though God is both Perfectly Free, and also Infinitely Powerful, yet he cannot Possibly do any Thing that is Evil. The Reason of this also is Evident. Because, as 'tis manifest Infinite Power cannot Extend to Natural Contradictions, which imply a Destruction of that very Power, by which they must be supposed to be wrought ; so neither can it Extend to Moral Contradictions, which imply a Destruction of some other Attributes, as necessarily belonging to the Divine Nature, as Power. I have already shown, that Justice, Goodness.

Being and Attributes of God. 197

ness and Truth, are necessarily in God ; even as necessarily, as Power and Understanding, and Knowledge of the Nature of Things : 'Tis therefore as Impossible and Contradictory, to suppose *his Will should Choose* to Do any thing contrary to Justice, Goodness or Truth ; as that *his Power should be Able* to Do any thing inconsistent with Power. 'Tis no Diminution of Power, not to be able to Do things which are no Object of Power : And 'tis in like manner no Diminution either of Power or Liberty, to have such a Perfect and Unalterable Rectitude of Will, as never Possibly to Choose to do any thing inconsistent with that Rectitude.

4thly. From hence it follows that Liberty, properly speaking, is not in it self an Imperfection, but a Perfection. For it is in the highest and completest degree, in *God Himself* ; Every Act, wherein he Exercises any Moral Attribute, as Goodness, Justice or Truth, proceeding from the most Perfect Liberty and Freest Choice ; without which, Goodness would not be Goodness, nor Justice and Truth, any

That Liberty is not in it self an Imperfection, but a Perfection.

Excellencies; these things, in the very Idea and Formal Notion of them, utterly excluding All Necessity. It has indeed been commonly taught, that Liberty is a great Imperfection; because it is the Occasion of all Sin and Misery: But, if we will speak properly, 'tis not Liberty that exposes us to Misery, but only the Abuse of Liberty. 'Tis True; Liberty makes Men capable of Sin, and consequently liable to Misery; neither of which they could possibly be, without Liberty: But he that will say every thing is an Imperfection, by the Abuse whereof a Creature may become more unhappy, than if God had never given it that Thing at all; must say that a Stone is a more excellent and perfect Creature than Man, because it is not capable of making it self miserable, as Man is: And by the same Argument, Reason and Knowledge, and every other Perfection, nay even Existence it self, will be Proved to be an Imperfection; because it is That without which a Creature could not be miserable. The Truth therefore is; The Abuse of Liberty, that is, the Corruption and Depravation of That, with-

Being and Attributes of God. 199

without which no Creatures could be happy, is the alone Cause of their Misery : But as for Liberty it self, it is a great Perfection : And the more Perfect any Creature is, the more Perfect is its Liberty : And the Perfectest Liberty of all, is such a Liberty, as can never by any Ignorance, Deceit or Corruption, be byassed or diverted from Choosin^g, what is the Proper Object of Free Choice, the greatest Good.

5thly. From hence it follows, that though probably no Rational Creature can be in a strict Philosophical Sense *Impeccable* ; yet we may easily conceive, how God can place such Creatures, as he judges worthy of so excellent a Gift, in such a State of Knowledge and near Communion with himself, where Goodness and Holiness shall appear so amiable, and where they shall be exempt from all means of temptation and corruption ; that it shall never be possible for them, notwithstanding the Natural Liberty of their Will, to be seduced from their unchangeable Happiness in the Everlasting Choice and Enjoyment of their greatest Good : Which is the State of

Of the highest Moral Perfections of Rational Creatures not excluding Natural Liberty.

Good Angels, and of the Saints in Heaven.

*That the
Grounds of
all Moral
Obligations
are eternal
and neces-
sary, and
depend not
on any
Laws.*

Lastly, From what has been said up-
on this Head, it follows, that the true
Ground and Foundation of all Eternal
Moral Obligations, is this; that the
same Reasons, *viz.* the forementioned
necessary and eternal *Different Relati-
ons* which *Different Things* bear one to
another; and the consequent *Fitness*
or *Unfitness* of the Application of dif-
ferent Things or different Relations
one to another, unavoidably arising
from that Difference of the Things
themselves; these same Reasons, I
say, which always and necessarily *do*
determine the Will of God, as hath
been before shown; *ought* also con-
stantly to determine the Will of all
Subordinate Intelligent Beings; And
when they do not, then such Beings Set-
ting up their own unreasonable Self-
Will in opposition to the Nature and
Reason of Things, endeavour (as
much as in them lies) to make Things
be what they are not and cannot be;
which is the highest Presumption and
greatest Insolence imaginable; an act-
ing contrary to their own Reason and
Know-

Being and Attributes of God. 201

Knowledge ; an attempting to destroy that Order by which the Universe Subsists ; and also by consequence an offering the highest affront imaginable to the Creatour of all Things, who himself governs all his Actions by these Rules, and cannot but require the same of all his reasonable Creatures. They who found all Moral Obligations ultimately in the *Will* of God, must recur at length to the same thing ; only with this difference, that they do not clearly explain how the Nature and Will of God himself must be necessarily Good and Just, as I have endeavoured to do. They who found all Moral Obligation only upon *Laws* made for the good of Societies, hold an Opinion which (besides that 'tis fully confuted by what has been already said concerning the eternal and necessary Difference of Things,) is moreover so directly and manifestly contradictory and inconsistent with itself, that it seems strange it should not have been more commonly taken notice of. For if there be no difference between Good and Evil, antecedent to all Laws ; there can be no reason given

ven why any Laws should be made at all, when all things are naturally indifferent. To say that Laws are necessary to be made for the good of Mankind, is confessing that certain things tend to the good of Mankind, that is, to the preserving and perfecting their Nature; which wise Men *therefore* think necessary to be establist by Laws: And if the reason why certain things are establist by wise and good Laws, is because those things tend to the good of Mankind; 'tis manifest they were good, antecedent to their being confirmed by Laws: Otherwise, if they were not good, antecedent to all Laws; 'tis evident there could be no reason why such Laws should be made, rather than the contrary: Which is the greatest absurdity in the World.

The Conclusion.

AND now, from what has been said upon this Argument, I hope it is in the whole sufficiently clear, that the Being and Attributes of God, are to attentive and considering Minds, abundantly capable of just Proof and Demonstration; and that the adversa-
ries

Being and Attributes of God. 203

ries of God and Religion, have not *Reason* on their side, (to which they would pretend to be strict adherers,) but merely vain Confidence, and great Blindness and Prejudice; when they would have it be thought, that in the Fabrick of the World, God has left himself wholly without Witnesses; and that all the Arguments of Nature, are on the side of Atheism and Irreligion. Some Men, I know, there are, who having never turned their Thoughts to Matters of this Nature, Think that these Things are all absolutely above our Comprehension; and that we talk about we know not what, when we dispute about these Questions: But since the most considerable Atheists that ever appeared in the World, and the Pleaders for Universal Fatality, have all thought fit to argue in this Way, in their Attempts to remove the first Foundations of Religion; it is Reasonable and Necessary that they should be opposed in their own Way; it being most certain, that no Argumentation, of what kind soever, can possibly be made use of
on

on the side of Errour, but may also be used with much greater Advantage, on the behalf of Truth.

2. From what has been said on this Argument, we may see how it comes to pass, that though nothing is so certain and undeniable, as the Necessary Existence of God, and the Consequent Deduction of all his Attributes ; yet Men, who have never attended to the Evidence of Reason and the Notices that God hath given us of Himself, may Easily be in great measure ignorant of Both. That the three Angels of a Triangle are Equal to two right ones, is so certain and evident, that whoever affirms the contrary, affirms what may very easily be deduced to an Express Contradiction : yet whoever bend not their Minds to consider it at all, may easily be ignorant of this and numberless other the like Mathematical and most infallible Truths.

3. Yet the Notices that God has been pleased to give us of himself, are so many and so obvious ; in the Constitution, Order, Beauty and Harmony of the several Parts of the World ;

Being and Attributes of God. 205

World ; in the Frame and Structure of our own Bodies, and the wonderful Powers and Faculties of our Souls ; in the unavoidable Apprehensions of our own Minds, and the common Consent of all other Men ; in every thing within us, and every thing without us ; that no Man of the meanest Capacity and greatest Disadvantages whatsoever, with the slightest and most superficial Observation of the Works of God, and the lowest and most obvious attendance to the Reason of Things, can be ignorant of *Him*, but he must be utterly without excuse. He may not indeed be able to understand or be affected by Nice and Metaphysical Demonstrations of the Being and Attributes of God : But then for the same Reason, he is obliged also not to suffer himself to be shaken and unsettled, by the subtle Sophistries of Sceptical and Atheistical Men ; which he cannot perhaps answer, because he cannot understand ; But he is bound to adhere to those Things which he knows, and those Reasonings he is capable to judge of ; which
are

are abundantly sufficient to determine and to guide the Practice of sober and considering Men.

4. But this is not all. God has moreover finally, by a clear and express Revelation of Himself, brought down from Heaven by his own Son, our Blessed Lord and Redeemer; and suited to ever Capacity and Understanding; put to Silence the Ignorance of Foolish, and the Vanity of Sceptical and Profane Men: and by Declaring to us Himself his own Nature and Attributes, has effectually prevented all Mistakes, which the Weakness of our Reason, the Negligence of our Application, the Corruption of our Nature, or the False Philosophy of wicked and Profane Men, might have led us into; and so has infallibly furnished us with sufficient Knowledge, to enable us to perform our Duty in this Life, and to obtain our Happiness in that which is to come. But this exceeds the Bounds of my present Subject, and deserves to be handled in a particular Discourse.

F I N I S.



BOOKS Written by the Reverend Mr.
Clark; and Printed for *James Knapton*,
at the *Crown* in *St Paul's Church-Yard*.

A Discourse concerning the Unchangeable Obligations of Natural Religion, and the Truth and Certainty of the *Christian Revelation*. Being Eight Sermons Preach'd at the Cathedral-Church of *St Paul*, in the Year 1705, at the Lecture Founded by the Honourable *Robert Boyle Esq*; Price 5 s.

The Great Duty of Universal Love and Charity. A Sermon Preached before the Queen, at *St James's Chapel*. On Sunday December the 30th, 1705 Price 6 d.

A Letter to Mr. *Dodwell*; Wherein all the Arguments in his *Epistolary Discourse* against the Immortality of the Soul are particularly answered, and the Judgment of the *Fathers* concerning that Matter truly represented. The Second Edition. Pr. 1 s.

A Paraphrase on the *Four Evangelists*. Wherein, for the clearer Understanding the Sacred History, the whole Text and Paraphrase are Printed in separate Columns over-against each other. Together with Critical Notes on the more difficult Passages, very Useful for Families. In two Volumes. 8vo. Price 12 s.

The whole Duty of a Christian, Plainly Represented in three Practical Essays, on *Baptism*, *Confirmation* and *Repentance*. Containing full Instructions for a Holy Life: With earnest Exhortations, especially to young Persons, drawn from the Consideration of the Severity of the Discipline of the Primitive Church. The 2d. Edition. Price 6 d. 100 for 2 l. fine Paper bound 1 s.

Jacobi Rohaulti Physica. Latine, vertit, recensuit, & uberioribus jam Annotationibus ex illustrissimi *Isaaci Newtoni* Philosophia, maximam partem haustis, amplificavit & ornavit *Samuel Clark*, M. A. Admodum Reverendo in Christo patri, *Joanni* Episcopo *Norvicensi*, a Sacris Domesticis. Accedunt etiam in hac secunda Editione, novæ aliquot Tabulæ æri incisæ. 8vo. Price 8 s.

Some Reflections on that part of a Book called *Amyntor*, Or, The Defence of *Milton's* Life, which relates to the Writings of the Primitive Fathers and the Canon of the New Testament. In a Letter to a Friend. Octavo. Price 6 d.

B O O K S

BOOKS Sold by J. Knapton, &c.

M. T. Cicero de Oratore, by
 Cockman.
 Horatius Minellii
 Terentius Min.
 Ovidii Metam. Min.
 Tristia & Epist. Min.
 Florus Min.
 Salust Min.
 Quintus Curtius Variorum.
 Suetonius Grævii.
 Vorstius de Latinitate.
 Stephanus de Urbibus, Gr. &
 Lat. Fol.
 Cellarii Geographia, 4to.
 Bellinus de Urinis, &c.
 Sturmii Mathesis Juvenilis.
 Puffendorff de Jure Gentium.
 Almelooven Fasti.
 Pecklinus de Purgantibus.
 Rutilii Itinerarium
 Herbert de Religione.
 Corn. Nepos Grevii Notis
 Devarius de Particulis.
 Dale supe. Arestæam
 Spanhemii Elenchus Contro-
 versiarum.
 Luesdeni Biblia Heb.
 Juliani opera, Gr. & Lat. Fol.
 Dile de Idolatria
 Cæsar Com. 24
 Erasmus Coll. 24.
 Quintus Curtius 24.
 Commelini Præludia Botanica.
 Luesdeni Compend Gr.
 Hippocratis Aphorismi.
 Redi opuscula.
 Muys Praxis.
 Typotii Emblemata cum multis
 Figuris 3 vol 120.
 Aurelius victor variorum.
 Terrence 24.

Rosini Antiquitates
 Testamentum Græcum Leusdeni.
 Palmerii Criticon.
 Magius de Tintinabulis.
 Tacqueti Arithmetica.
 Cæsari Comment. Not. Davissii
 ——— Dicto large Paper Cam.

4to.

Academiae Francofurtanæ ad
 viadrum Encænna secularia
 Oxonii in Theatro Sheldoni-
 ano Ap. 26. Anno Trucdat.
 201, An. Dom. 1706. Ce-
 lebra. Price 1 s. 6 d.

Dr Blackhall's Sermons, 8vo.
 Ld Clarendon's History, in 8vo.
 Puffendorff Introduction, 8vo.
 Eachard's Gazetteer.

The Situation of the Terre-
 strial Paradise, by Huetius.
 Price 1 s. 6 d.

The Life of *Leopold*, late Em-
 peror of *Germany*, &c. Con-
 taining the most remarkable
 Transactions of *Europe*, as
 well relating to the *Turks* as
Christians, for about sixty
 Years; with variety of Orig-
 inal Papers, Letters, Treaties,
 Characters, &c. Pr. 5 s.

Some Testimonies of the most
 Eminent *English* Dissenters,
 as also of Foreign Reformed
 Churches and Divines, con-
 cerning the Lawfulness of
 the Rites and Ceremonies of
 the Church of *England*, and
 the Unlawfulness of separa-
 ting from it, by Dr Wells.
 Price 4 d.

